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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
I Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
REQUEST OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Pursuant to Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Amend the Motion for New 
Trial filed in this Court to consider and include the grounds (a)(1): A new trial should be granted 
because of an irregularity in the proceedings - Ford Motor Company presented false evidence 
pertaining to the door latch defect and perpetrated a fraud on the jury; and because the jury was 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 6 2007 
>y-
coerced into a verdict. The grounds supporting the grant of a new trial are set forth in the 
original moving papers previously filed and in the Reply Memorandum filed herein. 
DATED this 13™ day of April, 2007. 
THOR O. EMBLEM 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
was served upon defendant's counsel at the address listed below, by depositing the same in the 
United States mail, postage pre-paid on the 13TH day of April, 2007. 
Dan Larsen, Esq. 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
THOR O. EMBLEM 
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Addendum 2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 1 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
- 0 O 0 -
DEE CLAYTON, e t a l . , ) 
v s . 
UTAH AUTO 
j e t a l . , 
P l a i n t i f f s , ) C a s e No. 000909522 
) PLAINTIFF 'S MOTION 
) FOR NEW TRIAL 
COLLECTION, ) 
D e f e n d a n t s . ) 
- 0 O 0 -
BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on t h e 7 t h day of May, 
2 0 0 7 , commenc ing a t t h e h o u r of 2 : 3 2 p . m . , t h e a b o v e -
e n t i t l e d 
HONORABLE 
t h e a b o v e 
and t h a t 
I < 
3 3 3 SOUTH Rio GRANDE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM 
m a t t e r came on f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, J R . , s i t t i n g a s J u d g e i n 
- n a m e d C o u r t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s c a u s e , 
t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e h a d . 
- 0 O 0 -
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV - ! 2007 
(Ly. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Oeputy cierk 
ffi DEPOMAXMERIT 
^ ^ ^ ^ B y —"""" LI 11C?A 1 ION o h K V l C h o II 
TOLL FREE 80O337-66 29 
PHONE 801-328-1188 
FAX 801-328-1189 
• A TRADITION O F QUALITY • 
\ »<J\ „ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
DEE CLAYTON, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, ) Case No. 000909522 
vs. ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
) FOR NEW TRIAL 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, ) 
et al., ) 
Defendants. ) 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 7th day of May, 
2007, commencing at the hour of 2:32 p.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., sitting as Judge in 
the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, 
and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
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1 The standard for J.O.N. V. and new trial, as 
2 far as sufficiency of the evidence, is the same 
3 standard under Rule 50 for J.N.O. V., a Rule 59 for the 
4 motion for a new trial. 
5 And the—the court has found—or the—the 
6 Utah Supreme Court has fond that the court, this 
7 court, the trial court must view the evidence in the 
8 light most favorable to the verdict and any evidence 
9 that's in dispute must be resoled in favor of the 
10 verdict. So, unless there's undisputed evidence to 
11 support the movant side and no significant evidence to 
12 support the non-movant side, the motion for a newt 
13 trial must be denied. 
14 The courts have said that new trials should 
15 be granted only in rare cases, only when no reasonable 
16 juror could have found the way that they did; so what 
1V they're asking is that-for the—the Court to find 
18 that six out of the eight jurors, if that's how many 
19 supported the verdict according to the instructions, 
2 0 could not have reasonably found that there was no 
2 1 defect on the door latch. 
2 2 It should be noted that they're only moving 
2 3 for a new trial on the door latch issue, and I think 
2 4 that's because they-they believe that's probably 
2 5 their best ground. 
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1 In the case of Child vs. Ro-or Child vs. 
2 Newsome, which is a Utah Supreme Court case, the Court 
3 said that even if nine witnesses testified at trial 
4 that the light was green and one witness testified at 
5 trial that the light was red, the j uty can believe the 
6 one witness that the light was red and that is 
7 sufficient evidence to support the verdict and they 
8 need not believe the nine. 
9 And here, there was much evidence submitted 
10 to the Court and to the jury on the evidence of 
11 defective door latch, not just where the tangs were on 
12 the open latch. And the trial record and the trial 
13 evidence is the best—is the best evidence of what was 
14 actually presented at trial and I won't try to go 
15 through all of that, but I'm going to try to hit some 
16 of the highlights of that. 
17 First, Dr. Caulfield testified that there 
18 was enough lateral outboard force on that door latch 
19 to create 3,000 pounds of pressure, and that 3,000 
2 0 pounds of lateral force was sufficient to overwhelm 
21 the latch. 
22 As the Court recalls, we offered the FMPSS 
2 3 206 test latch in which they were able to test the 
2 4 latch to failure and it took 3,000 pounds for-for it 
2 5 to fail. 
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1 Gilbert, the plaintiffs' expert, did not | 
2 have any criticism of the relative strength of the 1 
3 corporate mini-latch; in fact, he-he did not have any 1 
4 testimony or opinion that the latch was defective | 
5 because it could be overwhelmed. Instead, his theory I 
6 in this case that he stuck with was that there was rod | 
7 force shortening and basically that, because of crush § 
8 on the front of the A-pillar, that caused the inside i 
9 door rod to push backwards and instructed the latch to | 
10 release, causing the fork bolts to-to come straight I 
11 open. I 
12 And that gets to the point that Dr. I 
13 Caulfield testified about that Mr. Emblem was just I 
14 challenging, and his testimony was that if the latch 
15 was instructed to release, the fork bolts would be in 
16 a fully-opened position, with the tangs of the fork [ 
17 bolts completely hidden by the ends of the fish mouth. 
18 And it was not, in this case, which was evidence 
19 that's consistent with the fact that the latch was 
2 0 forced or torn open and was not opened all the way by 
2 1 activation. I 
2 2 And the evidence of that is not only the I 
2 3 testimony and photographs of Mr. Caulfield, but the— [ 
2 4 the photographs taken by Mr. Gilbert, which were taken 
2 5 two months before Packer Engineering inspected it. 
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1 And let me show you two photographs that 
2 were used on redirect examination of Mr. Caulfield at 
3 trial. You may recall, after Mr. Emblem spent much 
4 time going through each photograph that was taken by I 
5 different experts over the many, many years, this L 
6 thing was photographed and asking Mr. Caulfield, you l 
7 know, isn't this in the fully-opened position and Mr. I 
8 Caulfield would point with his little red laser J 
9 pointer, saying, no, you can see the tang sticking out J 
10 from the edge of the fish mouth in each one of those 
11 pictures that everybody took. 
12 And at Mr. Gilbert's inspection, he likewise I 
13 took photographs of the latch and it's interesting to I, 
14 me, because I was there and I was present and I recall | : 
15 and these photographs also show exactly what happened, |; 
16 and Mr Emblem was—was there as well. L 
17 The first photograph we have, which is j 
18 Exhibit 6 to the Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition j : 
19 and I'll just point it out and this is more easy- 1 
2 0 easy-more easy for the Court to take a look at mine, | 
21 the photograph, is the latch showing the two bolts or I 
2 2 screws that Mr. Emblem's pointed out, with the tang i 
2 3 that's nearest to those, sticking out slightly beyond 
2 4 the edge of the fish mouth and you can't quite see the 
2 5 other pari of the fish mouth, because as he says, the-
6 ( P a g e s 1 8 t o 2 1 ) 
6dbab3e0-1843-11 dc-9490-0011090233a5 
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1 -the sheet metal was pushed over the edge there. 
2 With their next photograph taken by Mr. 
3 Gilbert and what he's done is, he's taken metal pliers 
4 or a device and he moved the fork bolts, he's got to 
5 get them as close as he could to try and get them in 
6 what they call the secondary position, which is the 
7 initial latch position where they-they come together 
8 and they kind of grab the striker of the car when the 
9 door's not all the way shut. And Mr.-in Mr. 
10 Gilbert's report, he explains that-that the-that the 
1 1 latch, he could not get all the way in the secondary 
12 position nor could he get it all the way in the fully-
13 opened position. It was jammed, it was jammed before 
14 Packer Engineering even took a look at it. 
15 And as you remember, at trial, Mr. Gilbert 
16 came with a latch and the latch had been sent to Mr. 
17 Gilbert by Packer Engineering after it had been 
18 removed. And at the removal, Mr. Emblem, Mr. 
19 Engebritson was present, and they videotaped the 
2 0 entire removal process step-by-step and we did it all 
2 1 by stipulation and we were making sure that we were 
2 2 keeping the latch in the same position and—and 
2 3 configuration and we took photographs of the latch 
2 4 immediately after it being removed. We put it on a~a 
2 5 red oil rag and we photographed it and this thing has 
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1 been photographed more a beauty queen, as the Court 
2 knows. And then that latch was taken back and 
3 photographed at Packer Engineering. Then it was sent 
4 to Cau—or to—to Gilbert's office and it was Gilbert 
5 that brought it to trial. 
6 When he presented it at trial, I asked him 
7 on cross-examination, when you found the—when you 
8 inspected the latch, was it in a fully-open position 
9 and he said no, not quite, you couldn't get it into a 
10 fully-open position, it was jammed. It was pinned. 
11 He said it had been trampled on by elephants by—by 
12 being rolled over many times and that it was bent. At 
13 no time did Mr. Gilbert testify that there was any 
14 manipulation in the latch by Packer Engineering from 
15 the time that it was inspected by him, photographed by 
16 Engebritson and by Mr. Emblem and then sent to Packer 
17 and then sent to—on to Technocon, which is his—his 
18 outfit, 
19 There's no testimony at trial, no record 
2 0 evidence in the trial record that there was any 
21 manipulation or fraud or tampering. And what Mr. 
2 2 Gilbert did agree with is that the latch is bent, that 
2 3 the pins that hold the fork bolts in place are out of 
2 4 alignment, that the fork bolts are also mis-aligned 
? 5 because this thing has been internally damaged because 
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1 the frame has been bent and the latch has been bent. 
2 It was his testimony that that all occurred from the 
3 roll-over and that's the trial testimony that was 
4 presented. There's no evidence that Ed Caulfield, 
5 Packer Engineering, Ford Motor Company or its 
6 attorneys, did anything to try to swindle the Court or 
7 to—or swindle the jury into believing that somehow 
8 this latch must have been overwhelmed because now 
9 we've bent it and now you can see-you can see that 
10 we've done that. J 
11 This thing had been photographed by so many 
12 experts, inspected so many times and it's a plain 
13 misrepresentation to the Court by Mr. Emblem to say 
14 that this thing was always in a fully-opened position 
15 because none of the experts say it was always ftilly-
16 open. They may say it was open, it was open enough to 
17 be able to get past the striker and open the door and 
18 that's exactly what Mr. Gilbert said on examination at 
19 trial, when I asked him, Was it fully opened? He said 
2 0 it was open enough to get past the striker but you K 
21 could not get it fully opened because it was pinned. [ 
2 2 And the reason it was pinned was because 
2 3 this thing was overwhelmed. And there's so much more 
2 4 evidence to support the verdict that this was I 
2 5 overwhelmed. This is not the only piece of evidence L 
U 
Page 2 5 | 
1 that supports the verdict. | 
2 As the Court will recall, the latch was bent I 
3 from the striker pulling away from the latch and~do 
4 you have that in front of you? Is this t h e - J 
5 MR. EMBLEM: I have mine. | 
6 MR. LARSEN: If I may approach? L 
7 THE COURT: Oh, of course. f 
8 MR. LARSEN: As the Court can see and the 
9 Court probably recalls that the latch is bent. It's 
10 bent in a position where the striker has pulled out I 
11 from—from the latch. And this would be the front of K 
12 the vehicle, this would be the rear of the vehicle, 1 
13 the striker would be right here, the driver would be I 
14 right here and this would be the outside of the | 
15 vehicle. L 
16 And the reason that this-this is bent or | 
17 misaligned is because of a force on the outside of the | 
18 door pulling on the latch and the little-you can - 1 
19 might remember, there's a little flange on the ends of § 
2 0 the striker that grabs the fork bolts and cause those I 
21 fork bolts to get pulled out and misaligned. And that 1 
2 2 was the testimony that was offered and there's nothing 
2 3 to contradict that. Gilbert— 
2 4 THE COURT: The one I have here in front of 
2 5 me is the actual latch? 
7 ( P a q e s 22 t o 2 5 ) 
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LAW OFFICE OF 
MATTHEW H. RATY, PC 
MEW ENGLAND PROFESSIONAL PLAZA 
9677 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE D 
SANDY, UTAH 84070 
TELEPHONE: (801 495-2252 
FAX:(801)495-2262 
May 14, 2007 
The Honorable Joseph C. Fratto 
Third District Court 
450 So. State Street 
P.O.Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1860 
Re: Clayton, etal., v. Utah Auto Collection, et al. 
Case No. 000909522 
Dear Judge Fratto: 
Enclosed please find an Affidavit of Andrew Gillberg, as well as a Motion and Order for 
Leave to File the Affidavit. 
As you will note, Mr. Gillberg's Affidavit is material to the issues raised in oral argument 
of May 7, 2007, with regard to manipulation of evidence during the trial. 
We appreciate your attention to this matter. 
Yours truly, 
Matthew H. Raty 
MHR/jp 
Enclosures 
cc: Thor Emblem 
Q-\Claytoi)\C\JudgeFratto.<)51407 
Thor O. Emblem (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
LAW OFFICES OF THOR O. EMBLEM 
205 West Fifth Ave., Suite 105 
Escondido, CA 92025 
Telephone: (760) 738-9301 
Fax:(760) 738-9409 
Matthew H. Raty (#6635) 
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW H. RATY, PC 
New England Professional Plaza 
9677 South 700 East, Suite D 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 495-2252 
Fax: (801) 495-2262 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 i 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
FILE AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW 
GILBERG IN SUPPORT OF ORAL 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON MAY 7, 
2007 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Plaintiffs move the Court to file and consider the attached affidavit of Andrew Gilberg in 
support of motion for new trial and argument that was presented on May 7, 2007. The affidavit 
is necessary to rebut under penalty of perjury the factually false statements made concerning Mr. 
Gilberg's inspection by Ford's counsel at oral argument on May 7, 2007. Because the affidavit 
was expedited by facsimile transmittal, Plaintiffs will file the executed original affidavit as soon 
as it is received by Plaintiffs' counsel 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs request this Court issue an order allowing Plaintiffs to file the 
motion and accompanying affidavit and to consider the facts set forth in the affidavit in 
determining whether to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial and Motion to Tax Costs which 
also contends that Ford's door latch expert committed a fraud on the Court.. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2007 
THOR O. EMBLEM 
MATTHEW H.RATY 
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I, Andrew Gilberg, hereby declare: 
1. I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Science from Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute, New York, and a Masters of Science in Mechanical Engineering from 
the University of Michigan. I have more than 35 years professional experience in 
mechanical engineering and was employed by Ford Motor Company from 1971 - 1972 
and from 1973 -1978. From 1986 to present, I have been the owner and General Manager 
of Teknacon and specialize in analysis of unwanted door openings and other mechanical 
failures in automotive accidents. I have testified in many cases on these subjects. 
2. I am completely familiar with this case and I have personally physically 
inspected the Explorer as did both Ford's experts, Thomas Tiede and Ed Caufield. 
3. I testified at trial in the above captioned case in Salt Lake City Utah on 
January 11 and 12,2007. 
4. I am informed and believe that during the motion for new trial hearing in 
this case on May 7,2007, Ford's counsel, Mr. Dan Larsen, represented to the court that I 
had used pliers to move the fork bolts. That statement is a blatant falsehood. 
5. At no time during my testimony did I state or infer that I used pliers or any 
other tool to forcibly move the fork bolts on the Clayton's 1997 Ford Explorer driver's 
door. Indeed, it is, and always has been my practice never to force movement of the fork 
bolt with tools when examining the fork bolt range of movement. Use of tools risks 
altering the evidence. The fork bolts moved freely as stated in my report dated My 1, 
2005. (Exhibit 17 to Motion for New Trial.) 
6. On May 13,2005, the date of my inspection of the subject door latck, 1 
measured inspected and photographed the Clayton Explorer. I found the latch to be fully 
open with the immaterial exception that the upper fork bolt lobe was pushed slightly by the 
bent sheet metal. The door latch was left in the same condition as was memorialised by 
Ford's previous expert, Mr. Thomas Tiede in Mr. Tiede's report. According to Mr. 
Tiede's report, I am informed and believe that he inspected the Explorer on July 15,2002, 
At that time he reported and photographed the latch in an open position. 
7. I am informed and believe that Mr. Caulfield testified that all of the other 
engineers who inspected the Clayton vehicle moved the fork bolts using tools. I do not 
believe that to be true because it would violate the forensic engineer's ethical standards not 
to manipulate the evidence. Additionally, to the best of my knowledge, none of the other 
photographs taken by the other Ford engineers during their vehicle inspections show that 
the fork bolts had ever been moved following the subject accident 
1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Utah that the foregoing is true 
to the best of my recollection 
DATED this day of May , 2007. 
Andrew Gilberg, P.E 
9 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
 l A 
BEFORE ME THIS 14gpAYQF ^ 2 Q ( ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR SAID 
Notary Public, Jackson County, Georgia 
My Commission Expires July 11,2008 
Addendum 4 
DELORES CLAYTON, et. al MINUTE ENTRY 
Case no. 000909522 
V. Judge Fratto 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
The matter is before the court to consider plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File 
Affidavit of Andrew Gilberg in Support of Oral Argument Presented on May 7, 2007. 
New material, the purpose of which is to persuade the court of a disputed fact, submitted 
by one party after briefing and oral argument on motions, should not be considered in deciding 
those motions because the opposing party has no opportunity to respond and be heard. 
Accordingly, the motion is denied. 
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further 
order is required. 
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Addendum 10 
THOMAS TIEDE 
7092 Utde Harbor Drive Huntington Beach, CA 92648 714-536-0794 Fax: 7J 4-960-3944 
£ mall: tomt4@socal.rr.com 
January 30,2003 
Timothy B. Schade, Esquire 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: (Anthony) Clayton, et al. v. Utah Auto Collection, et al. 
Dear Mr, Schade: 
Per your request, I inspected the 1997 Ford Explorer that is the subject of the referenced 
lawsuit, on July 15,2002 in West Jordan, Utah. This vehicle was located at Jack 
Bingham's lot and Mr. Thor Emblem was in attendance. 
On November 27,1998, Mr. Anthony Clayton was driving this vehicle on Interstate 80 
with Kellie Montoya as a front seat passenger. Outside of Evanston, Wyoming, he swerved 
and lost control with a resulting rollover through the median into oncoming traffic lanes. 
The driver door was opened at some point in the rollover event, and he was ejected. 
Background 
My experience in the automotive industry began with my high school at Ford Motor 
Company where I had attended Henry Ford Trade School in the Dearborn Assembly Plant. 
I have worked as a draftsman, apprentice, designer, development engineer, design engineer 
as well as some intermediate positions on my way to Design Analysis Manager, which was 
my position when I left Ford Motor Company in 1983. I had a four year assignment in the 
Mechanical Hardware Department of Body Engineering, as a designer. I have designed 
many of the components and sub-systems associated with door latches. I was also a part of 
the design team that designed the first in-house latch design at Ford Motor for some 1962 
models , as well as the second generation design that was introduced in the 1965 Ford. I 
was asked to investigate the performance of the door latch systems on the Clayton vehicle. 
ffp'ffi I'TF/t'liVi! 
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Inspection 
The Clayton vehicle showed clear evidence of rollover damage and the driver door had 
come open and been crushed against the A-pillar area. The vehicle had experienced severe 
impact to the driver roof side rail during the rollover. The windshield header was caused 
to deform upward as the A-pillar and roof side rail were driven downward. The B-piUar 
was bowed outward by this same impact mechanism. The B-piiiar displacement was 
augmented by the door latch loading. The driver door latch striker is mounted to the B-
pillar and it was forcibly rotated outward by the inertial forces of the driver pushing 
outward on the door. The door latch mounting surface is designed as a plane, but this 
latch plane had been bowed by impact forces. 
The driver door latch was found in a fully open position. This design has an upper and 
lower latch bolt system where both bolts engage the latch striker. Both bolts were fully 
open and had been jammed in place by subsequent impact The entire latch mounting area 
on the rear end of the front door had been impacted while the door was open. This vehicle 
has a tubular steel side beam structure in the door which had overiaid the latch area as the 
door was deformed such that visual access to the latch is limited. 
The inside door handle is positioned below the armrest and is recessed into the normal 
surface of the door trim panel. The door trim panel had been completely broken away 
along with the inside door handle. The forward end of the inside handle actuating rod 
could be seen through the remaining opening, but it would normally be attached to the 
inside handle. The rear end of that actuating rod is attached to linkage on the door latch. 
This Knkage w&s in a free position and was not being actuated. 
Hie outside door handle is a painted, semi-flush design. The handle is attached to the 
outer door panel that had been folded over and crushed during the rollover. There was no 
evidence of ground contact of the outside door handle with the ground. 
TIMOTHY SCHADE, ESCL 
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Opinions 
The Clayton vehicle door latch systems were of good design and manufacture. The lack of 
latch bolt deformation,, and the adjacent latch body condition, indicates that the driver 
(joor latch system had been actuated during the rollover. Much of the residual deformation 
of the door and latch systems occurred after the door opened and impacted the ground. 
The outside door handle played no role in the actuation of the door latch in this accident 
The handle-to-latch relationship had changed dramatically due to the folding of the door. 
The outside handle actuating rod is a compression design, and, it had been displaced in a 
tensile fashion during the rollover impact The door handle showed no evidence of ground 
contact _____ ___ _ 
L
— • ^ ^ 
The inside driver door linkage was most probably actuated during the rollover, jrfae entire / 
door trim panel had been fractured and separated and ££U be seen in the policephotos. «M 
Tie inside door handle was broken away and is not available at this time. The rod to the 
inside handle is attached at the latch end but the forward end of the rod is free. 
The inside door handle system is designed to minimize inadvertent contact It has a 
compression linkage to the latch and the handle is recessed into the door panel. But, it 
must be designed to provide for comfortable access for operating the handle to open the 
door. 
My hourly rate for this case is $250 and I have no publications. 
Please advise if additional review or comment is desired. 
Sincerely, 
Automotive Consulting Engineer 
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1 completely. In other words, no stuck damage to the 
2 striker. 
3 Q. What happens if the latch and the striker are 
4 being pulled apart from each other without the inside 
5 rod being compressed? 
6 A. On the other hand, if you pull them apart due 
7 to overload, whatfs happened is the pawls have a 
8 strong handle on the striker. If you pull them apart 
9 due to overload, bend them, displace them, and then 
10 you overload them, as soon as the striker can escape, 
11 it does. 
12 So it doesn't call for Ml release on the 
13 two pawls. And when it can come scraping out of 
14 there, it will. This is in evidence here, 
15 particularly in that striker. And also the latch that 
16 we have on the panel. They are very significantly 
17 damaged. Which-
18 Q. And I'm gonna hand you whaf s marked as 
19 Exhibit — Plaintiffs Exhibit 334, which has been 
2 0 identified as the Clayton latch. Is that -- are the 
21 fork bolts in that latch in the fully-open position? 
22 A. One is. One is fully open, and the top one 
2 3 is not. 
2 4 THE COURT: Which exhibit, which exhibit are 
2 5 you referring to? 
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1 A. You have a damaged latch, which is 
2 Exhibit 334. These two pawls are tremendously out of 
3 plane. 
4 Q. You mean the fork bolts? 
5 A. Yes, the fork bolts are tremendously out of 
6 plane. I said "pawl," I misspoke. The fork bolts are 
7 out of plane. The latch is basically bowed. It's 
8 usually straight. Opening and closing the latch, as 
9 being portrayed by handle activation, doesn't leave 
10 behind that kind of evidence. 
11 Q. And if the Clayton latch was smashed or 
12 trampled on by elephants after it opened, would it — 
13 after it opened by a foreshortening theory, as 
14 Mr. Gilberg testified, would it be in fully-opened 
15 position, or a partially-opened position, as it is? 
16 A. If - let's take it a step at a time. 
17 Q. And that's a confusing question. Let me 
18 clarify that. Let me just rephrase that one. If, if 
19 the latch is opened, as Mr. Gilberg testified, by 
2 0 inside handle activation compression, would it be in 
21 the position that the Clayton latch is in? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Whynot? 
24 A. If it opened as Gilberg was portraying, as 
2 5 soon as it opens you would have a pristine latch, 
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THE WITNESS: Three thirty-four. 
When they're both released as if it were a 
mechanism activation, meaning handle or 
foreshortening, they will release to a position like 
this. All the front tails are completely hidden. 
This one here — 
THE COURT: That's a different exhibit. What 
number is that? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, Ifm sorry. Which-do 
we have an exhibit number for this? 
MR. LARSEN: That one was admitted. I think 
the tab was pulled off of it. That's 464-A-l. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, thank you. 
MR LARSEN: Which is the exemplar latch. 
THE WITNESS: When it's overloaded - my 
16 point is, it overloads, and overloads, and overloads, 
17 until the striker can just barely escape through the 
latch. And then it ends up getting ripped up, as 
literally it goes to climb under the fence rather than 
open the gate. 
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And when the striker is able 
to escape from overloading, does that leave telltale 
signs? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what signs are those? 
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fully open, and it would look like this latch here. 
Both these leading edges would be hidden underneath 
the side blades. 
Q. Can the striker still pull on the fork bolts 
when it's open? 
A. Striker can't pull on the fork bolts. It's 
completely free. Like I said before, it's like 
8 opening a gate and walking through the gate, compared 
9 to climbing under the fence and scraping yourself to 
10 death. 
11 Now, on the other hand, the Clayton one is 
12 not fully opened. It's still got partial on the top. 
13 Not fully released Even if you accept that it 
14 opened, and looked like this, and got trampled by 
15 elephants? I wouldn't expect it to be bowed in this 
16 fashion outward and have moved the fork bolts, or the 
17 forks at all, into a different position. 
18 This is probably pretty close to the position 
19 it released in. And it's this top guy here that's 
2 0 causing the scraping on that striker. 
21 Q. When you say "top guy" you mean the top fork 
22 bolt? 
23 A. Top fork bolt Or actually it's the bottom 
24 fork bolt if you turn it around. I misspoke. Top has 
25 two screws. This bottom folk bolt — top one is fully 
14 (Pages 50 to 53) 
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1 A. The push test basically, to summarize, the 
2 only thing that's in this case is a displacement from 
3 the A-pillar to the B-pillar of about half an inch. 
4 Gilberts theory is that that displacement of a half 
5 an inch can activate the inside handle rod, push it 
6 more toward the latch, and get the latch to activate. 
7 I've taken this test, pushed back on the 
8 order of 4 inches — not a half an inch, 4 inches — 
9 and canft get the inside handle rod to activate. 
10 Okay? As a matter of fact, it moves in the wrong 
11 direction. From the A-pillar moving to the B-pillar. 
12 So the theory that foreshortening caused the 
13 door to open, from this test — demonstration test and 
14 from the work I've done on the overloading of the 
15 latch, basically I have to discard. You can't open 
16 the door through rod foreshortening because of closure 
17 between the A and the B-pillar. 
18 Q. And in the tests that we just showed with the 
19 video where the arrow is moving apart, that is where 
2 0 you're putting over 8,000 pounds of load on the door 
21 and over 4 inches of crush? 
22 A. That's correct. That's correct. 
23 Q. And that's the video that we actually j ust 
24 saw? 
25 A. Correct. 
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1 compression rod? 
2 A. It wasn't designed to do that. It's designed 
3 to protect occupants in side impact. But it does give 
4 longitudinal, lengthwise, strength to the door. So in 
5 that way it does protect the linkages from moving 
6 relative to one another if the A-pillar moves toward 
7 theB. 
8 Q. Is that because the 214 bar and the 
9 compression rod are basically parallel to each other 
10 inside the door? 
11 A. No. It's because the 214 bar traverses from 
12 the A-pillar back to the B. And basically bridges all 
13 load that tries to cross that path back to the 
14 B-pillar. 
15 Q. There was one more video I think at the end 
16 of this test that demonstrated that the door latch 
17 still worked. Do you recall that video? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. We'll play that video. And if you can 
2 0 just describe what we can see. What are we looking at 
21 now? 
2 2 A. You are looking at exactly the same setup. 
2 3 Now we'll - and everything is still working fine with 
2 4 that amount of crush that we put into it of 4 inches;. 
2 5 There's no bowing of the forks. There's no distortion 
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Q. And I know the, the door is dark. Is that 
why in this lighting it's hard to see that? 
A. It's hard to see it because it's dark, but it 
appears better on the computer. 
Q. Okay. But at the end of that test what we 
would be looking at would be the deformation that we 
see with your tape on Exhibit 475-6-A; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. With — and this tape would show a straight 
line from the top to the bottom of the door? 
A. Correct. The A to B-pillar shortening, A to 
B-pillar shortening just basically crushes the door 
but will not move the inside handle rod. 
Q. And whafs your opinion about the relative 
16 strength of this door system when it comes to 
17 foreshortening? When we put together the A-pillar, 
the 214 bar, and the B-pillar? 
A. That's a pretty strong door. Ifs a strong 
door, and ifs well connected. Primarily coming from 
the 214 beam giving it a lot of its strength. If you 
cut away the 214 beam, you basically have a different 
vehicle. And if you dont bring that into play, you 
wont have as strong of a door. 
Q. And does that 214 beam protect the inside 
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of the forks. The latch still latches and unlatches. 
Now we're gonna active it again with the 
inside handle. And there's the two arrows moving to 
one another. And we'll just take it up and there's 
the door basically popping open. 
So it's still 5/8ths of an inch travel. 
We're activating off the inside handle. Everything 
8 still works fine. But we gave it 4 inches of crush, 
9 not a half inch of crush. 
10 Q. And moving on, was there a time more recently 
11 when the Clayton latch was removed from the Clayton 
12 vehicle? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. And I'm gonna show you whafs marked 
15 as Defendant's Exhibit 477, and ask if you can 
16 recognize that? 
17 A. Yes. This is a photo log of the latch being 
18 taken out. The actual subject latch being taken out 
19 of the Clayton vehicle to — 
When was the latch removed? 
October 27,2006. 
So just last fall? 
Correct. 
Okay. And who removed the latch? 
Kevin Vosburgh did, here in Salt Lake; 
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1 Q. Okay. 
2 MR. LARSEN: And we would move to admit 
3 Defendant's Exhibit 477, which is the photo log of a 
4 latch removal. 
5 THE COURT: Any objection? 
6 MR. EMBLEM: No objection. 
7 THE COURT: Received. 
8 (Defendant Exhibit No. 477 was received.) 
9 Q. (By Mr. Larsen) Dr. Caulfield, just to help 
10 us understand how the latch was removed, can you 
11 describe briefly what Exhibit 477-8 demonstrates? And 
12 let me bring it closer. 
13 A. Yeah. My eyes are shot. Turn it that way. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. And 477-8 is a picture of the Clayton door 
16 before the latch removal. And demonstrated there are 
17 cut marks that we'll make into the metal to basically 
18 take off that top piece of metal so we can get at the 
19 latch to take the latch out of the vehicle. 
2 0 Q. And now I'm going to show you what's marked 
21 as Exhibit 477-16. 
22 A. Okay. There's a photograph ~ 477-16 is a 
2 3 photograph of that piece of metal cut away, exposing 
2 4 the Clayton latch. There's the Clayton latch. Which 
2 5 is the same latch as we have here, which is marked 
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primary. 
When you just closed it but didn't do a good 
job, it's not all the way shut but it's still — you 
4 have to unlatch it to open it, that's the secondary 
5 position. 
6 Q. And is that 206 government standards require 
7 that? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And the test that you performed, though, is 
10 with the latch in the primary, all-the-way-closed 
11 position? 
12 A. That*s correct. 
13 Q. Let me show you what's marked as 
14 Exhibit 470 - well, excuse me, not yet. 
15 Gonna hand you another set of photo logs. 
16 I'm gonna hand you whaf s marked as 478, and ask if 
17 you can identify that? 
18 A. Four seventy-eight is a photo log. It's 
19 comparing a new latch, I believe, to the Clayton 
2 0 latch. 
21 Q. And where was this performed? 
22 A. This was taken at Packer. 
2 3 Q. And was this after the subject removal? 
2 4 A. Yes. 
2 5 MR. LARSEN: Okay. We'd move to admit 478. 
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1 334. There's exactly the same view of the Clayton 
2 latch that we have. 
3 Q. Okay. And where's the inside compression rod 
4 in this photo? 
5 A. Inside compression rod will be right here. 
6 Q. And what position are the fork bolts in? 
7 A. Fork bolts, as I said before, one is - top 
8 one is fully released. Which is that one there. And 
9 the bottom one is partially released. 
10 Q. Okay. And is there a primary and secondary 
11 latch position on these fork bolts? 
12 A. By law there has to be a primary and 
13 secondary position on all door latches. 
14 Q. And for our - for those of us who open doors 
15 every day, can you explain what that means? 
16 A. Did you ever shut the door on your car, it 
17 doesnt shut all the way completely, but it's still 
18 shut? In other words, there's a little gap there. 
19 Sometimes you can go up to it and push it real hard 
20 and get it to shut all the way. That's the secondary 
21 position. 
2 2 And what they have is they have a double 
23 position. If you look at this bottom fork. That 
2 4 clicked into the secondary, and that clicked into the 
25 primary. So when the door is fully shut, it's in the 
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THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. EMBLEM: No objection. 
THE COURT: Four seventy-eight is received. 
(Defendant Exhibit No. 478 was received.) 
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) There's actually a paper 
clip attaching those; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And have you also blown up some of these 
photos so we can look more closely at the latch? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And first of all showing you what's 
marked as Exhibit 478-13-B. Can you identify what 
that is a photo of? 
A. Okay. That's a photograph, after it's 
15 removed from the vehicle, of the Clayton latch. 
16 That's what it is. 
17 Q. Okay. And what does it depict for us that's 
18 significant to your opinion regarding overloading? 
19 A. Okay. The Clayton latch — and I'll show you 
2 0 a comparison to these — is bowed. It's bowed to the 
21 rear of the vehicle. In other words if the latch sets 
up like this in the vehicle, it's bowed like this. 
Bowed out. 
It's bowed, if you will, toward the striker 
25 on the vehicle. The forks are misaligned. The 
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latch -
Q. When you say "misaligned," what do you mean? 
A. Well, these forks should be running parallel. 
In other words, it's just like a scissors. They're 
basically pulled toward the striker. In other words, 
they're no longer on parallel paths. Since it's 
bowed, that axis is going up, this axis is going down. 
8 And there's no longer alignment between the upper and 
9 the lower fork. 
10 Q. When you say "axis," can you identify what 
11 you mean by the axis that you are pointing to? 
12 A. The axis these forks pivot on are underneath 
13 the springs. That's the release spring for the fork. 
14 Q. And is that basically a pivot pin? 
15 A. And that basically is a pivot pin. There's 
1 6 one for the upper and one for the lower. What's 
17 happened is the latch is basically spread in this 
18 fashion. And these two latch pins are now moving up 
19 and down, this way and this way. So these two forks 
20 are no longer moving parallel. 
21 Q. Okay. Fm gonna show you what's — 
22 A. In this window here, down here in this lower 
2 3 window, the mechanisms here are overlapping. So 
2 4 there's damage to the latch down in this part. Damage 
25 to the latch in this part. The latch is pretty well 
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1 Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And now I'm gonna show you 
2 what's marked as Exhibit 478-37. Is that basically 
3 just the other side of those two latches to compare? 
4 A. Yeah. This is the other side of the story, 
5 so to speak. There's the new latch. And look at the 
6 amount of bowing that's on the Clayton latch. There's 
7 what I meant when we talked about misalignment of the 
8 forks. See how the forks are running parallel in the 
9 new latch? And how they're totally misaligned, due 
10 t o -
11 THE COURT: I think we need to proceed as a 
12 question and answer, in that format. 
13 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
14 THE COURT: Let's proceed that way. 
15 Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And before I show these to 
16 the jury I'm gonna show you what's marked as photos 
17 956-A and 956-B. If you can describe what these 
18 photos are basically of, without describing any 
19 details? 
20 A. What I've done is I've taken the test piece 
21 we have from the 206 test where I overloaded the 
2 2 latch, compared it to the subject latch, and compared 
23 it to an exemplar latch which wasn't tested at all. 
24 MR LARSEN: Move to admit 956-A and 956-B. 
2 5 MR EMBLEM: No objection. 
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1 mangled. 
2 Q. Now, is that damage that's consistent with 
3 overloading, or j ust ground damage? 
4 A. This latch is inside the door. This latch is 
5 the over — or this damage is clearly the overloading, 
6 because we can repeat that. This is inside the latch. 
7 So this has to be damage due to the overload of the 
8 latch. There's two parts coming together here that 
9 aren't even close to the original construction. 
10 Q. And I'm showing you what's marked as 
11 Exhibit 478-41. Can you describe what you are 
12 demonstrating in that photo? 
13 A. Let me see it closer. 
14 MR EMBLEM: The number again? 
15 THE WITNESS: It's 478-41. 
16 MR EMBLEM: Thank you. 
17 THE WITNESS: This is a - put it back up. 
18 It's a new latch for comparison purposes. Compared to 
19 the Clayton latch over here on the right Clayton 
2 0 latch is basically bowed. The new latch is basically 
21 straight up and down. So it demonstrates the bowing. 
2 2 Repeating, there's the Clayton latch still in 
23 the locked position. This latch is also in the locked 
24 position. It's just a back view of a new latch 
25 compared to the Clayton latch. 
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1 THE COURT: Received. 
2 (Defendant Exhibit Nos. 956-A and 956-B were 
3 received.) 
4 Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And first, Dr. Caulfield, 
5 can you describe what 956-B demonstrates? 
6 A. Yes. Nine fifty-six-B, the first one, is the 
7 test that I told you about where we ran the latch to 
8 overload for FMVSS 206. 
9 Q. And that's the exhibit right in front of you? 
10 A. Right. We got around 3,000 pounds. 
11 Q. Which exhibit is that? 
12 A. Four sixty-four-B-one. Which we call the 
13 transverse test. 
14 This is the subject latch. So there's the 
15 Clayton latch. And this is a new exemplar. What 
16 we're showing here on the subject latch is bowed 
17 toward the striker, if you will. 
18 The transverse test is bowed. Not to the 
19 same degree, because it didn't have quite the same 
2 0 direction of pull that the subject latch did. 
21 And the exemplar latch is straight. 
2 2 We're also noting the direction of the pivot 
2 3 pins for the forks. The transverse test has 
2 4 misaligned pivot pins. The subject has misaligned 
25 pivot pins. That's where these forks pivot about. 
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1 will mark the Tiede report, place it in front of the 
2 witness, and ask him if he relied on it, and if he says he 
3 didn't rely on it, it will not be discussed and won't go 
4 in the record. But I also will ask him about photographs 
5 taken by Tom Tiede. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I suppose you're entitled to 
7 see if there's the foundation that I've outlined with the 
8 witness, so I'll permit that. You may inquire in terms of 
9 laying foundation. 
10 Actually, I think because the jury is not here 
11 that rather than have them exposed, if you will, to that 
12 exchange, let's have Dr. Caulfield come in and see if the 
13 foundation is laid there. 
14 (Dr. Caulfield returns to the courtroom.) 
15 THE COURT: Dr. Caulfield have a seat, please. 
16 Before we do that, because we're going to have 
17 this questioning, I think it's bad form, if you will, that 
18 there's a lot of movement in the well, or even anywhere in 
19 the courtroom during the examination. I think we should 
2 0 pay everyone the courtesy of keeping quiet and allowing 
21 the examination to proceed rather than moving around and 
22 distracting from that. And thafs how I would like 
2 3 everyone to proceed. 
2 4 I have Dr. Caulfield. Mr. Emblem, you may 
2 5 cross-examine. 
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1 A I still have that opinion, yes. 
2 Q Mr. Tiede was a Ford engineer; isn't that 
3 correct? 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q And he worked in the very department where those 
6 door latches were developed; isn't that correct? 
7 A I believe that's correct. I haven't traced his 
8 history, but I believe that's true. 
9 Q But nonetheless you have a different opinion 
10 concerning that? 
11 A Concerning how the door opened? 
12 Q Yes. 
13 A Well, unequivocally, yes, I do have a different 
14 opinion. 
15 Q And you reviewed the photographs taken by Thomas 
16 Tiede; is that correct? 
17 A I don't know if I reviewed the photographs or 
18 not. I pretty much did my own work. 
19 Q Would you disagree with the contents of the 
2 0 photographs taken by Thomas Tiede? 
21 A I don't know how to answer. A photograph is a 
2 2 photograph. I think the content speaks for itself. I 
2 3 just didn't rely on his photographs. 
2 4 MR EMBLEM: Okay. So we would move for the 
2 5 exhibit, Your Honor. 
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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. EMBLEM: 
3 Q Good morning, Dr. Caulfield. I'm going to place 
4 an exhibit in front of you that's been marked as 
5 Plaintiffs Exhibit 396 titled, "Thomas Tiede," T-i-e-d-e. 
6 Have you seen that document before, sir? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Did you consider the contents of the report of 
9 Thomas Tiede, dated January 30, 2003, in arriving at your 
10 opinions that you've expressed before the jury in this 
11 case? 
12 A I haven't relied on his report or opinions to 
13 arrive at mine, but I reviewed his report as background. 
14 Q Did you consider his opinion that the interior 
15 door handle rod could have actuated this latch causing the 
16 door to open? 
17 A I read that in his report, if that's what you 
18 mean by "consider it." And I eliminated it from the 
19 possibilities. 
2 0 Q And you expressed your opinion to this j ury that 
2 1 this door in the Ford Explorer cannot open in that 
22 fashion? 
23 A Which fashion? 
2 4 Q By foreshortening of the door, fore-to-aft rod 
25 operation? 
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MRLARSEN: Same objection. I think the 
foundation has not been laid. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Dr. Caulfield, you may step down, please watch your step. 
THE WITNESS: Go out again? 
6 THE COURT: Well, maybe we'll leave you right 
7 there because we are going to have the jury come in. This 
8 gives everyone maybe about two minutes here so we can be 
9 ready for the examination. We are in session. 
10 MR O'NEILL: Your Honor, for clarification, 
11 when things are being displayed, is it permissible to walk 
12 not in the well but back, or do you want permission first 
13 even in the back of the courtroom? 
14 THE COURT: I'll give you permission - I think 
15 so that everyone is not moving around. I mean, one is 
16 entitled, at least when questioning the witness and is 
17 handling that aspect of it, to move where they can see 
18 what's happening. You don't have to seek permission for 
19 that. I think everyone else should remain pretty well 
2 0 seated and let the examination continue without — we'll 
21 pay the courtesy, I think, to both sides. 
22 MR. O'NEILL: Thank you. 
2 3 (Jury enters.) 
2 4 THE COURT: The jury has returned into the 
2 5 courtroom. Cross-examination, Mr. Emblem? 
o wx*. >u?<^fc&/im'&m&*miM&<^\^mm!^. l^m^-^'r^i^^iyjimi^^M-X' \ H &•'*&?,* yH> */!*«;**?3 
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1 you put it in drive and it starts rolling — I j ust want 
2 to get it straight 
3 A Doors have to be closed, wheels rolling. 
4 Q Now, in this photograph 478-29 we also see an 
5 exemplar latch, the opening in the fish mount looks like 
6 the latch all the way open? 
7 A That's correct. 
8 Q And I believe that you said in your sworn 
9 testimony yesterday that if the Clayton latch was all the 
10 way open, like that, that would be evidence of rod 
11 operation? 
12 A That's correct. 
13 Q And the Clayton latch, in your photograph, 
14 depicts a different position than all the way open, as you 
15 described. 
16 A It's short of all the way open. 
17 Q One side is all the way open, but the lower side 
18 lacks a little bit? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q And we can tell up from down because there's two 
21 mounting holes at the top of the latch, and only one 
2 2 mounting hole at the bottom? 
2 3 A That's right. 
2 4 Q This is 477-8. I'll show you that. Are you 
2 5 familiar with that? 
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1 Q I'm going to mark one of those 328 — 328 A and 
2 place that in front of you. 
3 (Exhibit 328A marked for identification.) 
4 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Now in the Morse test conducted 
5 by Andrew Giiberg, the effect of what you call point 
6 loading — is this true, what we're looking at right here? 
7 A That's correct. 
8 Q And the inside of the door is pushed out, oh, 
9 right about between the door handle and the latch; is that 
10 correct? 
11 A Correct 
12 Q So that's about between — can you see that?-
13 between the door handle and the latch. In this area right 
14 here? 
15 A Thafs correct. 
16 Q And ifs your testimony that Mr. Clayton would 
17 not have been able to push on that exact spot? 
18 A You can't push on an exact spot. That's point 
19 loading. He'll distribute across the door. 
2 0 Q So you would expect a different shape in the 
21 door once ifs bent out than we see here? It wouldn't be 
2 2 quite as sharp? 
2 3 A For point loading compared to body loading, yes. 
2 4 Q In fact, there's no bow-out in the Clayton 
2 5 vehicle? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q On 477-8 this was - your testimony, I believe, 
3 was this was just before you cut the latch out. 
4 A Correct. Or unscrewed the latch. We cut the 
5 metal and unscrewed the latch. 
6 Q And in this photograph, can you see that that 
7 bottom - what do you call it? 
8 A It's a fork tooth. 
9 Q Fork tooth. The bottom fork tooth is not fully 
10 opened? 
11 A Fully opened, correct. 
12 Q And that was the condition j ust before you sawed 
13 the latch out? 
14 A Correct. 
15 Q Would you use your laser there to point out that 
16 exact spot that's important? 
17 A Yeah. Turn the picture over, if you will. Cue 
18 more time. Okay. Now it's up and down correct. There's 
19 the tooth right there which is not fully released. 
2 0 Q The tooth - we talked about the Morse testing. 
21 I'm going to put Exhibit 328 in front of you that's been 
2 2 admitted. And those are the photographs — you can look 
23 at them - of the Morse test done by Andrew Giiberg. Do 
2 4 you recognize that to be true? 
2 5 A Yes. 
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1 A I disagree with that. It's clearly pulled away 
2 from the anchor where the striker anchors to the hitch. 
3 It's deformed there. And it is bowed out at that 
4 location. 
5 MR. EMBLEM: We'll mark the next photo in this 
6 series 328B. 
7 (Exhibit 328B marked for identification.) 
8 MR. EMBLEM: May I display 328B? 
9 THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
10 MR. LARSEN: No objection. I think it's been 
11 admitted for demonstrative purposes. 
12 THE COURT: This 328B is a photograph within 
13 another exhibit. 
14 MR, EMBLEM: Within 328. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I'm not quite sure why you 
16 won't display the actual photograph. 
17 MR. EMBLEM: Because it's this large. 
18 THE COURT: It's a blowup. You may display it. 
19 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) There we go. 328B is 
2 0 displayed. And in this case, you see, sir, that the — 
21 first time I've asked you this: You didn't do this test? 
22 A No. 
23 Q And you haven't done a test like this? 
2 4 A Giiberg did this test, and I haven't done one 
25 like it. 
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1 A That would be me. 
2 Q And that shows that little tang in the opening? 
3 A Let me see. My one eye isn't that good. That 
4 shows the tang. 
5 Q So those — that kind of highlights one of the 
6 main pieces of evidence that it didn't open by rod 
7 operation? 
8 A Thafs not the main piece. The main piece is 
9 the striker. That's a corroborating piece. 
10 Q The other thing that you mentioned as being 
11 evidence, which is 478-37, was the fact that the jaws were 
12 no longer parallel? 
13 A You mean the forks? 
14 Q The forks. 
15 A The forks are no longer parallel. They're 
16 misaligned. 
17 Q And that misalignment, then - referring to 
18 here, right? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q ~ was another piece of evidence that 
21 corroborated your belief that the door did not open with 
2 2 rod operation? 
23 A That's correct. 
24 Q And then you've got an exhibit, 956B, where 
2 5 you've compared the subject latch, the Clayton latch, with 
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1 Q Okay. And the fact that the B pillar is bowed 
2 as it's bowed? 
3 A The B pillar is bowed outward. 
4 Q And did you take into consideration the fact 
5 that the roof received an impact above the B pillar? 
6 A I realized that, but it didn't load the striker. 
7 Q But did it bend the B pillar? 
8 A It bent the B pillar outward. 
9 Q And when you pulled on the striker in 471 -5, you 
10 pulled the pillar outward and rotated it? 
11 A No, we just rotated the striker. We didn't pull 
12 the pillar outward. 
13 Q You didn't bend the pillar outward? 
14 A Let me check. No, I don't think we did. 
15 THE COURT: You're referring to which exhibit? 
16 THE WITNESS: I'm referring to 475. 
17 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) The latch pin is attached to 
18 the pillar kind of like Fve stuck it in this cup? 
19 A We're on something different now? 
2 0 Q The latch pain, the striker. 
21 A Well, a little bit stronger than that. 
22 Q Okay. But the pillar is tubular in shape? 
23 A It's rectangular. 
2 4 Q Rectangular in shape. 
25 A It'sabox. 
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1 an exemplar, correct? 
2 A That's correct. The subject latch and a new 
3 exemplar. 
4 Q And your reason for pointing out in the Clayton 
5 latch evidence that the door didn't open by foreshortening 
6 was this misalignment in this center photograph? 
7 A Well, thafs one of the pieces. The misaligned 
8 pin, the bowed latch, they're all evidence of overload. 
9 Q Right, and the third thing was the latch pin? 
10 A The latch pin? 
11 Q Well, you said it was - the latch pin was the 
12 other piece of evidence. 
13 A The tong that wasn't folly released from the 
14 fork is another piece of evidence. 
15 Q What do you close the door on? What do you call 
16 that? 
17 A The striker. You were calling it the latch pin, 
18 I call it the striker. That's the biggest piece of 
19 evidence. 
20 Q Some people call it latch pin, right? 
21 A Ithinkso. 
22 Q And that was your 470-34. A component of that 
2 3 was rotation, correct? 
2 4 A The striker being rotated out 25 degrees, that's 
2 5 the biggest piece of evidence. 
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1 Q And if you put weight on the top of it and push 
2 it down, is there any possibility that the weight coming j 
3 down on the top of that pillar, rectangular in shape, will | 
4 also rotate it? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Noway? 
7 A No. 
8 Q But if you add a rearward component, it starts 
9 to push that latch pin out, as Mr. Gilberg has testified 
10 to. Wouldn't that actually create that? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Noway? 
13 A The loads came. in through the latch pin, not on 
14 the other side of it. 
15 Q There's a few more photographs I want to show 
16 you. I'm going to put 467 in front of you again. 
17 A I think these are yours from Gilberg. 
18 Q These go in the Morse test. Well put them 
19 back. 
2 0 Inspection photos taken by — it was taken by 
21 Mr. Bosburgh, right? 
2 2 A Correct, on July 21st, 2005. 
2 3 Q Exhibit 467 - we put little tabs on them so 
2 4 they're easy for you to find. We're going to start with 
2 5 this one here. 
2 1 ( P a g e s 7 8 t o 8 1 
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1 Q. And when you open the latch it looks like 
2 that, correct? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. Okay. That's 464-A-l. Now, we can see the 
5 fork bolt up here, can't we? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. And over here? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 A. But they're both always tucking down below 
11 these edges. And in the Corrigan pictures it's still 
12 sticking up. In our pictures and Gilberg's pictures 
13 it's still sticking up. It moves from inspection to 
14 inspection by the experts. 
15 Q. This 464-A-l that you brought with you today 
16 is another mini latch, just like the Clayton latch; 
17 isn't that true? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. So when these two pins line up here in the 
2 0 center, that's all the way open, those two pins One 
21 up in the center? 
22 A. Say that again. 
23 Q. Right here in the center, these two pins 
2 4 right here that we saw here in the Corrigan 
2 5 photographs? 
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1 THE WITNESS: It had to b e -
2 THE COURT: Dr. Caulfield, there's an 
3 objection. I need to have pause to deal with that.. 
4 Your objection? 
5 MRLARSEN: Argumentative. 
6 THE COURT: Sustained. 
7 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) I'm gonna show you 320-D. 
8 These were admitted this morning. These are 
photographs of an inspection done by Mr. Vosburgh, of 
your company. 
A. Okay. 
MR EMBLEM: Three twenty-D, please. 
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Do you remember, in the 
photographs we looked at this morning, Mr. Larsen and 
I were out front when Mr. Vosburgh was taking the 
16 photographs from inside the parking garage? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 MR. EMBLEM: Three twenty-D? Okay. Can we 
2 0 close in on the door latch? Right there. Back up a 
21 little. 
22 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Is that door latch fully 
2 3 open? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. No? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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A. I judge it more whether that nose is tucked 
under that side piece, rather than looking at the 
center location. 
Q. Yeah. So you've changed your testimony then 
about the latch being jammed and it won't move? 
6 A. No. You can forcibly move it. It is jammed. 
7 Q. Well, I'm sorry. I don't quite understand 
8 you. Are you saying that when Mr. Vosburgh went to 
9 the site in July of'05 that he moved it and then took 
10 a picture of it? 
11 A. Fm saying all the experts can move these. 
12 It is jammed. They can forcibly move them. But I can 
13 show you from picture to picture that you can force 
14 the movement of these. Tm gauging that it was in 
15 this position that we have from the damage on the 
16 striker. That's where it had to be. 
17 Now, if you want to force this or put a tool 
18 on there, you can move it. But the experts are moving 
19 these to see how jammed they are from inspection to 
2 0 inspection. 
21 Q. You weren't there. Youdon*tknowifthe)^ 
2 2 moved them. You are just making that wild guess. 
) 2 3 Admit it. 
j 24 A. I'm not making a wild guess. 
2 5 MR. LARSEN: Objection, argumentative. 
1 
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A. See the tab? 
Q. It's a little fuzzy because we've blown it up 
quite a bit, but isn't it true that these two pins are 
lined up exactly? 
A. Well, there's a tab sticking its nose up 
right there. That will tell you immediately it's not 
tucked in under here, under the side plate, so it's 
not fully open. Same thing ~ 
Q. Well, it's sticking out over here too, isn't 
it? 
A. Same thing with the top. They should be 
completely snugged away. 
Q. Isn't it true that the sheet metal has been 
14 torn along here? 
15 A. I don't think so. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A . I think that the latch has slid down a bit. 
18 MR. EMBLEM: Okay. Then we go to 320-E. 
19 Three twenty-E. Would you close in on that, please? 
2 0 Okay, back out just a little. Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Is that the same? 
A. I don't know if it's the same picture. Same 
answer. It's not fully open. 
MR. EMBLEM: Three twenty-F. Yeah, they 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2 5 don't ~ let me go back. Let me go back to E one more 
2 9 ( P a c r e s 1 0 9 t o 1 1?) 
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1 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) This is a photograph taken 
2 by Mr. Vosburgh on July, is it 5th, 2005? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And it's your testimony that the sheet metal 
5 on this side over here has not been deformed and does 
6 not explain the appearance of that little cog in that 
7 upper window? 
8 A. Say that again. 
9 Q. Is it your testimony — a moment ago you 
10 couldn't remember that the sheet metal was torn. Does 
11 this help you recall that the sheet metal was torn in 
12 the side of that latch opening? 
13 A. I don't think it's torn. First you said 
14 deformed. It is deformed. I don't believe it's torn. 
15 But the sheet metal I was talking about is that latch 
16 sheet metal which that nose has to stick down below. 
17 There's a rim on that latch. Not the sheet metal on 
18 the vehicle. 
19 Q. I'm gonna show you a photograph that's been 
2 0 marked as Exhibit 541. Do you recognize that as being 
2 1 a photograph of the Clayton door? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q, And if s focused on the latch; is that 
2 4 correct? 
25 A. Focused from below into the latch, yes. 
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1 Q. Did you — do you have any reason to believe 
2 that Mr. James moved those fork bolts around? 
3 A. I can't show where he did from photograph to 
4 photograph. I can only show that they are being moved 
5 around by the experts, in and out, under tremendous 
6 resistance because they're bound. 
7 Q. Tm gonna show you two photographs that have 
8 been marked as Plaintiff s 302-AA and 302-BB. I'll 
9 ask you if you recognize those photographs being 
10 photographs of the Clayton automobile door and latch? 
11 A. I recognize them. 
12 Q. All right. And that latch is the focus of 
13 your investigation; is that correct? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 MR. EMBLEM: All right. Your Honor, 
16 plaintiffs would move 302-AA and 302-BB. 
17 THE COURT: Any objection? 
18 MR. LARSEN: Foundation, cumulative. 
19 THE COURT: Overruled. HI receive P-302-AA 
20 and 302-BB. 
21 (Plaintiff Exhibit Nos. 302-AA and 302-BB were 
2 2 received.) 
23 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Do you know an engineer 
2 4 named Ragan? 
25 A. Larry Ragan? Yes. 
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1 MR EMBLEM: Your Honor, plaintiffs would 
2 move Exhibit 541. 
3 MR. LARSEN: Objection, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: It'sP-541? 
5 MR EMBLEM: Right. 
6 MR LARSEN: Objection, foundation, 
7 cumulative. 
8 THE COURT: Overruled. I'll receive P-541. 
9 (Plaintiff Exhibit No. 541 was received.) 
10 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Okay. May I see that for a 
11 second? 
12 A. Sure. 
13 Q. Do you know an engineer named James that made 
14 an inspection on behalf of Ford Motor Company? 
15 A. Yes, I know of him. I didn't know he was on 
16 the case. 
17 Q. You have the photograph in front of you. 
18 Mr. James' photograph. Do we see that the, the inside 
19 of the fork bolts are completely aligned as the latch 
20 is folly open? 
21 A. I don't think the fork bolts are completely 
2 2 aligned. I think they're still misaligned and always 
j 2 3 have been. You don't have the right view for it to 
2 4 determine that, as they show up in this physical 
2 5 evidence I have here of the latch. 
^^^^^^^mi^mi^msmim^^^^mmem^mm^^mmim^i 
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1 Q. I want to get his name right. Larry Ragan. 
2 You recall him? 
3 A. I'm sorry? 
4 Q. You recall his name is Larry Ragan? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. He's an engineer? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Do you recall that he was assigned to do an 
9 investigation in this case? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 MR. EMBLEM: Are we looking at 302-AA? 
12 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Mr. Ragan's photographs, 
13 taken February 3,2003. Isn't it true, sir, that that 
14 door latch is wide open? 
15 A. Is that his photo? 
16 Q. Do you have it there in front of you? 
17 A. Was it 302-AA? No, 302-BB. 
18 MR. EMBLEM: Do you have BB up? 
19 OLAV EMBLEM: AA. 
20 THE WITNESS: It's not that one either. 
21 Which one is Ragan's? 
22 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) The 302s. 
23 A. Well, that's not the photo up on the -
2 4 THE COURT: Let's avoid the - questions and 1 
2 5 answers, that's all we want to entertain here. § 
3 1 ( P a g e s 1 1 7 t o 1 2 0 ) 
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M PACKER 
E N G I N E E R I N G 
September 15,2005 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Mr. Dan Larsen 
SneU&WilmerLLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Re: Clayton et al v Utah Auto Collection (Ford Motor Company) 
Packer Engineering Project No. 102342 
Case No. 35577.1124 
Dear Mr. Larsen: 
The following constitutes a report regarding the above captioned matter, hi preparation for this report my 
review has included the material contained in Appendix A. Also attached is my curriculum vitae. In 
addition to this activity, Packer Engineering personnel inspected the subject 1997 Ford Explorer on July 
21, 2005 and also an exemplar 1998 Ford Explorer on September 12, 2005. All my conclusions and 
opinions contained in the report are stated to a high degree of engineering certainty based on my analysis 
of this file material and engineering analysis to date as well as my background, training, and experience. 
The background surrounding this incident may be stated as follows. A 1997 Ford Explorer was traveling 
eastbound on 1-80 when it drifted off the road into the median and lost control. Subsequently, the Ford 
Explorer rolled over multiple times before coming to rest in the westbound lanes of travel on 1-80. The 
driver was ejected during the rollover collision. 
I have drawn the following opinions and conclusions regarding this matter: 
L The driver's door came open during the rollover as a result of collision related forces, including 
loading from the unrestrained driver impacting the door outward Damage to the inner door panel 
supports the fact that there was high occupant loading to the door. The physical evidence of the 
subject door latch demonstrates there was overload in a bending direction about the horizontal 
axis of the latch plate which caused the pawl mechanism to be misaligned with the fork bolts 
allowing the fork bolts to move freely. Some of the residual deformation causing this condition 
remains. Due to interaction between fee door and the ground after fee door opened during the 
rollover event, some of the physical deformation to fee latch and door was changed and obscured. 
2. The striker on the subject vehicle also exhibits evidence of excessive occupant loading. The 
overload evidence on the striker consists of approximately 25*30 degrees of outward residual 
rotation caused by occupant loading to the door with the latch connected to the striker. 
P.O. Box 353 (60566-0353) 
1950 N. Washington St (60563-1366) 
Napervilfe, IL 
630.505.5722 Fax: 630,505.1986 
www.packereng.com 
6700 Alexander BeH Drive 
Suite 100 
Columbia, MD 21046 
443.545.2000 Fax: 443.545.2001 
www.packereng.com 
1050 Highland Drive 
Suite B 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48108-2262 
734.786.5000 Fax: 734.786.50D1 
www.packereng.com 
Mr. Dan Larsen 
September 15, 2005 
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3. The door did not come open due to a foreshortening of the door resulting in the inside handle 
compression rod movement. There is no evidence of longitudinal loading to the driver's door 
during this lateral rollover event The driver's door opening is foreshortened residually by 
approximately lAtf at the top hinge level and is increased by an equal amount at the lower hinge 
level. This is due to collision damage to the vehicle's roof structure occurring during the rollover 
collision. There is no evidence of outside handle activation due to ground contact 
4. The driver's door inside handle is missing from the vehicle. Activation of the inside handle 
during the rollover collision would also result in actuation of the latch allowing the door to open. 
This situation is a possibility, though less likely, scenario of how this door came open during this 
rollover collision. 
In summary, I find no defects in the subject 1997 Ford Explorer from the manufacturing or design 
standpoints. The vehicle is safe and not unreasonably dangerous as it relates to the areas investigated by 
tin's author. 
This concludes my report to date. My investigation into this matter continues. If new information 
becomes available, I will give it consideration. If I arrive at additional opinions or if my opinions change, 
I will notify you immediately and modify my report accordingly. 
If you need any additional information or need further clarification, please contact me. 
Sincerely, 
PACKER ENGINEERING, INC. 
Edward M Caulfielo^ml)., P.E. 
President and Chief Technical Officer 
EMC/cls 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO FORD'S 
LIMINE MOTION NO. 26 
TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO 
WITNESSES NOT CALLED BY FORD 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF FORD'S 
EXPERT DOOR LATCH ENGINEER THOMAS TIEDE'S OPINIONS ON 
THE CAUSE OF THE DOOR OPENING SINCE MR. TIEDE'S OPINIONS 
WERE RELIED UPON BY FORD'S NEW DOOR LATCH EXPERT, ED 
CAUFIELD, IN FORMING HIS EXPERT OPINION IN THE CASE. 
Ford first hired Thomas Tiede, a former Ford engineer to inspect the Clayton Explorer 
and provide an expert opinion regarding the cause of the door opening in the rollover. In some 
critical aspects, Mr. Tiede does not disagree with the opinions of Plaintiffs' door latch 
engineering expert, Andrew Gilberg. Ford's then hired another expert, Ed Caufield to provide 
FILEB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
N0V2 9 2P06 
SALT LAKE O 
* — 
1 
them with a different opinion. Mr. Caufield relied on Mr. Tiede's photographs taken and 
reviewed Mr. Tiede's report and considered it in forming his expert opinion. (See, Exhibit A, p. 
8, 9, 16, 18, 20 22-24.) Mr. Caufield agreed with Mr. Tiede as to some aspects of the Tiede 
report, but disagreed with him on the roof crush contributing to the door opening (Exhibit A, p. 
20) and the lack of bolt deformation. (Exhibit A, pp. 23, 24.) Unlike Tiede, Mr. Caufield did not 
know whether the exterior handle activating rod had been displaced in a tensile fashion. (Exhibit 
A, p. 24-25.) 
The circumstances in this case are different than those cited in Hoffman v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004). In that case, the court refused to give a "missing 
witness" instruction and allow an adverse inference from an expert not called at trial. Because 
the expert was not called, there could be no adverse inference. Here, however, since Ford's own 
expert relied on Tiede's photographs and report in part and in forming his opinion, Plaintiffs 
have a right to examine Caufield on the differences of opinion and should be free to comment on 
Ford's decision to rely on Mr. Caufields' opinion rather than Mr. Tiede's. MUJI No. 2.13 
permits Plaintiffs to demonstrate the surrounding circumstances as to how an opinion was 
made.1/ (See Exhibit B.) Consequently, Ford's Motion should be denied. 
Dated: November 28, 2006. Respectfully submitted. 
THOR O. EMBLEM 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
1
 Ford may state that Plaintiffs have made a similar motion, Plaintiffs' Limine Motion 
No. 21. However, Plaintiffs experts never relied on anything Larry Kashur did in forming their 
opinion. 
Exhibit A 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Page 1 J 
No. 000909522 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, 
et al., 
DISCOVERY DEPOSITION OF 
EDWARD M. CAULFIELD, Ph.D., P.E. 
FEBRUARY 17, 2006 
9:00 A.M. 
The deposition of EDWARD M. CAULFIELD, 
Ph.D., P.E., called for examination, taken before WENDY 
M. STRICKLER, a Notary Public within and for the County 
of cook, State of Illinois, and a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter of said state, at 3031 Finley Road, Downers 
Grove, Illinois, on the 17th day of February, A.D., 
2006, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
RSA/VERITEXT COURT REPORTING COMPANY 
1845 Walnut Street, 15th Floor 
^^^^^^W^mWA^^^'^^J^^.a .W'fiJfWflttWWiari^fr^^ 
(215) 241-1000 (888) 777-6690 
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1 Q. What was your area of expertise in that case? 
2 A. Mechanical engineering and mechanical 
3 metallurgy. 
4 Q. What was the part involved? 
5 A. The car involved was a Mustang, older Mustang, 
6 probably in the 70s. And the allegation was the rear 
7 hanger bracket for the rear bumper valence puncturing 
8 the tank 
9 Q. 70s, was that similar in any way to the 
10 exploding gas tank in the, what was it, do you remember 
11 what I am talking, in the early70s, the Ford? 
12 MR- LARSEN: Pinto? 
13 MR. EMBLEM: Pinto. Is that a similar issue 
14 as the Ford Pinto? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. On April 18,2005, in Edwardsville, Missouri, 
17 you gave testimony in Jablonski, is that misspelled or 
18 J-a-b-1-o-n-k-s-i or should it be s-k-i? 
19 A. Probably is s-k-i. 
20 Q. — versus Ford. Did you work for Ford or its 
21 attorneys in that case? 
22 A. I worked for Ford or their attorneys. 
23 Q. What was your area of expertise? 
24 A. Mechanical engineering as well as mechanical 
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1 case? 
2 A Yes, I did. 
3 Q. What was your area of expertise? 
4 A. Mechanical engineering and mechanical 
5 metallurgy. 
6 Q. What was the part involved? 
7 A. The part involved was a roof, Mustang vehicle. 
8 Q. Was that a "roof crushed" case? 
9 A. Not as generic as that It was rear roof 
10 header impact and crush. 
11 Q. Rollover? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. On February 25, 2005, in Wheaton, Illinois, a 
14 case called Freedle, F-r-e-e-d-i-e, versus Ford, did you 
15 give testimony in that case? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys? 
18 A Yes, I did. 
19 Q. What was your area of expertise? 
20 A. It would have been mechanical engineering and 
21 mechanical metallurgy. 
22 Q. What was the part involved? 
23 A. And I dont remember the exact details of 
2 4 Freedle as I sit here. 
1 
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metallurgy. 
Q. What was the part involved? 
A The part involved was a fuel tank 
Q. What was the vehicle? 
A. Lincoln town car. 
Q. Whatyear? 
A I would say early '90s. 
Q. On March 21st,'05 in Florence, South 
Carolina, you gave testimony in a case called Strickland 
versus Ford; is that correct? 
A. That's correct 
Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys in that 
case? 
A Yes, I did 
Q. WTiat was your area of expertise? 
A. Mechanical engineering, mechanical metallurgy. 
Q. And what was the part involved? 
A The vehicle was an Fl 50. The part involved 
was door latch and handle assemblies. 
Q. Turning back a page, on March 3,2005, in 
21 Beaver Dam, Kentucky, in a case called Deno, D-e-n-o, 
2 2 versus Ford, you gave testimony in that case? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys in that 
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1 Q. Do you recall the vehicle? 
2 A. No, I dont 
3 Q. On January 20,2005, in Knoxville, Tennessee, 
4 in a case called Teets, T-e-e-t-s, versus Ford, did you 
5 give testimony in that case? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. What was your area of expertise? 
10 A. Mechanical engineering, mechanical 
11 metallurgy. 
12 Q. What was the part involved? 
13 A That was a truck, commercial truck, looking 
14 for the reasons of fuel tank puncture dealing with 
15 aftermarket connections. 
16 Q. Okay. Thaf s all on that one. 
17 (WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit 
18 Number 368 was marked for 
19 Identification as of this date.) 
2<y> MR. EMBLEM: Okay. 
2 / Q. I will give you a document that's been marked 
as 368. And it says, 'Thomas Tiede" at the top, 
T-i-e-d-e? 
A. Yes. 
5 ( P a g e s t o 
Page 6 
1 Q. Okay. We have your raw notes from the file; 
2 is that correct? 
3 A. Correct 
4 Q. Any measurements that you took? 
5 A. Correct 
6 Q. We have a list of your testimony and 
7 publications? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And you have record of payments in this case? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. I am going to place in front of you, but not 
12 mark your CV, in case you to need reference it I will 
13 just ask if this is your most recent CV? 
14 A. Yes, it is. 
15 Q. On the third page, you note there in the 
16 publications, ffNon-published Corporate Reports and 
17 Investigative Studies," Fatigue Analysis? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Did you learn to do fatigue analysis while in 
20 college? 
2 1 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Did you expand upon that when you went into 
2 3 practice? 
2 4 A. Yes. 
Page 
Q. Have you supplemented your metallurgical 
education through self-study and experience? 
A Yes. 
Q. The box of materials that we have here beside 
you, is this your complete file? 
A. Yes, except for what I have mentioned before 
with the depositions and the parts. 
Q. In the file here, you have some photographs 
taken by a Thomas Tiede. Did you consider those in the 
in reaching your expert opinions in this case? 
A. I considered them as just background. I have 
my own photographs of the subject vehicle and the 
13 photographs done by Packer Engineering, I believe it was 
14 Kevin Vosburgh. I relied primarily on those, but I used 
15 Tiede's photographs and everybody else's photographs as 
16 far as background. 
Q. Okay. You also had a copy of Thomas Tiede's 
report? 
A. Correct 
Q. You had a copy of Andrew Gilbert's report? 
A. Correct 
Q. Did you consider Andrew Gilbert's report-
A. Yes. 
Q. - in forming your opinions? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Page 7 Page< 
Q. Fatigue analysis, is that in any way related 
to value mode analysis? 
A. Fracture mode analysis for metals under 
continual cycle mode would be fatigue analysis. 
Q. And what about failure mode analysis, do you 
go in and look at metal things that have broken? 
A. Yes. 
To determine how they are broken? 
Yes. 
Does that involve any component of metallurgy? 
Yes. 
Did you take metallurgy in college? 
Yes. 
Was that a part of your engineering studies? 
Yes. 
Is that part of a typical engineering 
17 curriculum at the university of where you attended? 
18 A. No, I don't believe so. I think if you took a 
19 degree in general engineering you might not have any 
20 metallurgic engineering course work. 
Q. Is it related to general engineering? Would 
metallurgy be an elective as opposed to a required 
subject? 
A. It could be. 
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A. 
Q. Did you consider Tom Tiede's report in forming 
your opinions? 
A. I read all the reports. I considered them, 
yes. 
(WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit 
Number 367 was marked for 
Identification as of this date.) 
Q. I am going to place an exhibit thafs been 
marked as 367 in front of you. It's identified as 
the "Edward M. Caulfield Testimony Record?" 
A. Correct 
Q. Is this record up-to-date? 
A. No, it only goes up to September 21st I have 
had cases since then. Let me check that 
MR.LARSEN: Is this Exhibit 368? 
MR EMBLEM: 367. 
MR.LARSEN: Did I do something wrong with the 
exhibits? Maybe I have them wrong. I thought we 
started with 366. 
MR. EMBLEM: We did. 
MR.LARSEN: With the notice. 
MR.EMBLEM: IdidntmarktheCV-
MR.LARSEN: Oh, okay. 
3 (Pages 6 t o 9) 
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M 1 Q. A report dated January 30,2003? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. You considered this report in reaching your 
4 opinions in this case? 
5 A. Yes. 
\ 6 Q. Mr. Tiede, in his report, indicates that he 
7 visited the vehicle in West Shore, Utah on July 15, 
8 2002. Did you obtain the photographs that he took at 
9 that time? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And as you said earlier, you looked at those. 
12 And because you looked at them, you did consider them in 
13 some respect? 
14 A. I have looked at all the photos. 
15 Q. Mr. Tiede reports in the lower paragraph, 
16 about the fifth line up from the bottom, he said, "I 
17 have designed many of the components and sub-systems 
18 associated with door latches." Have you designed any 
19 door latches? 
0 A. I haven*t designed any for manufacturers. 
21 have analyzed a lot of them but never designed them. 
22 Q. Mr. Tiede says that his experience began 
2 3 working at Ford Motor Company and that he worked there 
24 in the design analysis department Did you ever work 
i / 
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forces, et cetera 
I guess I could clear it up. I don't see 
roof crush — the fact that the roof is crushing or has 
been severely impacted as one of the main contributions 
to the door opening. Do you see what I'm saying? 
Q. Do you agree with the term that it's an 
7 unintentional door opening? 
8 A. It wasn't activated by the handle. I agree 
9 with that. 
10 Q. Wasn't activated by the handle? 
11 A. There was nobody that pulled on the handle. 
12 Q. Do you agree that Ford specifically designs 
13 these doors to stay closed in accidents? 
14 A. They tiy to design them that way. But it's a 
15 fact of life that everything has an overload value. The 
16 intention is to keep it closed for reasonable forces. 
17 Q. Sure. So would you then agree that if it 
18 opens during an accident, that that would be an 
19 unintentional event? 
20 A. Yeah. I have put all unintentional events 
21 into the category. It wasn't activated by one of the 
22 handles, yes. 
23 Q. The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The 
2 4 windshield header was caused to deform upward as the 
Page 19 
1 for Ford or Ford Motor Company? 
2 A. No. Only as a consultant 
3 Q. Mr. Tiede says on the second page, Inspection 
4 Section, second line, it says, "The vehicle had 
5 experienced severe impact to the driver roof side rail 
6 during the rollover." Is that the fact? First of all, 
7 do you agree with the fact? 
8 A. I would agree with that. 
9 Q. Is that fact important? 
10 A. It should be rollovers, though there is more 
11 than one. Sol would just change that to S. 
12 Q. Is the fact that the driver's roof side rail 
13 received severe impact, and as you say, perhaps more 
14 than one, is that important to the door latch issue in 
15 this case where the door - first, do you agree that the 
16 door unintentionally opened in the Clayton case? 
17 MR- LARSEN: Objection, vague. 
18 THE WITNESS: I would agree the door opened, 
19 you know, due to overload of the latch number. I would 
20 say the fact that we have tremendous forces going on in 
2 1 the vehicle to cause that type of overloading is an 
2 2 important factor. But ifs not so much how the 
2 3 components of the vehicle loaded the door. Ifs the 
2 4 forces going on in the vehicle that cause occupant 
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A-pillar and roof side rail were driven downward" Do 
you agree with the fact that the A-pillar and roof side 
rail were driven downward? 
A. I would agree with that 
Q. Is that important to the analysis of how this 
door unintentionally opened? 
A. If you drive down the header and it does 
separate from the frame on the window, that can cause 
some component loading on the latch because the two are 
trying to move in different directions. Ifs a factor 
but not, as I see it, a major factor. 
Q. The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The 
B-pillar was bowed outward by this same impact 
mechanism." Do you agree with that statement? 
A. I agree with that 
Q. Is the fact that the B-pillar bowed out by the 
same impact mechanism, is that important to the analysis 
of how this door opened unintentionally? 
A. If the B-pillar bows out, the door will bow 
20 out with it So the two will stay together. So as far 
21 as latch loading is concerned, I would say no as far as 
22 the B-pillar bowing out 
23 Q, The next paragraph Mr. Tiede reports, "The 
24 driver door latch was found in a fully open position." 
6 ( P a g e s 1 8 t o 2 1 ) 
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1 Was it still in the fully opened position when you 
. 2 inspected the vehicle? 
/ 3 A. I don't know what he means, fully opened. I 
4 don*t think ifs fully opened. It looks like ifs been 
5 crushed back into the vehicle, folded in half. But I 
6 will agree it is open. 
7 Q. The next sentence that he says, "Both bolts 
8 were fully open and had been jammed in place by 
9 subsequent impact." I think thafs what you were just 
10 saying about subsequent impact. What does he mean when 
11 he says "Both bolts were fully open?" 
12 MR. LARSEN: Objection, fully open, 
13 MR. EMBLEM: If you know. 
14 A. What he means there is he means what I would 
15 call forks or some people call fork bolts. And those 
16 are the components inside the latch that do the 
17 latching. And both bolts were fully opened and are 
18 jammed, I disagree that thereby subsequent impact 
19 Q. In the last sentence of that paragraph he 
2 0 says, Mr. Tiede says, "The vehicle has a tubular steel 
21 side beam structure in the door." I will stop right 
22 there. Is that the way you would describe the side beam 
2 3 structures or tubular steel side beam structures? 
24 A It is tubular and ifs the side protection 
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1 you agree with that or do you not agree? 
2 A. I disagree that there is no deformation. What 
3 he is trying to say is the lack of deformation on the 
4 adjacent latch body, there is deformation on the latch 
5 body. He goes on to say, he indicates "The driver door 
6 latch system had been actuated during the rollover." I 
7 dont think it's been actuated. I think ifs been 
8 overloaded during the rollover. In other words, I think 
9 actuated — I think he means — I can't tell you what he 
10 means honestly, is it was activated by some of the 
11 activating mechanisms, such as internal rod outside 
12 handle, but it wasn't actuated. It was overloaded 
13 Q. And the next paragraph Mr. Tiede says, "The 
14 outside door handle played no role in the actuation." 
15 Do you agree with that? 
16 A I agree. 
17 Q. It continues a little further in the 
18 paragraph, "The outside handle actuating rod is a 
19 compression design." Do you agree with that? 
A. Correct I agree with that 
Q. And "It had been displaced in a tensile 
fashion during the rollover impact" Do you agree with 
that? 
A. Don't know whether to agree or disagree on 
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beam, and I agree ifs in the door. 
Q. Do you know what weight or gauge or thickness 
of the sheet metal is that constructs the beam that's 
being described on this? 
A. I don't know its weight, but ifs a tube. I 
think it's about a tenth-of-an-inch thick wall. And I 
believe ifs made out of high-strength steel and it's 
about one inch, maybe a little over an inch in diameter 
tube. 
Q. On the last page of Tom Tiede's report dated 
January 30,2003, Mr. Tiede says, "The lack of latch 
bolt deformatioiL" First I will ask you if you agree 
Page 25 
^ 
that is there is a lack of latch bolt deformation? 
A. No. There is definitely latch bolt 
deformation. 
Q, And what is a latch bolt? 
A. A latch bolt are the forks inside a latch that 
do the latching on the latch pin or the striker pin. 
Q. Was that the same as both bolts that we talked 
about earlier? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then Tom Tiede continues, "And the adjacent 
latch body condition, indicates that the driver door 
latch system had been actuated during the rollover." Do 
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that I dont think if s been displaced. I cant see 
how he would get tension out of that. 
I \ 3 (WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit 
Number 369 was marked for 
Identification as of this date.) 
MR. EMBLEM: Q. I am going to mark only the 
front cover page of a booklet that you have in your file 
thafs called the "Photographic Log. Clayton versus 
Ford." And it has, "Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, 1998 
Ford Explorer." 
What was the purpose of having an 
Exemplar Vehicle Inspection? 
A. Actually the first purpose here for this photo 
14 log was to establish the so-called foreshortening of 
15 A-piilar to B-pillar on this particular vehicle. 
16 Q. And you wanted to know what the actual 
17 measurements are of the vehicle that had not been 
18 racked? 
19 A. Correct, not been rolled over. 
20 Q. I want to discuss the photos for a second, if 
21 I can locate them. I didnt have a bound copy of the 
22 Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, did you? I do have some 
23 colored photographs. Is there a way to identify which 
2 4 photographs showed the measurements that you actually 
7 (Pages 22 t o 25) 
Exhibit B 
2.13 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL 
MUJI 2.13 
STATEMENT OF OPINION 
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does 
not purport to be based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a 
particular statement was a statement of fact or merely an expression of 
opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which 
it was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the 
ordinary effect of the words used. You may also consider the relationship 
of the parties and the subject matter with which the statement was 
concerned. 
References' 
BAJI No. 9.51 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 
West Publishing Company 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION REGARDING 
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE OF THE 
OPINION OF FORDS ENGINEERING 
EXPERT THOMAS TIEDE 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto J 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following authority and argument in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration regarding presenting evidence of Ford engineer Thomas 
Tiede's opinion regarding the door latch. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Ford's limine motion No. 26 to exclude evidence of witnesses not called was previously 
granted in a pre-trial motion. According to the Court's statement to the parties' counsel at oral 
argument, all motions were ruled on without prejudice of later establishing relevance. Plaintiffs 
move for reconsideration because Ford has made the issue of its expert, Thomas Tiede's door 
latch opinions relevant by opening the door in both opening statement and in extensive cross-
examination of Plaintiffs' expert David Ingebretsen in front of the jury as to the differences in 
Plaintiffs' engineering opinions regarding the door latch. Ford argued to the jury that Plaintiffs 
"shopped" around to get another door latch expert opinion as follows: 
"Now the interesting part though they had an expert or had an expert Mr. Ingebretsen who 
has testified that well what happened here was there was crush of the roof around the 
door and it pushed the door kind of bowed the door out and the vertical rod that actuates 
the level open in the door latch and that's how the door came open. Well, folks it turns 
out that this has an automatic block system so the minute you put get in the vehicle and 
put it drive and start driving the doors lock, and door cannot come open, even when 
there's that kind of crush. And the vertical rod kind of theory doesn't work. So guess 
what? They got another expert. They changed their theory. Instead of the vertical rod 
being actuated and the door latch opening now it's a horizontal rod on a different piece. 
They kind of ran into some problems and they just got a different expert. And that's 
what you're going to hear." 
In this case, the Court's pre-trial ruling will allow Ford to make an inference to the jury 
that the Plaintiffs were "shopping" for another engineering expert, when Ford itself, has 
"shopped around" and previously retained Ford engineering expert, Thomas Tiede to opine on 
the door latch and door opening. Tiede did NOT disagree with many aspects of Plaintiffs' door 
latch expert, Andrew Gilberg's and David Ingebretsen's testimony. Plaintiffs should be 
permitted to cross-examine Ford's new door latch expert, Edward Caufield (as the Court allowed 
Ford to do) about the former opinions of Mr. Tiede, a Ford engineer for over 30 years. 
"> 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE FORDS NEW 
DOOR LATCH EXPERT, ED CAUFIELD ON THE OPINIONS OF MR. 
THOMAS TIEDE. 
MUJI 2.13 instructs the jury that it may "consider the surrounding circumstances1' on 
which an opinion was made. Utah R. Evid. 703 has broadened the basis for an expert's testimony 
by specifying that facts or data used in forming an opinion or inference need not be admissible if 
of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the witness1 field of expertise. (Patey v. Lainhart, 
1999 UT 31, P30 (Utah 1999).) Utah Evid 705 states: 
"The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without 
first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The 
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on 
cross-examination." 
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp,, 801 P.2d 920, 924 (Utah 1990) 
Defendants contend that there were several instances where the trial court's limiting of 
cross-examination prevented them from examining the basis of opinions offered by plaintiffs" 
experts. The Court held that the defendants were entitled to conduct cross-examination into the 
basis of the opinions offered by plaintiffs' expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons they 
had made on direct examination. {Ibid,) The Whitehead court remarked: 
"Here, defendants were repeatedly cut off during their attempts to cross-examine 
plaintiffs' experts. The numerous objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were 
improperly sustained, prevented defendants from probing the basis of opinions given by 
plaintiffs' experts on comparisons they had made in their direct examination. As a result, 
the issues were presented to the jury without the added light that thorough 
cross-examination sheds. We find, therefore, that the trial court erred in limiting 
defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The trial court did not limit 
those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles on their direct examination. Hence 
cross-examination should not have been so restricted." 
Here, Mr. Caufield considered ALL of the reports including Tom Tiede's report dated 
January 30, 2003, in reaching his conclusion in the case. (Exh A, Depo, pp. 9, 18.) Mr. Tiede 
3 
said in his report that "both bolts were fully open and had been jammed in place by subsequent 
impact." (Exh A, Depo, p. 22.) Ford's new expert, Ed Caufield, disagreed that there was 
subsequent impact. (Ibid.) Mr. Tiede said there was a "lack of latch bolt deformation." (Exh A, 
Depo, p. 23.) Ford's new expert stated that "there is definitely latch bolt deformation/' (Ibid,) 
Mr. Tiede opined that the driver's door latch system had been actuated during the rollover. (Exh 
A, Depo, p. 24.) Ford's new expert, Mr. Caufield disagrees the door latch was "actuated," and 
contends the latch was "overloaded." (Ibid.) 
These differences in Ford's own door latch experts' opinion should be brought out to 
present the jury with a fair and complete picture of the party's evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
should not be prohibited from eliciting on cross-examination information reviewed and evaluated 
by Ford's new door latch expert, Ed Caufield. 
Dated: January 31, 2007. 
Matthew H. Raty 
A 
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1 Q. Okay. We have your raw nptes from the file; 
2 is that correct? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. Any measurements that yoij took? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. We have a list of your testimony and 
7 publications? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And you have record of payments in this case? 
10 A. Yes. I 
11 Q. I am going to place in frontjof you, but not 
12 mark your C V, in case you to needlreference it. I will 
13 just ask if this is your most recent CV? 
14 A. Yes, it is. I 
15 Q. On the third page, you note [there in the 
16 publications, ,rNon-published Corporate Reports and 
17 Investigative Studies," Fatigue Analysis? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Did you learn to do fatigue j 
20 college? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Did you expand upon that \j/hen you went into 
2 3 practice? 
2 4 A. Yes. 
analysis while in 
1 
U 
1 
1 
1 
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1 Q. Have you supplemented your metallurgical 
2 education through self-study and experience? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. The box of materials that we have here beside 
5 you, is this your complete file? 
6 A. Yes, except for what I have mentioned before 
7 with the depositions and the parts. 
8S* Q. In the file here, you have some photographs 
taken by a Thomas Tiede. Did you consider those in the U 
1 (| in reaching your expert opinions in this case? i 
A. 1 considered them as just background. I have I 
my own photographs of the subject vehicle and the I 
photographs done by Packer Engineering, I believe it was|[ 
Kevin Vosburgh. I relied primarily on those, but I used If 
Tiede's photographs and everybody else's photographs as 11 
14 far as background. 
1 TV. Q. Okay. You also had a copy of Thomas Tiede's 
18 report? 
19 A. Correct. 
2 0 Q. You had a copy of Andrew Gilbert's report? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Did you consider Andrew Gilbert's report — 
23 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. — in forming your opinions? 
asii 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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Q. Fatigue analysis, is that in aiW way related 
to value mode analysis? i 
A. Fracture mode analysis for metals under 
continual cycle mode would be fatigue analysis. 
Q. And what about failure modje analysis, do you 
go in and look at metal things that have broken? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To determine how they are broken? 
A. Yes. j 
Q. Does that involve any component of metallurgy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you take metallurgy in college? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that a part of your engineering studies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that part of a typical engineering 
curriculum at the university of where you attended? 
A. No, I don't believe so. I think if you took a 
degree in general engineering you might not have any 
metallurgic engineering course work. 
Q. Is it related to general engineering? Would 
metallurgy be an elective as opposed to a required 
subject? 
A. It could be. 
Page 9 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did you consider Tom Tiede's report in forming 
3 your opinions? 
4 A. I read all the reports. I considered them, 
5 yes. 
6 (WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit 
7 Number 367 was marked for 
8 Identification as of this date.) 
9 Q. I am going to place an exhibit that's been 
10 marked as 367 in front of you. It's identified as 
11 the "Edward M. Caulfield Testimony Record?" 
12 A. Correct. 
13 Q. Is this record up-to-date? 
14 A. No, it only goes up to September 21 st. I have 
15 had cases since then. Let me check that. 
16 MR. LARSEN: Is this Exhibit 368? 
17 MR. EMBLEM: 367. 
18 MR. LARSEN: Did I do something wrong with the 
19 exhibits? Maybe I have them wrong. I thought we 
20 started with 366. 
21 MR. EMBLEM: We did. 
22 MR. LARSEN: With the notice. 
23 MR. EMBLEM: I didn't mark the C V -
2 4 MR. LARSEN: Oh, okay. 
»^-j»* J!!MJ^*W ^ 4 » tWHIU* * WS& <4SUUkmUksJm'' 
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, "j Q. A report dated January 30,2003? A 
1 1 A. Yes. 1 
1 0 You considered this report in reaching your 1 
§ opinions in this case? 1 
b A. Yes. 1 
|6 Q. Mr. Tiede, in his report, indicates that he 1 
F visited the vehicle in West Shore, Utah on July 15, 1 
J8 2002. Did you obtain the photographs that he took at 1 
19 that time? I 
10 A. Yes J 
fcl Q And as you said earlier, you looked at those. J 
Jl 2 And because you looked at them, you did consider them in J 
| l 3 some respect? 1 
ill 4 A. I have looked at all the photos. J 
jkc Q. Mr. Tiede reports in the lower paragraph, 
16 about the fifth line up from the bottom, he said, "I 
1 7 have designed many of the components and sub-systems 
18 associated with door latches." Have you designed any 
19 door latches? 
2 0 A. I haven't designed any for manufacturers. I 
21 have analyzed a lot of them but never designed them. 
22 Q. Mr. Tiede says that his experience began 
2 3 working at Ford Motor Company and that he worked there 
2 4 in the design analysis department. Did you ever work 
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| 1 for Ford or Ford Motor Company? 
2 A. No. Only as a consultant. 
3 Q. Mr. Tiede says on the second page, Inspection 
4 Section, second line, it says, "The vehicle had 
5 experienced severe impact to the driver roof side rail 
6 during the rollover." Is that the fact? First of all, 
7 do you agree with the fact? 
8 A. I would agree with that. 
9 Q. Is that fact important? 
10 A. It should be rollovers, though there is more 
11 than one. So I would just change that to S. 
12 Q. Is the fact that the driver's roof side rail 
13 received severe impact, and as you say, perhaps more 
1 4 than one, is that important to the door latch issue in 
15 this case where the door ~ first, do you agree that the 
16 door unintentionally opened in the Clayton case? 
17 MR. LARSEN: Objection, vague. 
18 THE WITNESS: I would agree the door opened, 
19 you know, due to overload of the latch number. I would 
20 say the fact that we have tremendous forces going on in 
21 the vehicle to cause that type of overloading is an 
2 2 important factor. But it's not so much how the 
2 3 components of the vehicle loaded the door. It's the 
[ 2 4 forces going on in the vehicle that cause occupant 
Page 20 I 
I \ 
1 forces, et cetera. r 
2 I guess I could clear it up. I don't see [ 
3 roof crush — the fact that the roof is crushing or has 1 
4 been severely impacted as one of the main contributions [ 
5 to the door opening. Do you see what I'm saying? I 
6 Q. Do you agree with the term that it's an [ 
7 unintentional door opening? f 
8 A. It wasn't activated by the handle. I agree | 
9 with that | 
10 Q. Wasn't activated by the handle? r 
11 A. There was nobody that pulled on the handle. [ 
12 Q. Do you agree that Ford specifically designs | 
13 these doors to stay closed in accidents? L 
14 A. They try to design them that way. But it's a j 
15 fact of life that everything has an overload value. The [ 
16 intention is to keep it closed for reasonable forces. | 
17 Q. Sure. So would you then agree that if it | 
18 opens during an accident, that that would be an | 
19 unintentional event? l 
2 0 A. Yeah. I have put all unintentional events F 
21 into the category. It wasn't activated by one of the 1 
| 2 2 handles, yes. r 
2 3 Q. The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The F 
2 4 windshield header was caused to deform upward as the | 
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1 A-pillar and roof side rail were driven downward " Do t 
2 you agree with the fact that the A-pillar and roof side \ 
3 rail were driven downward? f 
4 A. I would agree with that. fc 
5 Q. Is that important to the analysis of how this L 
6 door unintentionally opened? 1 
7 A. If you drive down the header and it does r 
8 separate from the frame on the window, that can cause f 
9 some component loading on the latch because the two are j 
10 trying to move in different directions. It's a factor r 
11 but not, as I see it, a major factor. | 
12 Q, The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The 1 
13 B-pillar was bowed outward by this same impact c 
14 mechanism." Do you agree with that statement? f 
15 A. I agree with that. f 
16 Q. Is the fact that the B-pillar bowed out by the t 
17 same impact mechanism, is that important to the analysis I 
18 of how this door opened unintentionally? | 
19 A. If the B-pillar bows out, the door will bow | 
20 out with it. So the two will stay together. So as far | 
21 as latch loading is concerned, I would say no as far as | 
22 the B-pillar bowing out. [ 
2 3 Q. The next paragraph Mr. Tiede reports, "The 1 
2 4 driver door latch was found in a fully open position." [ 
6 (Pages 18 to 21) 
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1 Was it still in the fully opened position when you 
2 inspected the vehicle? 
3 A. I don't know what he means, fully opened. I 
4 don't think it's fully opened. It looks like it's been 
5 crushed back into the vehicle, folded in half. But I 
6 will agree it is open. 
7 Q. The next sentence that he says, "Both bolts 
8 were fully open and had been jammed in place by 
9 subsequent impact." 1 think that's what you were just 
10 saying about subsequent impact. What does he mean when 
11 he says "Both bolts were fully open?" 
12 MR. LARSEN: Objection, fully open. 
13 MR. EMBLEM: If you know. 
'\f* A. What he means there is he means what I would 
call forks or some people call fork bolts. And those 
are the components inside the latch that do the 
latching. And both bolts were fully opened and are 
jammed, I disagree that thereby subsequent impact. 
19 Q. In the last sentence of that paragraph he 
says, Mr. Tiede says, "The vehicle has a tubular steel 
21 side beam structure in the door." I will stop right 
2 2 there. Is that the way you would describe the side beam 
2 3 structures or tubular steel side beam structures? 
2 4 A. It is tubular and ifs the side protection 
Page 2^  
1 you agree with that or do you not agree? 
2 A. I disagree that there is no deformation. What 
3 he is trying to say is the lack of deformation on the 
4 adjacent latch body, there is deformation on the latch 
5 body. He goes on to say, he indicates "The driver door 
6 latch system had been actuated during the rollover." 
7 don't think it's been actuated. I think ifs been 
8 overloaded during the rollover. In other words, I think 
9 actuated — I think he means - I can't tell you what he 
1 0 means honestly, is it was activated by some of the 
1 1 activating mechanisms, such as internal rod outside 
12 handle, but it wasn't actuated. It was overloaded. 
1 3 Q. And the next paragraph Mr. Tiede says, "The 
14 outside door handle played no role in the actuation." 
1 5 Do you agree with that? 
1 6 A. I agree. 
17 Q. It continues a little further in the 
18 paragraph, "The outside handle actuating rod is a 
19 compression design." Do you agree with that? 
2 0 A. Correct. I agree with that. 
21 Q. And "It had been displaced in a tensile 
2 2 fashion during the rollover impact." Do you agree with 
2 3 that? 
2 4 A. Don't know whether to agree or disagree on 
\ 
or 11 
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1 beam, and I agree it's in the door. 
2 Q. Do you know what weight or gauge or thickness 
3 o f the sheet metal is that constructs the beam that's 
4 being described on this? 
5 A. I don't know its weight, but ifs a tube. I 
6 think it's about a tenth-of-an-inch thick wall. And I 
7 believe it's made out of high-strength steel and it's 
8 about one inch, maybe a little over an inch in diameter 
9 tube. 
L 0 Q. On the last page of Tom Tiede's report dated 
L1 January 30, 2003, Mr. Tiede says, "The lack o f latch 
L 2 bolt deformation." First I will ask you if you agree 
L 3 that is there is a lack of latch bolt deformation? 
L 4 A. No. There is definitely latch bolt 
L 5 deformation. 
L6 Q. And what is a latch bolt? 
L 7 A. A latch bolt are the forks inside a latch that 
L 8 do the latching on the latch pin or the striker pin. 
L 9 Q. Was that the same as both bolts that we talked 
y
- 0 about earlier? 
>1 A. Yes. 
?
- ?f* Q. Then Tom Tiede continues, "And the adjacent 
y
- f latch body condition, indicates that the driver door 
? f latch system had been actuated during the rollover." D o 
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1 that. I don't think it's been displaced. I can't see 
2 how he would get tension out of that. 
3 (WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit 
4 Number 369 was marked for 
5 Identification as o f this date.) 
6 MR. EMBLEM: Q. I am going to mark only the 
7 front cover page of a booklet that you have in your fde 
8 that's called the "Photographic Log. Clayton versus 
9 Ford." And it has, "Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, 1998 
1 0 Ford Explorer." 
1 1 What was the purpose o f having an 
12 Exemplar Vehicle Inspection? 
1 3 A. Actually the first purpose here for this photo 
14 log was to establish the so-called foreshortening of 
1 5 A-pillar to B-pillar on this particular vehicle. 
1 6 Q. And you wanted to know what the actual 
17 measurements are of the vehicle that had not been 
18 lacked? 
1 9 A. Correct, not been rolled over. 
20 Q. I want to discuss the photos for a second, if 
21 I can locate them. I didn't have a bound copy of the 
2 2 Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, did you? I do have some 
2 3 colored photographs. Is there a way to identify which 
2 4 photographs showed the measurements that you actually 
7 ( P a g e s 2 2 t o 2 5 ) 
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MR. EMBLEM: We'll mark the rod as 316B. And 
we'll move for those exhibits strictly for demonstration 
purposes. 
MR. LARSEN: No objection to being used for 
demonstrative purposes. 
THE COURT: So we have 316 and 316A and 316B? 
There's no objection? 
MR. LARSEN: For them being used for 
demonstrative purposes. 
THE COURT: For that purpose then they are 
received. 
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) And the only thing that we 
haven't looked at yet is the pin, the latch pin; is that 
correct? 
A As far as the inside handle system goes, yes. 
Q And do you also have an outside handle? 
A Yes, I brought one of those along as well. 
Q Does the outside handle factor in in any way to 
the reasons that the latch failed, if it failed in this 
case? 
A Not in my opinion? 1 think Mr. Ingebretsen had 
a theory related to the outside handle and how that may 
have caused the unwanted opening. 
Q I see. Did you determine that one theory 
predominated based upon the forensic evidence over the 
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other? 
A Not only with forensic evidence, but also 
knowledge of how the system works. 
Q What is your conclusion as to which methodology 
opened this latch during this event? 
A It's my opinion that the inside handle system is 
the source of the unwanted door opening. And I built some 
exemplar doors to demonstrate how I think that happened. 
Q Is this a good time to demonstrate those doors? 
A As good as any. 
MR. EMBLEM: Okay. The doors have been marked 
for identification purposes and for demonstrative purposes 
only as 317, an unmodified door, and 318, a modified door. 
We would move those for that purpose. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. LARSEN: No objection to them being used for 
demonstrative purposes. 
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Mr. Gilberg, if you step down, 
I'll assist you. Should we start with the unmodified 
door, 317? 
A I think that would be best. 
Q Before we go any further in the demonstration, 
can you explain what this door is? Is this a 1997 
Explorer door? 
A This is a 1997 Ford Explorer driver's door. The 
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original VIN number is here, manufactured 01/97. 1 
Q So this door is exactly like the Clayton door I 
before the crash? j 
A Except for the color. 1 
Q Okay, proceed. What are you going to show us? 
MR. LARSEN: I'd rather go by question and 
answer and j ust proceed. J 
THE COURT: I think we should proceed by 
question and answer. 1 
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Explain first to us what you 
want to demonstrate for the jury, and with permission 
we'll do the demonstration. j 
A First of all, the door demonstrates how the 1 
latch operates normally. And with the Court's permission 
I would just like to repeat the demonstration I did 1 
holding the latch out in the air, just to show it 1 
functions the way it's supposed to. I 
THE COURT: Well, it's a question-and-answer 
format. Let mr. Emblem ask the questions. Go head. 
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Mr. Gilberg, would you please 
demonstrate how the door operates in its unmodified 
condition as we see here Exhibit No. 317? J 
A Yes, sir. First of all, to make this a little 
more compact, what we've done is mount the striker bolt, 1 
which is here on the latch, on a spring-loaded plunger, so 1 
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that when I open up the handle the striker bolt moves I 
instead of the door. But the latch and door operate as I 
normal. 
Q Maybe when we do this you can turn it and show 
it to the -
THE COURT: It's not necessary to do that. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. And so we have the outside 
handle control. Lifting the outside handle causes the rod 
to push down a release lever inside the door and trigger 
the release on the latch. (Demonstrating.) 1 
There's also the inside handle that I showed you I 
earlier. Same situation. If I pull this handle, it 
causes the latch to release by giving the lever on the 
latch a push. (Demonstrating.) So those are the two ways [ 
that the door operates normally. p 
Now, if I lock the door and lift up on the r 
outside handle, nothing happens. But, remember, we talked 1 
about override locking. If I pull on the inside handle I 
now, it first unlocks the latch and causes the latch to I 
release. (Demonstrating.) And that creates the situation 1 
that I feel is responsible for the unwanted opening. L 
MR. LARSEN: Objection, narrative. t 
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Does this create the situation I 
that you feel caused the unwanted door opening in this 
case? 
10 (Pages 34 to 37) 
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1 A Yes, sir. 
2 Q How far does the push rod have to move to | 
3 release the latch? 
4 A It's on the order of a half an inch. It depends I 
5 on adjustments inside the door, upon sheet metal variation 
6 between where the handle mounts and where the latch | 
7 mounts, but it's approximately a half inch. J 
8 Q Is there a little bit of tolerance say in the 
9 manufacture of a door like this in the manufacturing | 
10 process, do you know? I 
11 A There's tolerance in the manufacture of 
12 everything. 
13 Q What does that mean? 
14 A There's always going to be — for example, if 
15 you're stamping a part on a steel die, stamping a steel 
16 part, and you do it a hundred times, the first part and 
17 100th part are going to look very much alike, but they 
18 won't be identical. 
19 Q Is that due to what? 
2 0 A Could be due to all kinds of things, like wear, 
21 properties of the materials involved, free play in 
2 2 machinery that punches holes in the steel. 
2 3 Q Is that the reason there are adjustments 
2 4 available within the system, so that you can adjust these 
2 5 latches to fit to deal with those tolerances or those 
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1 differences? 
2 A Yes, that's why there's some free play in the 
3 system, and why there's some adj ustability in the system. 
4 Q Is there a particular name for the adjustment 
5 component of rod that operates the door latch in a case 
6 like this? Is it a clip? Or what is it? 
7 A Well, in the case of the inside handle link, the 
8 free play is positioned in this lever. It's contained 
9 within this lever. So there's kind of a range of motion 
10 available to it where nothing happens. 
11 THE COURT: You're referring to which exhibit? | 
12 THE WITNESS: I'm referring to Exhibit 316. And | 
13 I'm wiggling the inside handle release lever. 
14 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) And that adjustment, is there | 
15 such a thing as a Mazda clip? Is that a factor to this? | 
16 A The outside handle lever has what's called a 
17 Mazda clip, and that has like a threaded body to it. The 
18 rod that inserts in here has a thread on it and you can 
19 adjust it up and down. And you clip it like that so it's 
2 0 secure. 
21 Q Do you have enough knowledge of the 
2 2 manufacturing process of Ford to say whether those 
2 3 adjustments are done by machine or by human? 
24 A The assembly of the door, at least of the 
2 5 Explorer, is done by human. 
WENDY ALCOCK - DE 
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1 Q We've talked a little bit about how the door 
2 should operate, the latch should operate, assuming 
3 everything is okay. We've also created an exhibit. First 
4 let me ask you: What went wrong with the Clayton vehicle? I 
5 MR. LARSEN: Objection, vague. 
6 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) If you have an opinion on that. 
7 THE COURT: Overruled. 
8 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Did something go wrong with the 
9 Clayton vehicle that caused the door to come open? 
10 A In my opinion, yes, something went wrong. I 
11 Q What is it that went wrong? 
12 A The door was subjected to crushing, endwise I 
13 crushing or longitudinal crushing. And that caused the I 
14 handle to give this rod a push, and that caused the latch I 
15 to release. And we designed this exhibit to demonstrate j 
16 how that happens. I 
17 MR. EMBLEM: Permission to do the demonstration? r 
18 THE COURT: This is the other door? 
19 MR. EMBLEM: He's going to show it here. Please 
2 0 explain to the judge what you're going to demonstrate. I 
21 THE COURT: Keeping in mind that of course we I 
2 2 have a record here that doesn't capture on video what we: | 
2 3 have here. We need to refer to these by their number. I 
2 4 MR. EMBLEM: Exhibit 317. 
2 5 THE WITNESS: I've already demonstrated how this 
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1 door can open through the normal mechanism in it, and I 
2 that's the way you want it to open. There's another way I 
3 it can open, and that's through crushing from this | 
4 direction. What we've done to demonstrate that is we've I 
5 made a cut in the door panel that surrounds the handle and I 
6 comes out here. So there's — the inner door panel is now 
7 two pieces. 
8 And the reason we did this cut is because if I I 
9 was Charles Atlas I might be able to demonstrate it one I 
10 time, but that would be the only time we would be able to I 
11 demonstrate it, because you would bend the sheet metal and I 
12 it wouldn't recover. So what we've done is make some 
13 accommodations for the fact that I'm not strong enougji to 
14 repeatedly bend this thing, and also it won't recover I 
15 afterldothat. | 
16 So let me demonstrate what happens in a V 
| 17 collision whereby the door is crushed in between the A I 
I 18 pillar and B pillar. (Demonstrating.) What did I do? I I 
I 19 just moved the handle about 5/8thsofan inch towards; the j ; 
2 0 latch. And you might be able to pick that up by looking | 
21 at the handle when I operate this lever. (Demonstrating.) v 
2 2 And what this simulates is collapse of the door in this [ 
2 3 region of about half an inch. p 
2 4 Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Maybe we could turn it around I 
| 2 5 so the judge could see it. J 
11 (Pages 38 t o 41) 
3MAX REPORTING, LLC 
Page 98 
1 incremental damage that accrues over a distance — a 
2 distance and a time that should be survivable by the 
3 occupants. 
4 Q. So if s — is it true — or let me ask you, 
5 what is the ~ if a person is contained as opposed to 
6 ejected, is he more likely to live or not live? I 
7 mean, is it more likely that he'll live if he's 
8 contained? 
9 MR. LARSEN: Objection, foundation. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained. 
11 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Do you have a basis upon 
12 which to explain to the jury the reasons, either 
13 statistical or otherwise, why containment is important 
14 to survivability? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. What is that? 
IV A. Well, there are a number of, of both public 
18 and, and in-house records related to Ford that say as 
19 much. I brought a, an advertisement from a 1956 Ford 
2 0 that references that. 
21 Q. Okay. That was a public statement by Ford 
2 2 regarding containment is better for the occupant than 
2 3 ejection? 
2 4 MR. LARSEN: Objection, facts not in 
2 5 evidence, and leading. 
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1 an exhibit. It's untimely. 
2 THE COURT: Let me have you come to the. 
3 MR. EMBLEM: Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
4 (A private bench conference was held on the 
5 record.) 
6 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Concerning the opinions 
"7 which you have expressed regarding the, the facts of 
8 this 1997 Explorer, do you hold that opinion to a 
9 reasonable degree of engineering certainty? 
10 A Yes, I do. 
11 Q. Is it your opinion that it is defective and 
12 unreasonably dangerous to drivers and passengers? 
13 MR. LARSEN: Objection, leading. 
14 THE COURT: Sustained. 
15 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) What is your opinion 
16 concerning the reasonable degree of danger to drivers 
17 and occupants? 
18 A. As I stated in my report, I think it's, it's 
19 unreasonably dangerous to both drivers and passengers. 
2 0 Occupants of vehicles. And it's beyond the 
21 contemplation of, of the consumer. 
22 Q. Now, we talked about one other reasonable 
2 3 alternative, and that was the cable release system as 
2 4 you demonstrated with your exhibits, right? 
2 5 A. Yes. 
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1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 MR. EMBLEM: Let me have that 1956 Ford 
3 exhibit. 
4 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) While I'm pulling the 
5 exhibit, Mr. Gilberg, you just testified that you have 
6 a foundation based upon your education, experience, 
7 and background to make the statement that containment 
8 is better for survivability than ejection, correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Did I restate that correctly? I want to show 
11 you an exhibit that's been marked as 388-B. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 Q. (By Mr. Emblem) I'll ask you what that 
14 document is that you are looking at. Without 
15 describing the content, just tell us what it is. 
16 A. It's part of a leaflet that was passed out by 
17 Ford dealers in 1956. And it represents some of the 
18 things that were told to consumers in that year about 
19 door latches and the importance of them. 
2 0 Q. Okay. 
21 MR. LARSEN: Objection your Honor. 
22 MR. EMBLEM: T h e -
2 3 MR. LARSEN: This document that they're 
2 4 laying foundation for was never disclosed. Not 
2 5 even - not until just today. Pretrial disclosures as 
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1 Q. I want to show you a document that's been 
2 marked as 346. And I'll ask you what that is without 
3 disclosing the contents, please. 
4 A. Thank you. This is a United States patent. 
5 Q. What is the patent concerning? 
6 A. The title is "Latch Actuating Means." 
7 Q. And it bears what date, sir? 
8 A. It was filed in June of 1963, and granted in 
9 August of 1965. 
10 Q. Does this document represent a reasonable 
11 alternative design which would have made the 1997 Ford 
12 Explorer door system safe, in your view? 
13 MR. LARSEN: Objection, leading. 
14 THE COURT: Overruled. 
15 THE WITNESS: I don't know whether it would 
16 have made the Explorer safe. It certainly shows that 
17 Mr. Priest - Priestman, who was the applicant, was 
18 considering the specific problem we were — which 
19 caused the unwanted door opening in this accident. 
2 0 So it gives a, a feel for the, the amount of 
21 time that the engineer ~ 
2 2 MR. LARSEN: Objection, nonresponsive. 
2 3 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 4 MR. EMBLEM: Okay. Your Honor, plaintiffs 
2 5 would move this exhibit. Whafs the number? 
mmsmi^^^mmmmm^m^!imm^^>m^msmmmmmm!mmf 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Except as otherwise instructed, please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the 
issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you 
cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, of if you find that the evidence 
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 
1. At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold was the safety (anti) sway bar link 
defective? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
2. At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did it have a defect in its front 
suspension geometry in the area in which the steering and sway bar must 
operate, that allowed metal to metal contact leading to reverse bending of 
the tie rod and breaking of the tie rod? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
3. At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did it have a defect in its overall 
stability because it did not have a sufficient margin of safety? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of Kellie 
Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold was the door frame, including the A 
and B pillars and roof rail, defective in that they did not protect the door 
from opening? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold was the door-latch rod operating 
system defective in that it did not prevent the door from opening? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn 
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not 
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the sway bar 
link? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
7. At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn 
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not 
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer its front suspension 
geometry? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
8. At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn 
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not 
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the inadequate 
margin of stability? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn 
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not 
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the A and B 
pillars and the Explorer door frame? 
Yes No 
• If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn 
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not 
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the door-latch rod 
operating system? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
Was Ford negligent in designing the 1997 Explorer: 
A. The safety (anti) sway bar link design? 
Yes No 
B. The front suspension geometry design? 
Yes No 
C. The inadequate margin of stability design? 
Yes No 
D. The design of the A & B Pillars and the roof rail? 
Yes No 
E. The door operating rod system? 
• If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a 
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
Do you find that Tony Clayton is comparatively at fault for the cause of the 
crash? 
Yes No 
If "Yes, consider that 100 percent amounts to all of the fault 
in the crash. How much do you assign? [The Total must add 
up to 100 %] 
To Ford? % 
To Tony Clayton? % 
Did Ford breach an express warranty to the Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
If you answered YES, was the breach a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
14. Did Ford breach an express warranty to the Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
• If you answered YES, was the breach a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
• If you answered YES, was the beach a proximate cause of 
Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
15. Do you find that Kellie Montoya timely filed her lawsuit against Ford? 
Yes No 
16. Do you find by {clear and convincing) evidence that Ford acted with a 
knowing and reckless disregard for the safety of Tony Clayton? 
Yes No 
1*7. Do you find by {clear and convincing) evidence that Ford acted with a 
knowing and reckless disregard for the safety of Kellie Montoya? 
Yes No 
Signed: Dated: 
Presiding Juror 
After this Verdict Form has been answered and completed, please sign and date, 
and deliver this verdict form to the Court's Bailiff. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE CLAYTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S PROPOSED 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
REGARDING LIABILITY 
Case No. 000909522 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Defendant Ford Motor Company respectfully submits the following proposed special 
verdict form regarding liability for the Court's consideration. 
DATED this Q "flay of February, 2007. 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
Tim O'Neill 
Dan R. Larsen 
Kimberly Neville 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE CLAYTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case No. 000909522 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find 
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if 
you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." At least six 
jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each 
question. 
L DEFECT 
1. Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer defective and unreasonably dangerous? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered 
44Yes" to Question No. 1, move on to Question Nos. 2 and 3. 
2. If you answered "Yes" to Question 1, please identity the nature of the defect in the 1997 
Ford Explorer: 
3. Was the defect in the vehicle a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 3, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 3, move on to Question No. 4 
1 
II. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Only answer this question if you answered "Yes" to Question No. 3. 
4. Did Defendant Ford Motor Company negligently inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff 
Kellie Montoya? 
Yes No 
III. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
5. Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent, in any way, for causing the 
accident and plaintiffs' injuries? 
Yes No 
6. Assuming the combined fault of everyone involved in causing the accident must total 
100%, you must determine the percentage of fault attributed to each responsible party. 
Tony Clayton % 
Ford Motor Company % 
Total: 100 % 
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
1. Please identify the date upon which a reasonable person knew, or through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the nature of his/her injuries and the 
cause? ' 
Date 
V. PUNITIVE FINDING 
8. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of Ford's office 
or managing agent were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that 
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of the rights of, 
plaintiffs and that punitive damages should be assessed against Ford? 
Yes No 
Dated this _ day of , 2007. 
Foreperson 
2 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Except as otherwise instructed, please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the 
issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you 
cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, of if you find that the evidence 
preponderates against the issue presented, answer ccNo." 
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 
1. When the Explorer was sold, was it in a defective condition, unreasonably 
dangerous to the Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
2. If you answered Question 1 "Yes/5 then answer the following questions: 
Was such defective condition a proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
Was such defective condition a proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's 
injuries? 
Yes No 
3- Was Ford Motor Company negligent in the design of the 1997 Explorer? 
Yes No 
4. If your answer to Question 3 is "Yes/5 answer the following questions: 
Was the negligence of Ford Motor Company a proximate cause of Tony 
Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
Was the negligence of Ford Motor Company a proximate cause of Kellie 
Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
5, Did Ford Motor Company fail to warn the Plaintiffs of a defective condition 
in the 1997 Explorer? 
Yes No 
Was the failure to warn a proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
Was the failure to warn a proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
6. Did Ford Motor Company breach a warranty to the Plaintiffs that the 
Explorer was fit for its intended purposes? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question 6 is "Yes," answer the following questions: 
Was the breach of warranty a proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death? 
Yes No 
Was the breach of warranty a proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's 
injuries? 
Yes No 
If you found the Explorer defective and that such defective condition 
caused Kellie Montoya's injuries, did Ford Motor Company negligently 
inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff Kellie Montoya? 
Yes No 
Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent for causing the 
rollover and plaintiffs' injuries? 
Yes No 
If you answered Question 9 "Yes," and find Tony Clayton was negligent, 
assuming the combined fault of the parties involved in causing the accident 
must total 100%, you must determine the percentage of fault attributable to 
each party at fault: 
Tony Clayton was % at fault. 
Ford Motor Company was % at fault. 
[Total must equal 100%] 
11. What is the date Kellie Montoya knew or through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered any harm and the cause? 
Date: 
12. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Ford Motor Company 
acted with knowing and reckless indifference toward the safety and rights 
of the Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
Signed: Dated: 
Presiding Juror 
After this Verdict Form has been answered and completed, please sign and date, 
and deliver this verdict form to the Court's Bailiff 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT hXftfc ^OUMTI 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE CLAYTON, et aL, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL*rERDICT 
Case No. 000909522 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Unless otherwise indicated, please answer the following questions from a preponderance 
of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer 
"Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue 
presented, answer "No." At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they 
need not be the same six on each question. 
L When the subject 1997 Ford Explorer left Ford Motor Company was it in a defective 
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
^ 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 1, move on to Question No. 2. 
Was this defect the proximate cause of the accident and Tony Clayton's injuries? 
Yes No 
Was this defect the proximate cause of the accident and Kellie Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
1 
4. Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it is 
ordinarily used? 
Yes No 
If >ou answered "No" to Question No, 4, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 4, move on to Question No. 5. 
5. If you found that that the subject 1997 Explorer was not reasonably suitable for the 
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, was this condition the proximate cause of the 
accident and Tony Clayton's injuries9 
Yes No 
6. If you found that that the subject 1997 Explorer was not reasonably suitable for the 
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, was this condition the proximate cause of the 
accident and Kelhe Montoya's injuries? 
Yes No 
7. Did Defendant Ford Motor Company negligently inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff 
Kelhe Montoya? 
Yes No 
8. Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 8, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 8, move on to Question No. 9. 
9. If your answer to Question 8 is "Yes", answer the following question Was Tony 
Clayton's negligence a proximate cause of the accident and the injuries suffered by the 
Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 9, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"Yes" to Question No. 9, move on to Question No. 10. 
10. Assuming the combined fault of the parties in causing the accident and injuries to total 
100%, what percentage of fault do you attribute to: 
Tony Clayton % 
Ford Motor Company % 
Total: 100 % 
11. Please identify the date upon which Kellie Montoya knew, or through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, both her harm and its cause: 
Date: j^^^^^ol^fZ^ 3 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, stop here, and sign and date this verdict. 
Do not answer Question No. 12. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, proceed 
to Question 12. 
12. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Ford acted with a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the safety and rights of the Plaintiffs? 
Yes No 
Dated this ^/ day of F^b r t ^^Au- , 2007. 
Foreperson 
i 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2fk_ 
A manufacturer of a product that is in a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
condition for its anticipated or reasonably foreseeable use is liable for damages resulting 
from physical harm to the ultimate user or consumer, or to the user's or consumer's 
property, provided: 
1. At the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller, 
there was a defect or defective condition in the product, which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous, that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in the 
community, considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, training or experience possessed by the particular 
buyer, user or consumer; and 
2. The manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer or distributor is engaged in the 
business of selling the product. 
One who manufactures or sells a defective and unreasonably dangerous product is 
liable for injury and damage to the ultimate user or consumer under the above 
circumstances even though: 
1. The product manufacturer or seller who placed the product in the stream of 
commerce has exercised reasonable, or the utmost, care in the manufacture and/or 
inspection of the product; and 
2. The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the product manufacturer or seller. 
INSTRUCTION NO .,21 
A product is defective in design: 
1. If it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer or user would expect 
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; or 
2. If there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs the 
benefits of that design. 
In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh the risks to which the 
product exposes the consumer or user, you may consider, among other things: 
1. The gravity of danger posed by the design; 
2. The likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause injury or 
damage; 
3. The usefulness and desirability of the product to the consumer or user and 
the public in general; 
4. The availability of a substitute product that would serve the same function 
but would not be as dangerous; 
5. The ease or difficulty with which the unsafe character of the product could 
be eliminated without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its 
utility; and 
6. The adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would 
result from an alternate design. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
The manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture a product to eliminate any 
unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury. 
However, there is no duty to make a safe product safer. A manufacturer has no duty 
to refrain from marketing a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or to 
inform the consumer of the availability of the safer model. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J O 
The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a 
proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily careful 
person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those reasonably to be 
anticipated. 
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, to see that 
which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not merely require 
looking, but also requires observing and understanding other traffic and the general situation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ \ 
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to avoid 
placing others in danger. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J j ^ 
An automobile manufacturer can be held liable if it has not exercised reasonable 
care in designing and constructing a vehicle, having in mind the protection of the 
passengers, it if fails to eliminate an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury. The 
manufacturer may be held liable for negligence that has caused injuries, even if found not 
liable for the initial accident. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
OBJECTIONS TO FORD'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
INTRODUCTION 
At the time Plaintiffs' filed their initial objections to Ford's proposed jury instruction, 
Plaintiffs did not know the source of some of Ford's proposed jury instructions. The parties met 
on Friday, February 2,2007, to agree on the submitted jury instructions. At that time, Plaintiffs' 
counsel was informed that some of the objected to proposed jury instructions were actually drafts 
1 
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presented of Ford's design changes in later model year Explorers. This instruction would 
unfairly confuse the jury. 
IL 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO FORD'S NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiffs object to Ford's proposed jury instructions (SEE EXH Z) on negligence as 
follows: 
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT - The first sentence should 
be modified to add "or entity" so the instruction does not unreasonably focus on Tony Clayton, 
the driver of the Explorer. 
NEGLIGENCE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CLAIM - Objection. This instruction 
says manufacturer. MUJI 12.16 should be given in addition to Ford's proposed instruction on the 
elements of negligent design as its states the defendant's duty under the law. 
NEGLIGENT - DUTY OF DESIGNER/MANUFACTURER - Objection. Plaintiffs 
object to the dicta in the second paragraph that states: 
"However, there is no duty to make a safe product safer. A manufacturer has no duty to 
refrain from marketing a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or to inform 
the consumer of the availability of the safer model." 
The jury instruction would confuse the jury. 
PROXIMATE CAUSE -
DEFECTIVE DESIGN ESSENTIAL TO NEGLIGENCE CLAIM - Objection. Ford's 
proposed jury instruction impermissible singles out their theory and the court may place weight on 
that instruction. The jury is already instructed on the essential elements of the claim of design 
negligence under other instructions. This instruction is improper. 
III. 
FORD'S DRIVER JURY INSTRUCTIONS ADVISING THE JURY THAT A 
DRIVER HAS A DUTY TO USE "REASONABLE CARE" ARE CUMULATIVE. 
ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS FORD'S 
PROPOSED "LOOKOUT" INSTRUCTION. 
Ford has proposed four driver jury instructions (SEE EXH AA) which essentially instruct 
the jury as follows: 
'The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to 
avoid placing others in danger." (Driver or Operator Duty/MUJI 5.1.) 
"Even if a driver complies with an applicable statute, ordinance or safety rule, this does 
not excuse that driver from the duty to act with reasonable care in other respects. 
One must always maintain a proper lookout for other traffic and hazards 
reasonably anticipated on the highway, and keep one's car under proper control." 
(Duty of Reasonable Care for all Drivers/MUJI 5.10.) 
"It is the duty of every person upon a public highway to exercise reasonable care at 
all times to avoid placing oneself or others in danger, and to use reasonable care to 
avoid causing an accident." (Duties of Persons on Public Highways/MUJI 5.21.) 
"The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a 
proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily 
careful person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those 
reasonably to be anticipated, [f ] A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and 
conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and apparent and to realize 
obvious dangers. This duty does not merely require looking, but also requires observing 
and understanding other traffic and the general situation. (Lookout/MUJI 5.14.) 
The only jury instruction that should be given is MUJI 5.1. Repetitive instructions on this 
issue will tend to reemphasize the defendants case, are confusing, and might amount to an 
inappropriate judicial comment on the evidence. (See Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1335-
1336 (Utah 1993).) 
There is no evidence that supports a "lookout" jury instruction. No one testified that 
there were any hazards, such as a deer in the road or oncoming car, to leave the road. No one 
testified that Tony Clayton should have seen objects and conditions in plain sight. The only 
12 
evidence was that it was a clear day, mid afternoon and there were good road conditions. 
Consequently, MUJI 5.10 and 5.14 should not be given. 
IV. 
FORD'S PROPOSED STATUTE OF LIMITATION JURY INSTRUCTIONS DO 
NOT FAIRLY STATE THE LAW. 
Ford proposed statute of limitations jury instruction (SEE EXH BB) asking the jury to 
find a "date" should be rejected because it contains an unfair summary of statement of the law. 
Utah Ann. Code, § 78-15-3, that defines the statute of limitations period in which to file a 
product's liability action states: 
"A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the time the 
individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its cause." 
The Complaint as it pertains to Kellie Montoya's causes of action allege: (1) the 1997 
Explorer was defectively due to the safety (anti) sway bar link design; (2) it was defective due to 
a front suspension geometry defect design in the area in which the steering and sway bar must 
operate that allowed metal to metal contact leading to reverse bending of the tie rod; (3) it was 
defective in its overall stability design because it did not have a sufficient margin of safety; (4) 
and Ford failed to adequately warn about the defects. 
Ford has the burden of proof to present evidence of the facts essential to the defense of 
the statute of limitations. {Stevens v. Rogers, 16 Utah 105, 109 (Utah 1897).) Ford's proposed 
jury instructions shifts the burden of proof from Ford having to prove its statute of limitations 
defense. Additionally, Ford's proposed instruction omits any mention of the delayed discovery 
rule. The policy behind this rule is that a potential plaintiff should not be barred from suit if he 
or she did not know and could not reasonably have known of the underlying facts giving rise to a 
cause of action. (See, Utah Ann. Code, § 78-15-3; Robinson v. Morrow, 2004 UT App 285, P10 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 000909522 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO FORD'S 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
I. BIFURCATION OF THE OCCUPANTS' INJURIES WOULD CAUSE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Bifurcated trials remain the exception, not the rule. (Cf., Angelo v. Armstrong World 
Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) [separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely 
ordered]; Laitram Corporation v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 791 F. Supp. 113, 114 (E.D.La. 
1992); See also, Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 
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1976) (bifurcation is the exception rather than the rule); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145 F.R.D. 314, 
317 (S.D.N. Y. 1993) (separation of issues is not the usual course under Rule 42(b).) The moving 
party bears the burden of establishing that separate trials are necessary to prevent prejudice or 
confusion and serve the ends of justice. (Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 
(S.D.N. Y. 1990).) 
The two Utah cases Ford relies upon are not on point. SCFCILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., 
Inc., 801F. Supp. 517, 528 (D. Utah 1992) involved bifurcation of the antitrust issues and the 
non-antitrust issues - - not liability and damages. In Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the trial court reasoned that 
testimony concerning diminution in value of the property was too "speculative" because it had to 
assume too much over a period beginning with a possible jury verdict requiring forfeiture and 
ending twenty-five years of a lease. 
While Ford has presented evidence in its moving papers that a District Court recently 
granted bifurcation, courts also routinely reject bifurcation motions given the circumstances. 
(See Plaintiffs' Exhibits A [Aldous v. Honda, et al] and B [Bowers v. Navistar International 
Transportation Corp, et al] attached.) To rebut Ford's contention that bifurcation is proper, 
Plaintiffs have submitted Exhibits A and B, two other cases where bifurcation was NOT granted. 
Nonetheless, keeping in mind that bifurcation is the exception, not the rule, the issue of 
bifurcation should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis (Cf, Spectra-Physics Lasers, Inc. v. 
Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99,101 (D. Cal. 1992)), i.e., based on the pleading allegations and 
testimony anticipated at trial. 
In determining whether to grant Ford's request for bifurcation, this Court must be 
satisfied that the decision to bifurcate does not unfairly prejudice the Plaintiffs who are the 
non-moving party. (See Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964 
["Regardless of efficiency and separability, however, bifurcation is an abuse of discretion if it is 
unfair or prejudicial to a party."] Prejudice is the Court's most important consideration in 
deciding whether to order separate trials under Rule 42(b). (See, Laitram Corp. v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 791 F. Supp. 113,115.) Regardless of efficiency and separability, 
bifurcation is an abuse of discretion if it is unfair or prejudicial to a party. (Angelo v. Armstrong 
World Indus., supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964; see also, Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1152 (6th 
Cir. 1988); Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980).) 
Ford has not met its burden of establishing lack of prejudice to Plaintiffs. The decision to 
bifurcate centers on a balance of equities. Plaintiffs have spent six years and hundreds of 
thousands of dollars investigating this case. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Explorer's design 
and manufacture was defective and was unreasonably dangerous because it did not adequately 
protect its occupants from injury during the crash and crash worthiness of the vehicle. (See 
Amended Complaint, 112 (b).) 
Ford argues that the injuries/damages should be bifurcated because if Tony is more than 
50 percent liable, then Ford is not responsible for any damages. (Ford Memorandum, p. 7.) This 
is not a correct application of the law. An automobile manufacturer can be held liable if it has 
NOT exercised reasonable care in designing and constructing a vehicle, having in mind the 
protection of the passengers. Under the crash worthiness doctrine, a manufacturer can be held 
responsible for failing to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury. (See, Fox v. Ford 
Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1978) citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 
495 (8th Cir. 1968).) The fact that a negligent driver may be the initial cause of an accident does 
not abrogate the manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care in designing an automobile to 
reduce the risk of "secondary impact" injuries. (See, Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d 
281, 288 (4th Cir. 1998), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A com.) The crash 
worthiness theory is a theory describing liability for negligence that has caused injuries, but not 
the initial accident. {Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 133 F.3d 281, 288, citing Seese v. 
VolkswagenwerkA. G., 648 F.2d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1981).) Thus, the injury evidence is relevant 
to whether the occupant's injuries were enhanced by the lack of crash worthiness of design. 
Citing a lengthy string of cases, Ford has characterized this trial as being capable of 
divisible phases, the "liability" and "damage" phases. (Ford's Memorandum p. 4.) It cannot be 
characterized as such. "Injuries" are not synonymous with "damages." Bifurcation is improper if 
the issues are not separable. {Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964.) The 
injury issues are not separable from the damage issues. Evidence of Tony Clayton and Kellie 
Montoya's injuries should be tried concurrently because the injuries have an important bearing 
on the question of liability and reasonableness of design. 
Ford's argument that bifurcation would not substantially prejudice Plaintiff Kellie 
Montoya (because of the statute of limitations summary judgment issue that was previously 
denied) should be rejected. In order to prove the Explorer's defective design, Kellie must show 
her injuries occurred even though the product was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner (she 
was seat belted) and the likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause injury. 
Thus, the jury must consider: "The gravity of danger posed by the design" and "the likelihood 
that such danger posed by the design would cause injury or damage. (See Exhibit C, MUJI 12.5.) 
Bifurcation would prejudice Kellie's claims on crash worthiness in that the jury would 
not then hear about the extent of her brain injury in deliberating on the reasonableness of the 
Explorer's occupant protection design. To hold otherwise, would allow the jury to infer that 
Kellie merely impacted her head in the rollover, without considering the nature and the extent of 
the injuries, and the reasonableness of the occupant protection design and crash worthiness of the 
Explorer. 
Likewise, the jury should hear of the extent of Tony Clayton's injuries in considering 
whether Ford failed to warn of the defects, whether the product was used in a reasonably 
foreseeable manner, occupant protection and the circumstantial evidence of the events. While 
the seat belt contains only "slight" stretch marks, Plaintiffs' contend that Tony's injuries are 
forensic evidence indicative that he was belted because he did not hit Kellie's body during the 
rollover sequences. Thus, Ford has not met its burden of establishing that the damage/injury 
issues are severable. 
II. BIFURCATION OF THE INJURY EVIDENCE OF THE TRIAL WOULD 
PREJUDICE THE PLAINTIFFS AND CONSUME UNNECESSARY TIME. 
In Utah, bifurcation of the punitive damages issue is automatic. Bifurcation of the 
general damage/injury issues would require the jury to deliberate three times, and is therefore not 
an expedient solution to the jury's use of time. The jury will be impaneled for at least six weeks, 
therefore, causing them to deliberate on two more occasions (and scheduling two more trials on 
damage and punitive damage issues) would cause an unreasonable and unnecessary delay and 
burden. Under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to their day in court and are entitled to present their complete cause to the jury. 
Ford has not established that the injury/damage portion of Plaintiffs' expert testimony 
will be unduly time consuming. Ford knows that Dr. Justin Fair is unavailable for trial and 
therefore, only a portion of his testimony will be read to the jury. (See Plaintiffs' Motion in 
Limine No. 18.) Ford's expert, John Hoffman, M.D., should not be able to testify at trial as he 
was NOT previously named by Ford in the expert witness exchange pursuant to the court's order. 
(See Ford's motion, p. 2, footnote 2, but see Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No.26.) 
Plaintiffs do not plan on calling all fifteen "potential" fact witnesses as portrayed in 
Ford's motion, page 2, footnote 3. In fact, Plaintiffs' have filed a motion to exclude the treating 
testimony identified by Ford in its Rule 26 (a)(4) disclosure exchanged on November 10, 2006. 
(See Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 27.) Plaintiffs believe that much of the medical testimony 
about Kellie's initial injuries can be discussed through Dr. Hewitt's testimony. Plaintiffs intend 
to call Dr. Joyce Anis, a neuropsychologist; Dr. Elena Hewitt, a neurologist and Dr. Joseph Wu 
to testify regarding Kellie's severe brain shearing injury and permanent brain damage. 
The only expert that Plaintiffs anticipate examining with exhibits, is Dr. Wu. Dr. Wu's 
testimony is limited to the physiological evidence consistent with the brain injury suffered by 
Kellie Montoya, and is anticipated to take no more than a couple of hours on direct. Based on 
the previous depositions by Ford, it is anticipated that Dr. Hewitt and Dr. Anis's testimony 
(together) would probably take approximately one day. It is anticipated that Plaintiffs' economic 
expert, Robert Johnson would take approximately 2 hours, to present the economic damages. 
"[E]ven if bifurcation might somehow promote judicial economy, courts should not order 
separate trials when bifurcation would result in unnecessary delay, additional expense, or some 
other form of prejudice. Essentially, then., courts must balance the equities in ruling on a motion 
to bifurcate." (Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 791 F. Supp. 113, 115, citations 
omitted.) 
Here, bifurcation will not save weeks of trial. (See Ford's Memorandum, p.5.) Contrary 
to Ford's claim that only two witnesses (Kellie Montoya and her twin sister) could be expected to 
testify at both stages of the trial, bifurcation would require Fred Clayton and Phil Van Orden 
who went to the scene of the rollover and observed the Clayton Explorer the day after Tony 
Clayton died to testify in both phases of the case. 
Equally unavailing is Ford's suggestion that Plaintiffs "present some limited medical 
evidence during the liability phase." (See, Ford's Memorandum, p. 8.) This would also require 
Plaintiffs' to attempt to sort out what evidence constitutes injury and what constitutes damages 
and incur the burden of an unnecessary expert witness costs. In the meantime, Plaintiffs, Fred 
and Dolores Clayton and counsel may have the tremendous expense of living in a motel during 
the trial while the jury is instructed three time to deliberate. Rule 42(b) permits courts to phase a 
case into separate trials if it is convenient. Central to that question is whether the issues would 
involve many of the same witnesses and documentary evidence. If the proof overlaps 
substantially, the parties, the witnesses and the court are inconvenienced. {Laitram Corp. v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 791 F. Supp. 113,117.) 
Ford's argument that the presentation of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages would prejudice 
their case is without merit. Ford's Motion is merely another effort to sanitize the trial to avoid 
liability. As argued, bifurcation is the exception, not the rule. Cases are routinely tried without 
bifurcation into phases. Jurors are adequately instructed that the case must be decided without 
regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice. (Exhibit D, MUJI 2.3.) Ford can always argue this 
instruction to the jury. It is presumed that the jury deliberates as instructed. 
For all of the above reasons, Ford's Motion to Bifurcate the case into three separate 
phases should be Denied. 
Dated: November 28, 2006. Respectfullyjj^mittedrN 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
NEW YORK 
1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7855 
May 30,1996, Decided 
May 30,1996, FILED 
DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendant's Motion for an Order of 
Bifurcation DENIED. 
COUNSEL: Appearances: 
JohnK. Powers, Esq., POWERS, SANTOLA LAW FIRM, 
Albany, New York. Ralph Edwin Chapman, Esq., 
CHAPMAN, LEWIS & SWAN, Clarksdale, MS, For 
Plaintiff. 
Michael E. Yaggy, Esq., PIPER, MARBURY LAW FIRM, 
Baltimore, MD. Howard A. Fried, Esq., New York, New 
York, For Defendants. 
JUDGES: Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief U.S. District Judge 
OPINION BY: Thomas J. McAvoy 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION & ORDER 
On May 24, 1992, plaintiff suffered severe injuries 
while operating an all-terrain vehicle manufactured by 
defendants. Plaintiff has since commenced this action 
against defendants on the theories of strict product 
liability, negligence and breach of warranty. Defendants 
now move for an order bifurcating the pending trial of 
plaintiffs action into separate liability and damages phases 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Plaintiff opposes 
bifurcation. 
I. DISCUSSION 
A. The Bifurcation Analysis: 
Rule 42(b) provides that "the court, in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials 
will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a 
separate trial . . . of any separate issue." At the [*2] 
threshold, the Court notes that for bifurcation to be 
appropriate, the issues to be bifurcated must be separate: 
bifurcation is inappropriate where the "same witnesses 
may be needed to testify as to both the issues of liability 
and damages, and . . . evidence pertaining to these issues 
may very well overlap." Hardin Group, Inc. v. Village of 
Solvay, 1990 WL 164694 *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying 
bifurcation in the face of evidentiary overlap "in an effort 
to promote efficiency"). The decision whether or not to 
bifurcate lies within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and turns primarily on the Court's assessment of "the 
various considerations of convenience, prejudice to the 
parties, expedition, and economy of resources." Witherbee 
v. Honeywell 151 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). The 
burden of demonstrating that bifurcation is appropriate, 
however, rests with the party seeking same. 
B. The Analysis Applied: 
i. Separability: 
Turning first to separability, while defendants claim 
(somewhat conclusorily) that the issues of liability and 
damages are clearly distinct and separate, plaintiff responds 
that a great deal of the evidence, particularly as to the 
medical [*3] proof, of the nature, the extent, and the 
pattern of plaintiffs injuries will be necessary to 
substantiate plaintiffs account of how the accident 
occurred. Furthermore, plaintiff claims that medical proof 
of plaintiff s injuries is necessary to prove the actual force 
of the impact and resulting injuries. Finally, if the Court 
correctly understands plaintiffs arguments opposing 
defendants' defense based on their "separation" theory, 
evidence of plaintiffs injuries will be necessary to show 
that defendants' vehicle was defectively designed. 
Defendants have made no showing contradicting 
plaintiffs averments that his injuries will need to be 
explored by the jury in deciding liability issues, and again 
considered by the jury in deliberating on plaintiffs 
damages, nl On this showing, then, while it appears to the 
Court that the issues are conceivably severable, it does not 
appear that the issues of liability and damages are distinctly 
separate, compare Witherbee, 151 F.R.D. at 29 (granting 
bifurcation because "it appears to the Court as though the 
evidence required to establish liability on the part of the 
defendants is separate and distinct from the evidence that 
the [*4] plaintiffs must proffer in establishing their 
damages.") (emphasis added). 
nl While defendants indicate that they are 
prepared to stipulate that plaintiff sustained certain 
personal injuries as a result of the accident, they 
also acknowledge that evidence relating to the 
biomechanics of plaintiff s injuries, and the manner 
in which they were sustained, will be offered during 
the liability phase and admitted as necessary and 
relevant. 
ii. Judicial Economy: 
Defendants claim that the parties anticipate calling 
nine separate damages experts and that if bifurcated, at 
least fifty percent of the trial time will be saved (assuming 
a liability verdict in defendants1 favor). Plaintiff (who 
presumably is in a better position to estimate his own 
intentions) responds that defendants' estimates are greatly 
exaggerated. Plaintiff indicates that he anticipates he will 
probably call four experts in connection with the damage 
phase of his case, together with several fact witnesses 
(some of whom will have already testified [*5] as to 
liability if bifurcation is ordered). n2 Plaintiffs bottomline 
is that the damage phase of his case, if consolidated with 
the liability phase, will take two to three days. 
n2 While plaintiff is careful to couch his 
estimates in terms of probability, the Court assumes 
that plaintiff does not make these representations 
lightly or without full and careful consideration of 
his case. Plaintiff is no doubt likewise mindful that 
any significant expansion of his damages proof 
beyond the estimates that the Court bases its 
decision on today could well support a preclusion 
motion by defendants. 
While the avoidance of three to four trial days is not an 
insignificant savings, it represents a less compelling 
economy when balanced against the inevitable lost time in 
conducting two openings and closings, two charges, and 
twice empaneling the jury. See Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145 
F.R.D. 314, 317 (S.D.N. Y. 1993) ("efficient judicial 
administration... favorfs] having only one trial whenever 
possible"). Additionally, [*6] unless the Court employs a 
trial schedule which incorporates a period of delay between 
the two phases, whether the trial is bifurcated or not the 
parties and the Court will nevertheless have to conference, 
and the Court will have to prepare in advance, full charges 
for both phases. Furthermore, the Court notes that the 
projected savings will only be realized upon the 
contingency of a liability verdict favorable to defendants. 
While the Court expresses no opinion as to the outcome of 
this trial, it is safe to say that defendants' projected savings 
are by no means guaranteed. 
Finally, the overlap of the injury evidence and 
testimony discussed supra poses the problem of whether to 
allow those witnesses to testify twice, or to simply rely on 
the jury's ability to "carry-over" that evidence from the 
liability phase to the damages deliberations. The former 
obviously taxes the Courts (and plaintiffs) resources, while 
the latter raises fairness concerns regarding plaintiffs 
opportunity to fully litigate both these issues. 
iii. Prejudice to Defendants: 
Finally, defendants argue that they will be prejudiced 
by the trial of liability and damages together. While there 
is certainly [*7] the possibility of prejudice by trying the 
issues together, such prejudice is not unavoidable in the 
absence of bifurcation. Indeed, the conclusion that 
defendants actually point to only a possibility of prejudice 
is underscored by the reality that one trial for liability and 
damages is the rule — bifurcation is the exception. 
Defendants point to no particular factors specific to this 
case that distinguish the potential for prejudice here from 
the potential prejudice which is normally and customarily 
dealt with through an appropriate charge and curative 
instructions where necessary. n3 The Court does not go so 
far as to demand herein a showing of extraordinary 
prejudice before it will order bifurcation in any case. 
Where, however, as here, the issues are not cleanly separate 
and the economies are not exceedingly substantial, the 
Court will look for a showing of more than that prejudice 
"that is normally experienced by a defendant who is found 
liable in a personal injury action . . . where the issues of 
liability and damages are tried to a single jury." Monaghan 
v. SZS 33 Assoc, L.P., 827 F. Supp. 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). Defendants have not shown that level of prejudice 
[*8] here. 
n3 Likewise the Court perceives no unusual 
danger of jury confusion from trying the issues 
together. 
n. CONCLUSION 
Defendants have not established either that the issues 
to be tried are cleanly separable, that bifurcation will yield 
a significant conservation of judicial resources, or that in 
the absence of bifurcation they will be subjected to 
extraordinary undue prejudice. As such, defendant's Motion 
for an Order of Bifurcation is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Binghamton, New York 
May 30, 1996 
Thomas J. McAvoy 
Chief U.S. District Judge 
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ROBERT BOWERS and JILL BOWERS, Plaintiffs, v. NAVISTAR 
EVTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORP., formerly known as 
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY INC., formerly known as 
NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP., formerly known as INTERNATIONAL 
HARVESTER CORP., PRECO, INC., and SOMERSET WELDING AND 
STEEL INC., Defendants. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION CORP., formerly known as INTERNATIONAL 
HARVESTER COMPANY INC., formerly known as NAVISTAR 
INTERNATIONAL CORP., formerly known as INTERNATIONAL 
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THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Third-
Party Defendants. SOMERSET WELDING & STEEL, INC., Second Third-Party 
Defendants, v. METROPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC., Second 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
NEW YORK 
1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6129 
May 10,1993, Decided 
May 10,1993, Filed 
JUDGES: [*1] SOTOMAYOR 
OPINION BY: SOMA SOTOMAYOR 
OPINION: 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Third-party defendants the City of New York and the 
New York City Department of Transportation (together 
"the City") move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 
42(b), for separate trials of the product liability claim and 
negligence claims brought against it. The City maintains 
that separate trials will further judicial economy, expedite 
the trial of the case, avert confusion of the issues by the 
triers of fact, and prevent substantial prejudice to it. 
Plaintiffs Robert Bowers and Jill Bowers (together 
"plaintiffs") and defendants Navistar International 
Transportation Corp. ("Navistar"), Preco, Inc. ("Preco"), 
and Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc. ("Somerset") (together 
"defendants") oppose the motion maintaining, inter alia, 
(1) that the product liability claim is inextricably 
intertwined with the third-party negligence claim asserted 
against the City, (2) that substantially the same witnesses 
and documentary evidence will be necessary to determine 
liability and damages, and (3) that the incentive for 
settlement of the case will be eliminated if separate trials 
are ordered. For the reasons stated below, the City's motion 
for separate [*2] trials is DENIED. 
This is a personal injury case stemming from an 
accident at a repaving work-site in Brooklyn, New York. 
On September 2, 1986, plaintiff Robert Bowers 
("Bowers"), a member of a repaving crew in charge of 
cleaning hot asphalt from the tail-gates of asphalt trucks, 
was injured by a dump truck driven by a fellow co-worker 
which reversed into him. The truck initially hit Bowers in 
the neck, pushing him down to the pavement and rolling 
over part of his body before other co-workers alerted the 
driver to the accident. Bowers suffered severe and 
permanent injuries, necessitating long periods of 
hospitalization and a host of surgical interventions. 
On November 17, 1988, plaintiffs commenced an 
action against Navister in state court. The case was 
removed to federal court on December 15, 1988 and on 
March 10, 1989, the Complaint was amended to assert 
product liability actions against (1) Navistar, the 
manufacturer of the dump truck's cab and chassis; (2) 
Preco, the manufacturer of the truck's electronic audible 
back-up system ("back-up alarm system" or "alarm 
system"); and (3) Somerset, the installer of the alarm 
system. Defendants Navistar, Preco and [*3] Somerset 
filed third-party complaints against the City as well as 
cross-claims against each other, alleging that any 
malfunction or improper installation of the back-up alarm 
system was due to the other parties' negligence and seeking 
indemnification and contribution with respect to any sums 
that ultimately might be adjudged against any of them. 
BACKGROUND Bowers essentially contends that the back-up alarm 
systems' audibility was inadequate given the noise level 
prevalent at the work-site where the accident occurred. In 
particular, Bowers maintains that the location and direction 
of the alarm, i.e., at the rear, "underneath the cab and 
chassis," and facing the front of the vehicle, compromised 
its audibility. In the alternative, Bower asserts that the 
alarm failed to work properly on the day in question. 
Defendants contest Bowers' assertion that the back-up 
alarm system failed to work as required by the City's 
specifications or that its installation under the cab and 
chassis or its direction rendered it inaudible to Bowers. 
Defendants claim that the accident resulted in whole or in 
part from Bowers' contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk in working despite diminished sensory and [*4] 
auditory capacities induced by a perception-inhibiting drug 
Xanax. Moreover, defendants maintain that Bowers' pre-
existing hearing loss caused or contributed to his inability 
to hear the back-up alarm. 
The City moves for separate trials on the products 
liability and negligence claims on the grounds of prejudice, 
complexity of the issues and judicial economy. Generally, 
the City argues that separate trials are proper because this 
case presents "two significantly different claims, the first 
for products liability and the second for negligence. And, 
the witnesses and proof concern either the products claims 
or the second group of claims, with little or no overlap." A 
careful review of the record, however, reveals that far from 
two distinct and separate claims involving substantially 
different sets of witnesses, this case presents fundamentally 
intertwined claims, necessitating extensive testimony by 
the same factual and expert witnesses with respect to both 
theories of liability. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 42(b) states: 
Separate Trials. The Court, in furtherance 
of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or 
when separate trials will be conducive to 
expedition and economy, may order a [*5] 
separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any 
separate issue or of any number of claims, 
crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party 
claims, or issues, always preserving the 
inviolate right of trial by jury as declared by 
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution 
or as given by a statute of the United States. 
28 US.C Rule 42(b) (1990). 
The aim and purpose of the Rule is aptly summarized 
in C. Wright and A Millers' Federal Practice and 
Procedure: 
The provision for separate trials in Rule 
42(b) is intended to further convenience, 
avoid delay and prejudice, and serve the 
ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient 
judicial administration that is to be 
controlling, rather than the wishes of the 
parties. The piecemeal trial of separate 
issues in a single suit is not to be the usual 
course. It should be resorted to only in the 
exercise of informed discretion when the 
court believes that separation will achieve 
the purposes of the rule. 
9 § 2388, at 279 (1971) (emphasis supplied); see also, 
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 42(b). 
As explained recently by the Second Circuit in United 
States [*6] v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158, 
6160, 1993 WL 100100, * 1 (2d Cir, April 6, 1993), the 
purpose of separate trials under Rule 42(b) is to "isolate 
issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and perhaps needless 
litigation... [and to] encourage settlement discussions and 
speed[] up remedial action." Id., at * 5 (citing, Amoco Oil 
v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Katsaros v. Cody, 744F.2d270, 278 (2dCir.), cert, denied 
sub nom., 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d 506 
(1984) (separate trials are proper to further convenience or 
to avoid prejudice); Ismail v. Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251 
(S.D.N. Y. 1989) (quoting, United States v. International 
Business Machines Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D.NY. 
1973) (separate trials under Rule 42(b) are appropriate, 
although not mandatory, to "(1) avoid prejudice; (2) 
provide for convenience, or (3) expedite the proceedings 
and be economical"). Separate trials, however, remain the 
exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Response of 
Carolina, Inc. v. LeascoResponse, Inc., 537F.2d 137 (5th 
Cir. 1976) [*7] (bifurcation is the exception rather than 
the rule); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145 F.R.D. 314, 317 
(S.D.N. Y. 1993) (separation of issues is not the usual course 
under Rule 42(b)). The moving party bears the burden of 
establishing that separate trials are necessary to prevent 
prejudice or confusion and serve the ends of justice. 
Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 
(S.D.NY 1990). 
Bifurcation rests within the sound discretion of the 
court. Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 278 (quoting, In re Master 
Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d 
506 (1984)). When confronted with a motion for separate 
trials, a court must pay particular attention to the nature and 
relation of the claims and the evidence necessary to 
establish each claim. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. 
McNary, 144 F.R.D. 191, 192 (S.DMY. 1992); see also, 
Zofcin v. Dean, 144 F.R.D. 203 (S.D.N. Y. 1992). When the 
evidentiary proof necessary [*8] to establish two or more 
distinct claims is different for each claim, see Haitian 
Centers, 144 F.R.D. at 192, or prejudice will result to one 
of the parties from the admission of evidence on one of the 
claims, set Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251, separate trials may 
be appropriate. By contrast, separate trials are inappropriate 
when the issues, witnesses and documentary evidence 
overlap. See In re Agent Orange Product liability 
Litigation, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1276-77 (E.D.NY. 1983) 
(denying separate trials because the issue of liability and 
causation merged to such an extent that there would be 
substantial duplication of evidence if the separate trials 
were held); see also, Drake v. Handman, 30 F.R.D. 394 
(S.D.N. Y. 1962); Woburn v. Degreasing Co. of N.J. v. 
SpencerKellogg&Sons, 37F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1941). 
Thus, Rule 42(b) does not call for a bright-line test; rather, 
a factual and legal analysis of each case informs the court 
as to the propriety of separate trials. Haitian Centers, 144 
F.R.D. at 192 [*9] (bifurcation demands a case by case 
analysis of the factual and legal issues of each case). 
The City has failed to demonstrate that bifurcation of 
the product liability and negligence claims will result in 
undue prejudice, further judicial economy or expedite the 
proceedings in this case. Undue prejudice obtains when the 
jury is unable to compartmentalize and isolate the evidence 
of liability on a particular claim against one of the parties 
and instead allows its evaluation of the evidence to 
contaminate its determination of another defendant's 
liability. See Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251. However, when 
the claims, witnesses and evidence overlap, no prejudice is 
visited upon the parties by joint trial of the claims. See, 
e.g., In re Agent Orange, 565 F. Supp. at 1276-77. This is 
so because the evidence on one claim is relevant and 
necessary to establish an independent but interrelated claim 
asserted against another party to the lawsuit. 
In this case, it is impossible to separate the alleged 
design and manufacture defect claims from the City's 
negligence, because the back-up alarm system was selected 
and installed according [*10] to the City's specifications; 
inspected and evaluated by the City's personnel; and 
maintained and operated by City's employees. Any 
determination as to the alarm system's audibility and its 
actual performance in this case must, perforce, include the 
testimony not only of the City technicians who determined 
the alarm's compliance with City specifications and the 
City employees who examined the truck prior to and after 
the accident, but also the testimony of those City 
employees who were present at the accident. Simply put, 
the alarm's performance, the effect of its installation in the 
rear portion of the truck, and the City's use of the 
equipment cannot be decided in a vacuum and will depend 
to a substantial degree on testimony regarding its 
performance in the field. Indeed, the non-moving parties 
would be prejudiced by separate trials, as liability would be 
impossible to ascertain without introduction of evidence on 
the alarm's field performance; thus making it impossible to 
determine the validity of plaintiffs' claims product liability 
claim. 
Similarly, separate trials would run counter to judicial 
economy. Substantially identical witness testimony will be 
used to establish [*11] both the products liability and 
negligence claim. In particular, virtually identical witness 
testimony will be introduced regarding the alarm's 
audibility, the noise level at the work-site and the safety 
procedures used by the City in its operation of the asphalt 
trucks. All of these issues are essential to the establishment 
of both the products liability and negligence claims. Thus, 
separate trials would contribute nothing but duplication and 
waste of judicial resources. 
The City cites In Re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 
F.2d207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 929,103 S. 
Ct 2090, 77L.Ed. 2d300(1983), onremand, 583F. Supp. 
1163 (E.D.Ky. 1984), Reading Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 61 F.R.D. 662, 664 (S.D.N Y. 1974), and/n 
re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310 
(CD. Cat. 1975), for the proposition that separate trials are 
advisable when a court is confronted with complex legal 
and factual issues that may lead to jury confusion. The 
cases are inapposite to the case at bar exactly because [*12] 
they involve complex factual and legal issues not present in 
this case. In re Beverly Hills, 695 F.2d at 217 (complex 
products liability case stemming from a major fire 
disaster), Reading Industries, 61 F.2d at 664 (S.D.N. Y 
1974) (complex antitrust case), and In re Paris Air Crash, 
69 F.R.D. at 322 (major air crash involving hundreds of 
lawsuits by 1,100 claimants against multiple defendants, 
and numerous third party claims, cross-claims and counter-
claims). There is simply a dearth of evidence that the issues 
raised by this case are sufficiently complex to cause the 
jury confusion or undue prejudicial effect inherent in those 
cases. 
The City also inappropriately relies upon Ismail v. 
Cohen, 706F. Supp. 243 (S.DMY. 1989), affd, 899F.2d 
183 (2d Cir. 1990), where the court ordered the separate 
trials of plaintiffs § § 1981 and 1983 claims against a 
police officer. In Ismail, the court ordered separate trials 
after finding that adjudication of plaintiff s § 1983 claim 
was not only independent from the § 1981 claim. By 
contrast, [* 13] resolution of the product liability claim in 
this case is inextricably intertwined with the negligence 
claim asserted against the City. 
Finally, separate trials in this case would truncate 
settlement negotiations, encourage lengthy and duplicative 
litigation, and postpone adjudication of liability for Bower's 
severe injuries. This result would run counter to the Second 
Circuit's recent pronouncement in United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158, 6160,1993 WL100100, * 
1,5 (2d Cir., April 6,1993). Contrary to the City's position, 
separate trials in this case is likely to eviscerate any 
incentive the parties may have to settle this already 
protracted and costly litigation. Bifurcation would force 
primary defendants to proceed to trial and have the claims 
reduced to a verdict in order to pursue indemnification and 
contribution from the City. Thus, rather than expedite the 
proceedings in this case and foster judicial economy, 
separate trials would have the negative effect of 
lengthening and duplicating litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court finds that the factual and legal questions 
raised by plaintiffs1 product liability and negligence claims 
are interdependent and [*14] fundamentally intertwined. 
Because separate trials at the product liability and 
negligence claims in this action would result in substantial 
duplication of testimony and would not result in prejudice 
to the City, the City's motion for separate trials is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: New York, New York 
May 10, 1993 
SONIA SOTOMAYOR 
U.S.DJ. 
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12.5 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL 
MUJI 12.5 
DEFINITION OF DEFECTIVE DESIGN 
(Alternate B) 
A product is defective in design: 
1. If it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer or user 
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable 
manner," or 
2. If there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs 
the benefits of that design. 
In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh the risks 
to which the product exposes the consumer or user, you may consider, 
among other things" 
1. The gravity of danger posed by the design," 
2. The likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause 
injury or damage," 
3. The usefulness and desirability of the product to the consumer or 
user and the public in general," 
4. The availability of a substitute product that would serve the same 
function but would not be as dangerous," 
5. The ease or difficulty with which the unsafe character of the 
product could be eliminated without impairing its usefulness or making 
it too expensive to maintain its utility," and 
6. The adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that 
would result from an alternate design. 
Comments 
The definition of defective design, Alternate A, is an alternative 
definition of design defect that has been adopted by a number of courts and 
jurisdictions based upon Barker v. LullEng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to address whether it would 
adopt Alternate B, which allows the trial court to submit one or both 
alternative definitions of design defect to the jury. Under Alternate B, if 
the plaintiff claims that the risk of danger inherent in the design 
outweighs the benefit of the design, then the plaintiff must make a prima 
facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's 
design. The burden of proof the a shifts to the defendant to prove that the 
product was not defective because the benefits of the product as a whole 
outweigh the danger inherent in the product's design. Bates v. John Deere 
Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1983); Akers v. Kelley Co., Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 513 
(1985). 
References'-
Barker v. LullEng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) 
BAJI No. 9.00.5 (1986). Reprinted with permission? copyright © 1986 
West Publishing Company 
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2.3 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL 
MUJI2 .3 
SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel 
sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this 
case based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion 
or prejudice. 
Referenced 
JIFU No. 1.5 (1957) 
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EXCERPTS APPLICABLE CITED RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(3)(A) - A party shall disclose to other parties the identify of any 
person who may be used at trial to present evidence unde Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(3) (Advisory Comm. Note) - In effect, the report will serve in lieu 
of responses to standard interrogatories. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 42 - The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may 
order a separate trial of any claim.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(a) - The court may permit the parties or their attorney to conduct the 
examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court shall permit the parties of their attorneys to supplement the examination 
by such further inquiry as is material and proper.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(1) - ...The juror challenged and any other person may be examined 
as a witness of the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one 
or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon 
the same grounds. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6) - Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that 
reasonably lead the court to conclude the jury is not likely to act impartially. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 - ...[A] new trial may be granted ...the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions 
oflaw.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) - Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party...which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(7) - Error in law. 
Utah R. Evid. 401 - Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 - Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations or...presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 602 - A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter... 
Utah R. Evid. 608 (c) - Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise 
adduced. 
Utah R. Evid. 701 - If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in 
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 - If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 803 (8) (C) - (Public records and report) ...in civil actions and 
proceedings...factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
APPLICABLE CITED STATUTE 
§ 78-24-1 states: "All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in 
this chapter, who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known 
their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons who have 
an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor those who have been 
convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their opinions on matters of religious 
belief; although, in every case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, by 
the manner in which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by evidence 
affecting his character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his motives, or by 
contradictory evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of his credibility." 
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LAW OFFICES OF THOR O. EMBLEM 
205 West Fifth Ave., Suite 105 
Escondido, CA 92025 
Telephone: (760) 738-9301 
Fax: (760) 738-9409 
Matthew H. Raty (#6635) 
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW 11 R ATY I'( 
New England Professional Plaza 
9677 South 700 East, Suite D 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 495-2252 
Fax: (801) 495-2262 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
THIRD DISTRHTmilKTOI ' SAI T I AKI nMINTi 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al. 
1 Man ,1.11 -w Appellant, 
v. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY. 
1 Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 000909522 
NOTTCI <M AITI Al 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, by and througl 
following Judgment and Orders c r :he Third District (V^r * -f Sail Lake County: 
1 . •:•• \ ..-. , • A U . * J ; ; , and filed in the District 
Court, Third Judicial District on March 12, 2007. 
2. The Minute Entry and Order entered by the Hon. Joseph Fratto, dated May 22, 2007, 
denying Plaintiffs' Ex -Parte Motioi I lm 1 cm v in i File AlT'uLn il 1 \IIHIIL W ( nlbni in Support of O'ral 
Argument Presented on May 7, 2007. 
'"'t'hL' 
SAL-
r)
't i: 
3. The Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 30, 2007, denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial. 
4. That portion of the Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 30, 2007, denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Tax Mediation Cost. 
DATED this l ^ t day of June, 2007. 
MATTHEW H. RATY^ 
i l i l i i i i l i i i i i L 
SC 1JIM/IL U f i l C [JCfC http: Vattorneygenera 1. Utah .go v Pr Rel/PrDec202002. htm 
NEWS 
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Protecting Utah # Protecting You 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
For Immedia te Relea.se 
December 20 ,2002 
Conf«n ( 
Paul M u r p h y : 
(801)538-1892 
\ . C SI' I I LES WITH FORD OVER EXPLORER SAFF1 \ CLAIMS 
Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff toda> announced a S51.5 million settlement with the Ford 
Motor Company to resolve allegations of making false claims about the safetv of Ford Explorers and the 
replacement tires for the sports utility vehicles. 
The agreement calls for $30 million from the settlement to mount a nationwide consume! education 
campaign about SUV safety. Utah and the 52 other jurisdictions taking part in the settlement will each 
ieceive a payment of $300,000. The remainder will be used to pa> for the costs of the investigation. 
"The Attorney General's Office has a responsibility to protect consumers," said Jeff Buckner. the 
assistant attorney general who represented Utah on the settlement. "One way we can do that is to stop 
companies from sending out deceptive advertising." 
The investigation alleged that Ford violated state laws against unfair and deceptive acts, 
including: 
* Foid advertised that the Explorer has "car-like" steering and handling 1 he \ chicle is a 
truck and has a higher risk of rollover. 
• The advertising exaggerated the Explorer's capability to earn cargo and passengers. 1 or 
some models with popular options, the vehicle would exceed capacity by simply having a 
person in each seat. 
• After-market tires were advertised as the same as the original tires I lie a fte? market tires 
had different specifications, standards and compounds. 
• bord failed to disclose the known safety risk associated with I \plorers equipped with 
Firestone A TX and Wilderness A1 tires. Ihord knew or should have known about the risk as 
early as 1993. 
Tord denies any wiongdoing and has agreed to abide by all state and federal laws governing SUV 
safety. The car manufactuiet has already spent $2 billion to replace tires in the I Jnited States 
"i would like io congratulate the hord Motor Company for agreeing to resolve these claims without 
expenshe litigation. This settlement shows that Ford has a real commitment to educating the pubhc about 
SUV safety," said Attorney General Mark Shurtleff. 
The joint settlement comes a year after a $51.5 million nationw ide settlement with 
Rridgestone Firestone for selling and advertising tires with high rates of tread separation. 
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OPINION' 
NARE S, J" I h is case is before us 
for a second time, after a GVR x order 
from the United States Supreme Court 
directed that we reconsider our 
original opinion in Buell-Wilson v. 
Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 
Cal.App.4th 525 [4 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 14 7] 
[*2] {Buell-Wilson I) in light of 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 
549 U.S. [166 L. Ed. 2d 940, 127 
S. Ct. 1057] {Philip Morris) . Philip 
Morris holds that upon request, courts 
must adopt procedures to ensure juries 
do not punish defendants for harm 
caused to third parties when 
determining the amount of punitive 
damages to award. The Supreme Court 
also reiterated, however, juries could 
consider harm to third parties in 
determining the reprehensibility of a 
defendant's conduct. 
1 GVR is the acronym used 
within the Supreme Court for "an 
order that grants certiorari, 
vacates the judgment below, and 
remands the case to the lower 
court for reconsideration in 
light of an intervening Supreme 
Court ruling ... ." (Stern et 
al., Supreme Court Practice (8th 
ed. 2002) § 5.12(b), p. 317 
(Stern).) 
Ford asserts that based on Philip 
Morris it is entitled to a new trial 
(or at least a further reduction in 
the punitive damages award) because 
there is a "significant risk" the 
punitive damages verdict in this case 
was based on improper evidence and 
arguments concerning third party harm. 
Ford also asserts that we should 
reconsider our original decision's 
rejection of its arguments that (1) 
California's [*3] punitive damages 
statute {Civil Code section 3294) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
this case, and (2) the trial court 
erred in excluding its industry custom 
and practice evidence. We granted 
permission to the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America (the 
Chamber) and the Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file 
amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's 
contentions on remand. 
We have reconsidered our decision 
in Buell-Wilson I in light of Philip 
Morris. Based on our analysis of 
Philip Morris and our review of our 
original decision and the proceedings 
in the trial court, we conclude Philip 
Morris does not compel a reversal or a 
further reduction of the punitive 
damages awarded in this case. Ford has 
forfeited the right to assert there is 
a significant risk the punitive 
damages verdict in this case was based 
on improper evidence and arguments 
concerning third party harm because 
Ford (1) submitted incorrect and 
misleading jury instructions on third 
party harm; (2) did not timely object 
to plaintiffs' closing argument at the 
punitive damages phase of the trial; 
(3) did not request a limiting 
instruction during the liability phase 
of the trial; and (4) did [*4] not 
raise instructional error as an issue 
on its original appeal. We also 
conclude our original decision reduced 
the punitive damages award to a 
constitutionally permissible amount 
that does not punish Ford for harm to 
third parties. We hold there was no 
evidence or argument at trial that 
created a significant risk that the 
jury, in deciding the amount of 
punitive damages to award, punished 
Ford for harm it caused to third 
parties. Finally, we conclude Philip 
Morris does not require that we change 
any of the holdings in our original 
opinion, and thus, with some changes, 
"we reiterate [our original opinion] 
in its entirety." {People v. Velasquez 
(1980) 28 Cal.3d 461, 462 [111 Cal. 
Rptr. 501, 622 P.2d 952].) 
INTRODUCTION 
B e n e t t a B u e l l - W i l s o n (Mrs. Wi lson) 
b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t Ford Motor 
Company (Ford) and Drew Ford (Drew) 2 as 
a result of the rollover and roof crush of her Ford 
Explorer (Explorer) that left her a paraplegic. Mrs. 
Wilson's husband Barry Wilson (Mr. Wilson) brought a 
claim for loss of consortium against Ford and Drew. A 
jury found in favor of Mrs. Wilson and Mr. Wilson 
(together the Wilsons), finding that (1) the Explorer was 
defectively unstable; (2) the Explorer was not 
crashworthy due to a defect [*5] in the roof; (3) Drew 
failed to warn the Wilsons that the Explorer was 
defectively unstable; and (4) Ford and Drew failed to 
warn the Wilsons of the danger posed by the defect in the 
roof. The jury awarded Mrs. Wilson $ 109,606,004 in 
damages for her injuries, consisting of $ 4,606,004 in 
economic damages and $ 105 million in noneconomic 
damages, and awarded Mr. Wilson $ 13 million for his 
loss of consortium. The jury also found that Ford acted 
with "oppression, fraud or malice" and awarded the 
Wilsons $ 246 million in punitive damages. The court 
later reduced Mrs. Wilson's total compensatory damages 
award to $ 70 million, resulting in an award of $ 
4,606,004 in economic damages and $ 65,393,996 in 
noneconomic damages. The court reduced Mr. Wilson's 
loss of consortium damages to $ 5 million. The court 
reduced the punitive damages award to $ 75 million, a 
one-to-one ratio to the Wilsons' total reduced award of 
compensatory damages. 
2 Ford Motor Company refers to itself and Drew 
Ford collectively as "Ford," except where 
necessary to distinguish between the two. 
Accordingly, we do the same here. 
On appeal Ford asserts (1) it is entitled to a new trial 
because the court erroneously admitted [*6] evidence 
about stability problems with a predecessor vehicle, the 
Ford Bronco II (Bronco II), and erroneously excluded 
evidence of the Explorer's "real-world" safety record and 
comparative data; (2) the noneconomic portion of the 
compensatory damages award was excessive and an 
unconstitutional violation of Ford's due process rights; 
(3) punitive damages were improperly awarded because 
(a) at most the Wilsons proved that "reasonable people 
could disagree regarding" the design decisions Ford 
made, and (b) California's punitive damages law is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied; and (4) the punitive 
damages award was excessive and the product of 
improper considerations. We granted permission to the 
Chamber, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
(AAM) and the PLAC to file amicus curiae briefs to 
support Ford's contentions on appeal.3 
3 Ford separately appealed the underlying 
judgment and the court's rulings on posttrial 
motions. On January 26, 2005, by stipulation of 
the parties, 'these two appeals were ordered 
consolidated. 
We hold that (1) the award of noneconomic damages 
to Mrs. Wilson, as reduced by the trial court, is excessive 
under California law, is the product of "passion or [*7] 
prejudice," and must be reduced to $ 18 million; (2) the 
reduced award for loss of consortium in the amount of $ 
5 million is reasonable and is affirmed; and (3) the award 
of punitive damages is excessive, violates federal due 
process limitations, and must be reduced to $ 55 million, 
a ratio of approximately two to one to the total 
compensatory damage award, after our reduction, of $ 
27,606,004 ($ 4,606,004 in economic damages + $ 18 
million in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million for loss of 
consortium). We issue a remittitur conditioning 
affirmance of the judgment on the Wilsons' agreement to 
those reductions. Thus, if the Wilsons accept the 
remittitur, the total judgment will be reduced to $ 
82,606,004 ($ 4,606,004 in economic damages + $ 18 
million in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million in loss of 
consortium + $ 55 million in punitive damages). We 
reject the remainder of the arguments made by Ford and 
amici curiae.4 
4 The Wilsons also appealed the judgment, but 
have voluntarily dismissed their appeal. 
Following briefing in this matter, the Wilsons 
filed a motion to strike allegedly false statements 
made in Ford's reply brief. We ordered the motion 
considered concurrently with the appeal. [*8] We 
deny the motion to strike, but note that in 
resolving this appeal we have not considered any 
statements that are not supported by the record. 
The Wilsons filed a motion for judicial notice, 
requesting that we take judicial notice of the 
legislative history of the 1987 amendment to Civil 
Code section 3294, as well as portions of the 
legislative histories for unenacted Assembly Bill 
No. 2880, unenacted Assembly Bill No. 2582, 
and unenacted Senate Bill No. 1429. The Wilsons 
also filed a motion for judicial notice requesting 
that we take judicial notice of a letter Ford filed 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. We grant these requests. 
I 'ACIUAI ANni 'ROCi' .hUKAl BAC MiKOlJND 
A. The Accident 
At around 5:00 p.m. on January 19, 2002, Mrs. 
Wilson, a married 46-year-old graduate student and 
mother of two, was driving her 1997 four-door Explorer 
within the speed limit on Interstate 8 near Alpine, 
California. The road was dry and sloped slightly 
(km iiliill 
Suddenly,, Mrs... Wilson saw what appeared, to be a 
metal object break loose from a motor home in front of 
her and bounce directly toward her windshield. As she 
swerved to avoid the object, the wheels on the passenger 
side lifted [*9] from the road, and the Explorer went out 
of control. The vehicle fishtailed multiple times across 
lanes and rolled four and a half times, coming to rest on 
its roof on the road's shoulder. Ford conceded at trial that 
Mrs Wilson bore no fault for the accident. 
A:> die Explorer rolled, its roofs pillars and rails 
crumpled, and the roof crushed down more than 10 
inches, causing severe injuries to Mrs. Wilson. Inside the 
vehicle, she hung upside down from her seatbelt, in 
"crushing ... unbelievable pain," gasping for breath and 
feeling as if her life were fading away. Motorists stopped 
to assist and struggled to flip the vehicle, and rescue 
crews cut the roof open to remove her. An ambulance 
took her from the scene to a life flight helicopter, which 
flew her to Sharp Memorial Hospital (Sharp) trauma 
center. 
B.Mrs. Wilson's Injuries 
1. Physical injuries 
The compressive forces from the collapsing roof 
fractured and severed Mrs. Wilson's spine at the T12 
level, where the thoracic and lumbar regions meet. She 
will never recover sensation or function below the level 
of that injury. She also suffered facial injuries, fractured 
ribs, a cut spleen that caused internal bleeding, a 
fractured leg [*10] and torn PCL and ACL ligaments in 
both knees, causing bilateral knee dislocations. 
In addition to the vertebral fractures, the spinal sac 
was damaged, causing leaking of cerebral spinal fluid, 
and portions of the spinal cord and nerve root were 
pulverized. Doctors inserted metal screws and rods into 
her back to stabilize her upper body. After almost two 
weeks, she was transferred to Sharp's rehabilitation 
center, where she spent another two and a half months. 
Mrs. Wilson's resulting paraplegia ended her active 
life and forced her to painfiilly relearn basic aspects of 
daily living, some of which she will never regain. She 
lives in severe and constant pain that will increase over 
time. Her accident left her with no sensation from the 
waist down, except "phantom pain"~a constant burning 
sensation below her ribs. Above her waist, she suffers 
constant pain, feels painfiil pressure on her ribs fiom the 
rods in her back, and has intermittent spasms of stabbing 
pain. 
Medication can provide temporary pain relief, but 
the strong medication needed has serious side effects. It 
causes her to lose alertness, which makes it impossible to 
drive. It interferes with her ability to communicate 
socially. [*11] It makes her unsteady in her wheelchair. 
She also runs the risk of becoming addicted to the 
medication. There is a constant conflict between efforts 
to reduce her pain and the debilitating side effects of the 
medicine itself. 
The spinal injury caused a total loss of bladder and 
bowel control. She must now catheterize herself multiple 
times daily. Her feces must be manually extracted. In 
addition to the emotional pain and humiliation from 
losing control over her bodily functions, she suffers 
recurring urinary tract infections, which expose her to a 
potentially fatal kidney disease. Mrs. Wilson is allergic 
to commonly prescribed medications, including sulfa and 
penicillin, and her chronic use of antibiotics to fight 
infections has caused resistance to other drugs. 
Mrs. Wilson also suffers severe bruising, which 
takes months to heal due to diminished circulation in her 
lower body. Her feet swell and are susceptible to 
cracking and bleeding. The constant grinding of her 
shoulder joints from wheeling her wheelchair has caused 
shoulder problems, which will worsen over time. She 
suffers disfigurement, with one leg smaller than the other 
and large surgical scars across her back. 
2. Mental and [*12] emotional injuries 
Before the accident, Mrs. Wilson was an active, 
athletic, outdoors woman, with a black belt in martial 
arts. She often camped and hiked with her family, 
backpacked with Girl and Boy Scouts, helped with the 
San Diego Tracking Team, and did projects at Mission 
Trails Regional Park. She and her husband took dancing 
lessons, traveled and took walks. 
She no longer can engage in any of the active 
lifestyle she once enjoyed, including swimming, skiing, 
snowboarding, dancing, backpacking and walking. Mrs. 
Wilson was finishing her masters degree in education 
and was about to start a second career as a teacher. These 
plans also have been indefinitely delayed and it is unclear 
whether they are now possible. Mrs. Wilson is unable to 
visit all the rooms in her home—including her own 
bedroom—because they are inaccessible to her. She and 
Mr. Wilson must sleep in their laundry room. 
independent person who took joy in aiding others, to 
being dependent on others for almost every aspect of her 
life. Her husband and children are now her caregivers. 
C.Mr. Wilson's Loss of Consortium 
The injuries to his wife dramatically changed Mr. 
Wilson's [*13] life as well. The Wilsons no longer share 
the physical relationship they had prior to the accident. 
Instead, he is now her caregiver and must assist her with 
the most personal of care, including showering and 
catheterizing her. He assists her in transferring in and out 
of her wheelchair and worries that she may fall if she 
tries to transfer on her own. Several times per night, he 
wakes to turn his wife over in bed so that she will not get 
bedsores. 
Mr. Wilson has had to decrease his work schedule as 
an attorney to assist his wife during the day and 
accompany her to medical appointments and therapy. He 
performs the household work that his wife can no longer 
do. The Wilsons spend most of their time trying to 
accomplish the mundane chores of daily life. Every day 
Mr. Wilson shares his wife's constant pain, frustration 
and anxiety in living with her injuries. 
D. The Explorer's Defects 
The Wilsons submitted evidence at trial that the 
accident and resulting injuries were caused by two 
independent defects in the 1997 Explorer. They 
established that the Explorer's design was dangerously 
unstable and prone to rollover due to its overly narrow 
track width and high center of gravity. They also 
established [*14] that the Explorer's roof was 
inadequately supported and defectively weak, so that it 
readily crushed into the passenger compartment when 
subjected to the forces inherent in a foreseeable rollover. 
Ford has not challenged on appeal the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting the jury's finding that the 
Explorer was defective on either of these grounds. 5 We 
therefore review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the judgment, disregarding contrary evidence 
submitted by Ford. (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 
CalAth 1040, 1053 [68 Cal Rptr. 2d 758, 946 P,2d 
427].) 
5 Ford does assert that the court erroneously 
admitted evidence that supported the jury's 
finding on liability and erroneously excluded 
evidence that supported its defense. However, as 
is discussed, post, those evidentiary rulings were 
not an abuse of discretion. 
1. Stability defects 
She has changed from a giving, enthusiastic, Long before the Wilsons purchased their Explorer, 
Ford's engineers knew that the vehicle's design was 
unstable and prone to rollover in emergency maneuvers 
due to its high center of gravity and narrow track width. 
Ford had known for decades the importance of vehicle 
stability in emergency maneuvers. It knew that on flat, 
dry pavement, a car or truck should slide out, rather 
[* 15] than roll. 
The Explorer was derived from the Bronco II and 
evidence of its development history was presented to the 
jury to show it how and why the Explorer's instability 
defect came to exist. In 1981, two years before the 
Bronco II's introduction, Ford measured the stability 
index (SI) of its competitor, the Jeep CJ7, which had a 
widely reported rollover problem. The SI is the average 
of front and rear track width, divided by the center of 
gravity height. The higher the SI rating (i.e., the wider 
the track and lower the center of gravity), the more stable 
the vehicle. The Jeep's SI was 2.04. The Bronco II's SI 
was less, measuring 1.86. The Bronco II was so unstable 
it would roll over at only 30 mph on Ford's test track. 
Ford engineers proposed improving its stability index by 
widening its track width. Because doing so would have 
delayed the vehicle's release date and impacted profits, 
that proposal was rejected by management. 
Ford knew that people were being seriously 'injured 
in Bronco II rollovers when the Explorer was being 
developed. In April 1989, a year before the Explorer 
release date, Ford executives objected to and tried to stop 
the release of a damaging Consumer Reports article 
[*16] on Bronco II instability. 
Regarding these efforts, Jerry L. Sloan of Ford's 
public affairs office wrote: "We think going in we were 
in deep trouble regarding our rollover rates .... [f| ... Our 
rollover rate is three times higher than the Chevy S-10 
Blazer. ... [T]he [Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
(FARS)] data put us in a bad light.... [10 ... [f| We think, 
however, that we have clouded their minds ... ." 
Instead of making design improvements in stability 
for the Explorer, Ford utilized the Bronco II platform. 
The Explorer had almost exactly the same track width, 
high engine mount and elevated center of gravity as the 
Bronco II, which caused the same instability problems. 
Over half the parts for the four-door and 80 percent for 
the two-door Explorer were carried over from the Bronco 
II. 
Ford's design engineers repeatedly requested Ford to 
widen the track width and lower the center of gravity on 
the Explorer to increase its stability. However, 
management declined to do so. As acknowledged by 
Robert Simpson, a program manager for the development 
of the Explorer, this was because of "the ... investment 
that Ford had sunk into the Explorer," and, as the 
Wilsons' expert, [*17] Dr. David Renfroe, explained, it 
was also because its "directive was u> me.-i M- itk 
release date]." Dr. Renfroe also explained t ... "U>-
engineers were proposing to make [stability indexj 
changes to be consistent with their standards and they 
were prevented from doing that by the management," 
Unable to pass the Consumers Union on-track 
stability test because the Explorer was rolling over at 
under 45 miles per hour, Ford resorted to using computer 
simulations to show the vehicle's safety. Ford claimed 
the validation data for its computer results did not exist, 
precluding an expert from determining whether the 
Explorer actually passed the computer tests. The 
Explorer did pass the Consumers Union short-course test, 
but that test was designed to measure its handling, not 
stability. 
The Explorer's instability was increased by Ford 
management's decision to utilize P235 tires that further 
raised the center of gravity, instead of the P215 tires 
specified and requested by its engineers to provide 
greater stability. Based on his review of Ford internal 
documents, the Wilsons' expert, Dr. Renfroe, testified 
that Ford "knew when they made that decision that the 
vehicle was going to be more unstable [*18] and more 
likely to rollover in an accident avoidance maneuver, and 
they were ... willing to accept the risk and take it to court, 
if necessary." Ford chose larger tires to fill a cosmetic 
gap between the wheel well and tire in order to present a 
more "robust" look. Ford's own analysis showed that 
Explorers equipped with P235 tires would have an SI of 
2.08, less than the then-current 1987 Bronco II's SI of 
2.15. With the P235 tires, the Explorer failed basic J-turn 
stability tests. 
In 1988 a Firestone engineer, who was working with 
* ->rd to analyze the stability effect of different tire sizes 
on the prototype Explorer, wrote to Ford complaining 
about the vehicle's inherent instability: "Most 
importantly, the vehicle still has [two-]wheel lift no 
matter what tire is on it, 225/70, 215/75 or 205/75. So 
you're kidding yourself if anyone thinks going back to a 
base tire of 215/75 is going to solve anything." 
Unable to pass stability tests with P235 tires, Ford 
executives in 1989 considered releasing the four-door 
Explorer on P225 tires in order to pass the Consumers 
Union test. Later, if the Explorer passed the test, Ford 
could release the vehicles with P235 tires, consistent with 
its marketing [*19] plan. In an internal Ford e-mail, this 
was referred to as a "strawman" that would "assure good 
performance in the [Consumers Union] Test and 
minimize any adverse Public Relations risk." Ford's 
decision to accept the risk of using the P235 tires is 
shown in an internal e-mail from Ford employee Roger 
Stornant to Charles White, a senior design engineer for 
the Explorer: "OGC [the office of general counsel] is 
concerned we will be the only OEM [original equipment 
manufacturer] with a vehicle that has a significant chance 
of failing the CU [Consumers Union] test. I believe that 
management is aware of the potential risk w/P235 tires 
and has accepted risk." 
Instead of using smaller tires, Ford executives 
decided in February 1989 to underinflate the P235 and 
P245 tires to 26 pounds per square inch (psi), as opposed 
to the tire's specification of 35 psi. Explorer owners were 
not informed of the need to underinflate the tires, nor 
were they told they were exposed to the risk of a rollover 
by complying with the tire's higher inflation 
specifications. 
Ford had an opportunity to improve the Explorer's 
stability when it changed its suspension design for the 
1995-1998 models. But again financial considerations 
[*20] prevailed and, according to a 1990 internal Ford 
document, Ford decided "not [to] take advantage of the 
fact that the engine could be lowered with a[n] SLA 6 
type suspension. This decision was driven by early 
implementation and program cost." As a result, the 
Wilsons' 1997 Explorer was no more stable than the 
original model or its prototypes. According to the 
Wilsons' experts, the Explorer's inherent instability 
caused it to roll in response to Mrs. Wilson's emergency 
avoidance maneuver, resulting in her injuries. 
6 "SLA" is short for "short/long arm" 
suspension, also known as "double wishbone" 
suspension. 
2. Roof strength defect 
As Mrs. Wilson's Explorer rolled, the roof crushed 
nearly a foot into the passenger compartment. The 
Wilsons' biomechanical expert, Dr. Anthony Sances, 
testified that Mrs. Wilson's spinal injury was caused by 
1,000 to 2,000 pounds of force crushing down onto her 
shoulder. Dr. Frank Coufal, her neurosurgeon, confirmed 
that compressive force caused the spinal injury. The 
Wilsons' experts testified that a stronger roof would not 
have crushed and would have prevented Mrs. Wilson's 
injuries. 
The Wilsons presented evidence that rollovers are 
relatively nonviolent events [*21] for the occupants 
when they are properly restrained and there is minimal 
roof intrusion, and occupants are killed or disabled only 
when the roof crushes inward. 
The Wilsons also presented testimony from their 
engineering expert Stephen Forrest as to why the 
Explorer's roof was defectively weak. The evidence 
showed that Ford could have provided the Explorer with 
a roof that would not have crushed by using high strength 
steel, adding reinforcements, eliminating open sections 
such as the depressed weld groove, eliminating holes 
and/or using foam filling. Ford had used safer closed 
section front headers in other vehicles. These 
modifications would have cost about $ 20 per vehicle. 
3. Ford and Drew's failure to warn the Wilsons of the 
defects 
The Wilsons testified that Ford and Drew did not 
provide notice of the Explorer's roof crush risk. The 
Wilsons also submitted evidence that Drew failed to 
warn them of the instability danger posed by inflating the 
P235 tires to the tire manufacturer's recommended psi. 
Drew did not disclose that their Explorer was equipped 
with larger P235 tires instead of smaller P225 or P215 
tires, nor that underinflation was required for the larger 
tires. The salesmen [*22] at Drew were unaware of an 
underinflation requirement. Although Ford directed its 
dealers to use no more than 26 psi in P235 tires, Drew 
never warned the Wilsons of this fact. Because of this, 
the Wilsons never knew to instruct attendants to 
underinflate the tires below the specified 35 psi when the 
vehicle was serviced. 
The Wilsons testified they never would have bought 
the Explorer if the rollover and tire pressure risks had 
been disclosed. 
E. Trial and Jury Verdict 
The jury deliberated for five days before reaching a 
verdict. It found nine to three the Explorer had a stability 
design defect that was a substantial factor in causing the 
Wilsons' injuries. The jury found 11 to one that there was 
a crashworthiness design defect in the roof and that this 
defect was also a substantial factor in their injuries. 
As to Drew, the jury found 10 to two that Drew 
failed to warn the Wilsons of the stability defect. It found 
in favor of Ford on this count. The jury found 10 to two 
that both Ford and Drew failed to warn the Wilsons of 
the Explorer's crashworthiness defect. 
The jury awarded Mrs. Wilson $ 573,348 for past 
economic loss, $ 4,032,656 for future economic loss, $ 6 
million for past noneconomic [*23] loss and $ 99 
million for future noneconomic loss. 
The jury found nine to three that Ford acted with 
oppression, fraud or malice. The court's poll of the jury 
confirmed each of the nine jurors had found fraud, 
malice or oppression by clear and convincing evidence. 
In a separate phase of trial, the parties presented 
evidence and arguments on punitive damages. During 
closing argument, counsel for Ford said: "It's impossible 
not to be angry at Ford, Ford Motor Company, for what 
decisions that in marketing and selling this Ford Explorer 
it knowingly put a defective product out on the market 
[sic] and caused the family tragedy that you see before 
you now. ... Hf] ... [%\ ... We are sorry. I don't think--I 
know it rings hollow, but I am going to say it anyway. 
We are sorry. We are sorry that we let you down. I k 
engineers are sorry that they let the rest of the comp;tn\ 
down." 
I !u ;ur\ awarded $ 246 million in punitive damages. 
Ford filed motions for nevA 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV 
The JNOV motion attacked the evidence supporting 
the punitive damages award. The court reexamined tlv 
evidence and concluded that the Wilsons had met [*? ' ; 
their burden of producing clear and convincing evidem 
that Ford acted with malice, a conscious disregard 
safety, and engaged in despicable conduct. 
Ford's motion for new trial challenged the si/e i»: • 
compensatory and punitive damages award. The CJU:. 
found "the damages awarded are excessive," but also 
stated, "The Court does not find that the jury rendered its 
verdict due to passion or prejudice." The court 
conditionally granted a new trial unless the Wilsons 
consented to a reduction of Mrs. Wilson's compensatory 
damages award to $ 70 million, Mr. Wilson's loss of 
consortium award to $ 5 million and the punitive 
damages award to $ 75 million. Subtracting the jury's 
award of economic damages in the amount of $ 
4,606,004, the court's remittitur left Mrs. Wilson with an 
award of noneconomic damages in the amount of $ 
65,393,996. 
In assessing the propriety of the amount of 
compensatory damages awarded to Mrs. Wilson, the 
court stated: "The evidence, in the Court's opinion, is 
insufficient to support a compensatory damage verdict in 
favor of [Mrs. Wilson] in the amount of $ 109,606,004. 
In reaching that finding and the other findings on the 
verdict on damages, the Court has weighed [*25] the 
evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, and 
is convinced from the entire record the jury clearly 
should have reached a different verdict on damages. That 
same evidence, however, ... is sufficient to support a 
compensatory damage award in favor of [Mrs. Wilson] in 
the amount of [$ 70 million]." 
In assessing the proper amount of punitive damages 
to be awarded the court stated: "In considering these 
factors, the evidence showed Ford had a pattern of 
deficient design regarding safety in favor of increased 
financial returns and was a result of the conscious 
disregard of Ford executives. That evidence was 
primarily adduced through Ford's own internal 
memoranda and correspondence. This conduct was 
reprehensible and weighs in favor of punitive damages, 
[f ] The remittitur reduces the punitive damage award to a 
one-to-one ratio relative to the compensatory award. This 
is well within the second guidepost set forth by the 
Supreme Court. Even as reduced, the compensatory 
damage award is large. When compensatory awards are 
substantial, a ratio of [punitive damages] equal to the 
compensatory damages is within the limits of the due 
process guarantee. [Citation.] The punitive damages 
[*26] are fair and reasonable and proportionate to the 
mount of harm suffered by the [Wilsons]," 
re W ilsons accepted the remittitur and an amended 
:ent was entered on September 3, 2004. Ford's 
inch appeals followed. 
\RGUMENT 
ttronco II Evidence 
Ford asserts it is entitled to a new trial because the 
..;al court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the 
f bronco II vehicle. This contention is unavailing. 
iiackground 
Ford contends the court erred in denying its motion 
• -• limine that sought to exclude as irrelevant "all 
evidence relating to the Bronco II and Ford's decision to 
cease manufacture of the Bronco II." In response, the 
Wilsons submitted evidence that the Explorer's relevant 
design characteristics were derived from the Bronco II 
and that Ford had knowledge of the rollover risk posed 
b> that design. 
The trial court denied Ford's motion, finding the 
Explorer's development was "intimately tied" to the 
Bronco IPs development, as shown by Ford's internal 
documents. 
Ford's motion for new trial asserted the court erred 
by allowing evidence of the Bronco II. The court rejected 
this argument, finding that the Wilsons "presented 
substantial evidence of the design carry-over [*27] from 
the Bronco II to the Explorer, evidence of the 
intermingling of the development and testing of the 
Bronco II and the Explorer and the similar source of 
rollover problems between the Bronco II and Explorer 
for the Court to find the two vehicles are substantially 
similar," 
2. Analysis 
" 'Broadly speaking, an appellate court applies the 
abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a 
trial court on the admissibility of evidence' " (City of 
Ripon v. Sweetin (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 887, 900 [122 
Cal Rptr. 2d 802]) " ' "The burden is on the party 
complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and 
unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has 
been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not 
substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of 
its discretionary power." ' " {Dorman v. DWLC Corp. 
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815 [42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
459].) 
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
evidence of similar design flaws in the Bronco II to those 
alleged to exist in the Explorer. The Wilsons' expert, Dr. 
Renfroe, testified that the Explorer and the Bronco II 
shared the specific dangerous design characteristics that 
created instability. In fact, it would have been impossible 
not [*28] to have evidence on the similarities of the 
Explorer and Bronco II's stability characteristics as Ford 
itself assessed the stability of the Explorer by comparison 
to the Bronco II. 
(1) Ford asserts that it was error to introduce 
evidence of the Bronco II because they were different 
vehicles, citing many differences in design. However, the 
evidence went to similarities in a particular design flaw, 
not the vehicles as a whole. Where a plaintiff intends to 
adduce evidence of the functioning of related products to 
prove that the product in question was defective, 
identical conditions need not be present between the two 
systems. Substantial similarity is sufficient. (See Hasson 
v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 CaUd 388, 403-404 [185 
Cal. Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171] {Hasson), disapproved on 
other grounds in Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 
CalAth 548, 574 [34 Cal Rptr. 2d 607, 882 P.2d 298] 
(Soule).) Thus, in an action against an automobile 
manufacturer to recover damages arising out of an 
automobile accident caused by brake failure in a 1966 
model vehicle, the California Supreme Court held that 
the trial court had a reasonable basis for admitting 
evidence of numerous failures occurring in 1965 models 
for the purpose of showing that 1966 models were 
similarly defective, [*29] even if plaintiffs did not prove 
that the 1965 system was exactly the same as the 1966 
system. (Hasson, supra, at pp. 403-404.) 
Ford argues that the Explorer's and Bronco II's 
stability characteristics were not sufficiently similar to 
allow the evidence concerning the Bronco II. The trial 
judge in the first mstance must determine if the design 
characteristics are sufficiently similar. (Hasson, supra, 
32 Cal. 3d at p. 404.) As discussed, ante, the court found 
that the Bronco II's and Explorer's relevant design 
characteristics were substantially similar, and we must 
give substantial deference to that finding. (See Bado-
Santana v. Ford Motor Co. (D.P.R. 2005) 364 F. Supp. 
2d 79, 92-94 [in rollover case involving Explorer, court 
denied Ford's motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
design and development history of Bronco II as too 
dissimilar to Explorer, finding such evidence relevant to 
Ford's knowledge of and failure to correct stability 
design flaws].) 
Moreover, "[w]hen evidence is offered to show only 
that defendant had notice of a dangerous condition, the 
requirement of similarity of circumstances is relaxed: ' 
"[A]U that is required ... is that the previous injury should 
be such [*30] as to attract the defendant's attention to the 
dangerous situation." ' " (Hasson, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 
404.) Here, the evidence was relevant to prove that Ford 
knew it was designing and manufacturing a vehicle with 
the same stability design defects as the Bronco II. 
(2) The Bronco II evidence was also relevant to 
show Ford's malice in order to support an award of 
punitive damages. "Marketing a product that is known to 
be defective and dangerous to consumers supports an 
inference of malice for purposes of punitive damages." 
(Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 
1202, 1230 [45 Cal Rptr. 3d 265] (Karlsson); Grimshaw 
v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal App. 3d 757, 814 
[174 Cal. Rptr. 348] (Grimshaw); Taylor v. Superior 
Court (1979) 24 CaUd 890, 895 [157 Cal Rptr. 693, 
598 P.2d 854] (Taylor) [malice may be shown by fact the 
defendant had acted with a "conscious disregard of the 
safety of others"].) 
Ford knew that to increase a vehicle's stability, it 
needed to widen the vehicle's track width and lower the 
center of gravity. The Wilsons presented evidence that 
Ford engineers requested such changes in the Explorer's 
design, but the changes were rejected. The Explorer's 
center of gravity, track width and SI were substantially 
similar to that of the Bronco [*31] II. 
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
evidence concerning the Bronco II's stability problems, 
as the Explorer's stability characteristics were 
substantially similar. The evidence was relevant to prove 
the cause of the Explorer's stability defect, to show notice 
on Ford's part at the time it was designing the Explorer 
and to establish malice on the part of Ford. 
B. Exclusion of Ford's Comparative Rollover Statistics 
Ford asserts that the court erred by excluding Ford's 
"real-world safety record and comparative data" relating 
to Explorer rollover rates. We reject this contention. 
1. Background 
Ford cites several evidentiary rulings it asserts were 
erroneous regarding the Explorer's comparative rollover 
rates. First, the court ordered stricken from the trial court 
record testimony offered by Ford that the Explorer "had 
one of the best rollover rates compared to other SUV's 
[sports utility vehicles] in its class." Hie court also 
refused to allow Ford's automotive engineering expert, 
Don Tandy, to testify as to whether the Explorer had a 
higher rollover rate than other SUV's. Ford asserts that 
the court erred in refusing to allow its statistical expert, 
William Wecker, Ph.D., [*32] to testify that the Explorer 
had a rollover rate comparable to other SUV's. The court 
also refused to allow Ford's stability expert, Lee Carr, to 
testify concerning accident statistics and rollover rates of 
other vehicles. 
Ford also contends that the court "compounded its 
errors" by allowing several of the Wilsons' witnesses to 
testify concerning their involvement in other Explorer 
rollover cases. 
2. Waiver 
Hie Wilsons assert that Ford waived the riti.hi ••* 
assert error regarding the testimony of its expert ! >: 
Wecker concerning the Explorer's rollover rate compared 
to other vehicles. The Wilsons point out that they 
brought a motion in limine to exclude his opinion, but the 
court reserved ruling on his testimony pending a 
foundational showing by Ford, and thereafter Ford did 
not attempt to lay a foundation for his testimony. 
Ford responds that the court ruled Dr. Wecker's 
testimony inadmissible in an unreported sidebar 
conference and that counsel for the Wilsons 
acknowledged this ruling on the record when it argued 
against admission of other similar evidence that Ford 
could not "get in from the Wecker types." Ford also 
asserts that it objected on several occasions more 
generally that it [*33] should have been allowed to 
present evidence of the Explorer's safety record as 
compared to other vehicles. 
We conclude that there was no waiver. First, a 
review of the trial transcript indicates that counsel for the 
Wilsons did acknowledge on the record that Dr. 
Wecker's testimony was previously excluded by the 
court. Moreover, " '[w]here an entire class of evidence 
has been declared inadmissible or the trial court has 
clearly intimated it will receive no evidence of a 
particular class or upon a particular issue, an offer of 
proof is not a prerequisite to raising the question on 
appeal ... .' [Citation.]" (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice 
Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2005) 
18:275.6, p. 8-154.) 
3. Analysis 
Ford asserts the expert testimony concerning the 
Explorer's comparative rollover rate was admissible to 
demonstrate that the Explorer "is a reasonably safe 
vehicle that is not unusually prone to roll over in 
comparison to other vehicles." However, such evidence 
was irrelevant and inadmissible. 
(3) A manufacturer cannot defend a product liability 
action with evidence it met its industry's customs or 
standards on safety. (Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal App. 3d 
at p. 803; Foglio v. Western Auto Supply (1976) 56 Cal. 
App. 3d 470, 477 [128 Cal Rptr. 545].) [*34] In fact, 
admission of such evidence is reversible error. {Heap v. 
General Motors Corp. (1977) 66 Cal App. 3d 824, 830-
832 1136 Cal Rptr. 304]; see also Use Note to BAJINo. 
3.16 (Fall 2007-2008 ed.) p. 78 [entitled "Evidence of 
Custom in Relation to Ordinary Care"; "It is error to give 
this instruction in a cause of action limited to strict 
liability"].) This is because in strict liability actions, "the 
issue is not whether defendant exercised reasonable 
care." (Foglio, supra, 56 Cal. App. 3d at p. 477.) Rather, 
the issue is whether the product fails to perform as the 
ordinary consumer would expect. (Barker v. Lull 
Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal3d 413, 435 [143 Cal 
Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443] (Barker).) 
In Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, the 
defect at issue was the Ford Pinto's gas tank. There, Ford 
requested the court instruct the jury that, in considering 
whether the gas tank was defective, it was to consider " 
'the extent to which its (Pinto's) design and manufacture 
matched the average quality of other automobiles and the 
extent to which its design and manufacture deviated from 
the norm for automobiles designed and manufactured at 
the same point in time.' " (Id. at p. 803.) The Court of 
Appeal held that the trial court properly [*35] refused 
the instruction as improper evidence of industry custom 
or practice. (Ibid.) 
Here, the trial court properly excluded evidence Ford 
proffered to prove the Explorer's rollover rate was 
comparable to other vehicles on the road. That evidence 
impermissibly sought to show that it met industry 
standards or custom for rollovers. 
Ford asserts that the comparative rollover rate was 
relevant to the "risk/benefit" analysis that must be 
considered in determining if a product is defective, citing 
Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d 413. However, as explained in 
Grimshaw, the Barker risk/benefit analysis does not 
allow admission of such evidence: "The Barker court's 
enumeration of factors which may be considered under 
the risk-benefit test not only fails to mention custom or 
usage in the industry, the court otherwise makes clear by 
implication that they are inappropriate considerations." 
(Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal App. 3d at p. 803.) 
Ford also contends that the comparative rollover 
evidence was relevant to prove it did not act with 
oppression, fraud or malice and therefore was admissible 
to rebut the Wilsons' claim for punitive damages. 
However, as will be discussed in more detail, post, the 
Court, of [*36] Appeal in Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal 
App. 3d 757, held that compliance with industry 
standards or custom was irrelevant not only to the issue 
of defect, but also to the issue of punitive damages. (Id. 
at pp. 792, 803, 807-822.) Indeed, counsel for Ford 
acknowledged at trial that the Wilsons' punitive damages 
allegations did not change Grimshaw's prohibition on 
industry custom and practice evidence. 
Even if the comparative rollover data were not 
inadmissible as a matter of law as improper industry and 
custom evidence, it would still be inadmissible as 
unreliable and misleading. Ford's statistics from which 
the comparable rollover rate testimony would flow were 
drawn from two databases, FARS and a state database 
tracking state accident information. FARS only included 
fatal rollover accidents and did not compare the relative 
stability of vehicles, included all vehicle types, not just 
SUV's, and did not track the cause of rollovers or the 
resulting injuries. The state database encompassed 
accidents from only 10 states, did not include the two 
most populous states, California and Texas, and did not 
detail causes of the rollovers. 
In Ford's offer of proof for its expert Carr, it 
acknowledged [*37] his proposed testimony compared 
the Explorer's rollover performance to a variety of 
dissimilar vehicles, including Greyhound buses and 
passenger cars. The court excluded only that portion of 
his testimony. Carr opined that the Explorer's design did 
not contribute to the rollover. Rather, according to Carr, 
the Explorer rolled because Mrs. Wilson steered it onto 
the dirt shoulder, which, because of the loose soil and 
uneven terrain, would make any vehicle, not just the 
Explorer, susceptible to rolling over. Carr also testified 
that the Explorer complied with stability guidelines 
related to steering. Over the Wilsons' objection, Carr was 
allowed to show a video of the rollover response of a 
1992 Chevrolet van to challenge the testing methodology 
used by the Wilsons' expert, Dr. Renfroe. Over the 
Wilsons' objection, he was also allowed to testify 
concerning the number of rollovers of various vehicles 
around the country. According to Carr, the vast majority 
of rollovers for all types of vehicles happened off the 
paved surface of the road. 
Further, while the court excluded evidence of the 
Explorer's comparative safety, accident or injury rates, it 
did not exclude the Explorer's own "real-world [*38] 
safety record." Indeed, Ford never proffered such 
evidence at trial. 
The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
Ford's proffered evidence on comparative rollover rates. 
The court also did not "compound its errors" by allowing 
several of the Wilsons' witnesses to testify as to their 
involvement in other Explorer rollover cases. Ford did 
not object to this testimony as improper. The only 
objection to this testimony overruled by the court was 
Ford's "asked and answered" objection. 
II. NONECONOMC DAMAGES 
Ford asserts that the noneconomic damages award of 
approximately $ 65 million to Mrs. Wilson, and the $ 5 
million award to Mr. Wilson, as remitted by the court, 
are excessive as a matter of law, are the result of passion 
and prejudice, are extreme when viewed against awards 
that have been upheld in comparable cases, and violate 
its due process rights. Amicus curiae AAM also asserts 
that the award violates due process principles. We 
conclude that the noneconomic damage award to Mrs. 
Wilson is excessive, the result of passion or prejudice, 
and that the substantial evidence in this case supports an 
award of $ 18 million. We also conclude, however, that 
Mrs. Wilson's award did not violate [*39] due process 
principles. We conclude the award to Mr. Wilson of $ 5 
million in damages for loss of consortium is reasonable 
and we affirm that award. 
A. Size of the Award 
1. Standard of review 
(4) "The amount of damages is a fact question, first 
committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the 
discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. 
They see and hear the witnesses and frequently ... see the 
injury and the impairment that has resulted therefrom. ... 
The power of the appellate court differs materially from 
that of the trial court in passing on this question. An 
appellate court can interfere on the ground that the 
judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict 
is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience 
and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part 
of the jury." (Seffertv. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 
56 CaUd 498, 506-507 [15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 
337], citation omitted (Seffert).) 
"The reviewing court does not act de novo, however. 
As we have observed, the trial court's determination of 
whether damages were excessive 'is entitled to great 
weight' because it is bound by the 'more demanding test 
of weighing conflicting evidence than our standard of 
review [*40] under the substantial evidence rule ' 
[Citation.] All presumptions favor the trial court's 
determination [citation], and we review the record in the 
light most favorable to the judgment [citation]." 
(Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 241, 
259 [259 Cal. Rptr. 311] (Fortman).) 
Further, " '[w]here the trial court has required a 
remission as a condition to denying a new trial "a verdict 
is reviewed on appeal as if it had been returned in the 
first instance by the jury in the reduced amount." ' " 
(West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. (1985) 174 
Cal. App. 3d831, 877 [220 Cal Rptr. 437] (West).) 
2. Analysis 
(5) In reviewing a noneconomic damage award 
"[t]here are no fixed or absolute standards by which an 
appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent 
of the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the 
wrongful act of the defendant. The duty of an appellate 
court is to uphold the jury and trial judge whenever 
possible. [Citation.] The amount to be awarded is fa 
matter on which there legitimately may be a wide 
difference of opinion' [citation]. In considering the 
contention that the damages are excessive the appellate 
court must determine every conflict in the evidence in 
respondent's favor, and [*41] must give him [or her] the 
benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from 
the record [citation]. [%\ While the appellate court should 
consider the amounts awarded in prior cases for similar 
injuries, obviously, each case must be decided on its own 
facts and circumstances. Such examination demonstrates 
that such awards vary greatly. [Citations.] Injuries are 
seldom identical and the amount of pain and suffering 
involved in similar physical injuries varies widely. These 
factors must be considered." (Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 
p. 508.) 
Further, "[t]he fact that an award may set a 
precedent by its size does not in and of itself render it 
suspect. The determination of the jury can only be 
assessed by examination of the particular circumstances 
involved." (Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
(1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 654-655 [151 Cal. Rptr. 
399].) 
"An appellate court should not assume to substitute 
its appraisal, for that of a jury, of the amount of damages 
for physical pain and mental suffering sustained by a 
party in a case where trial by jury was had as a matter of 
right [citation], but in a case where it appears that a 
verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any reasonable 
limit of compensation [*42] warranted by the facts as to 
shock the sense of justice and raise at once a strong 
presumption that it is based on prejudice or passion 
rather than sober judgment [citations] the appellate court 
may reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new 
trial either on all the issues or on the issue of damages 
alone [citations], or it may, in the interests of justice and 
with the consent of the party against whom the 
modification is made, modify the judgment as to the 
amount of damages, and affirm it as modified 
[citations]." (Deevy v. Tassi (1942) 21 Cal.2d 109, 120-
121 [130 P.2d 389] (Deevy); see also Hunton v. 
California Portland etc. Co. (1944) 64 Cal. App. 2d 876, 
882-885 [149 P.2d 471] [trial court, on a motion for new 
trial, found compensatory damages award excessive and 
reduced a jury verdict of $ 40,000 to $ 18,000; on appeal 
the appellate court, finding the award still excessive, 
reduced the damages to $ 10,000].) 
Ford characterizes the jury's award to the Wilsons of 
$ 118 million in noneconomic damages ($ 105 million to 
Mrs. Wilson + $ 13 million to Mr. Wilson) and the court-
reduced award of approximately $ 70 million 
(approximately $ 65 million to Mrs. Wilson + $ 5 million 
to Mr. Wilson) as "irrational, [*43] punitive, and the 
clear product of passion and prejudice" and asserts that 
the evidence "does not come close to supporting this 
unprecedented award."7 Although Mrs. Wilson's injuries 
were catastrophic, analyzing all appropriate factors, 
reviewing the trial court record, and using our collective 
experience, we conclude we must reduce the 
noneconomic damage award as excessive and the product 
of passion and prejudice. We also conclude the loss of 
consortium award to Mr. Wilson is reasonable and affirm 
that award. Because Ford focuses its discussion almost 
exclusively on the award to Mrs. Wilson, our analysis 
likewise focuses on whether that award was excessive.8 
7 In making this assertion, Ford neglects to 
discuss the evidence in support of the Wilsons' 
damages at all, much less in the light most 
favorable to the judgment. This failure in itself 
would allow this court to disregard Ford's 
arguments concerning damages. (Nwosu v. Uba 
(2004) 122 Cal.App. 4th 1229, 1246 [19 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 416].) Nevertheless, we elect to consider 
Ford's contention on the merits. 
8 We also note, as discussed, ante, that we do 
not review whether the jury's original award of $ 
118 million to the Wilsons "shocks the 
conscience and suggests [*44] passion, prejudice 
or corruption on the part of the jury." (Seffert, 
supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 507.) Rather, since the 
court remitted the award to $ 70 million as a 
condition of denying Ford's motion for new trial, 
we review the noneconomic damage award " ' "as 
if it had been returned in the first instance by the 
jury in the reduced amount."' " (West, supra, 174 
Cal. App. 3d at p. 877.) 
a. Nature of Mrs. Wilson's injuries 
A review of the evidence shows the substantial 
nature of the Wilsons' noneconomic injuries. Mrs. 
Wilson, a once vibrant and energetic wife and mother is 
now a paraplegic, who is in constant and debilitating 
pain, has lost all control over her bladder and bowel 
movements, and now requires constant care from her 
husband. She is disfigured and subject to ailments 
associated with her injuries that could worsen her injuries 
and shorten her life span. Mr. Wilson has lost his role as 
a husband. He is now a constant caregiver. 
(6) Noneconomic damages do not consist of only 
emotional distress and pain and suffering. They also 
consist of such items as invasion of a person's bodily 
integrity (i.e., the fact of the injury itself), disfigurement, 
disability, impaired enjoyment of life, [*45] 
susceptibility to future harm or injury, and a shortened 
life expectancy. (Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury 
Instns. (2008), CACINo. 3905A.) 
In this case, the noneconomic damages suffered by 
Mrs. Wilson were substantial, permanent, and support a 
significant award. However, the reduced award of 
approximately $ 65 million is, even given the severity of 
her injuries, disproportionate to those injuries so as to 
"raise a strong presumption that it is based on prejudice 
or passion." (Saari v. Jongordan Corp. (1992) 5 
Cal.App.4th 797, 807 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 82].) 
b. Amount of award versus projected life span 
We also consider the amount of the damage award in 
connection with Mrs. Wilson's projected life span of 35 
years. 9 The damage award, as reduced by the court, still 
amounts to approximately $ 1,868,399 per year over her 
projected life span, an extremely high amount. Ford on 
the other hand argues an award of $ 1 million is 
reasonable, which would work out to $ 28,571 per year, 
and only $ 78 per day. While we believe that the award 
as reduced by the trial court is still excessive, we also do 
not believe that Ford's suggested award fairly and justly 
compensates Mrs. Wilson. 
9 Mrs. Wilson's projected life span at [*46] the 
time of trial was 33 years. However, we use 35 
years here because the award of noneconomic 
damages included an award for approximately 
two years of past general damages. 
c. Comparison with other awards 
In support of its position the noneconomic damage 
award is excessive as a matter of law, Ford attempts to 
compare that award to published California decisions that 
have upheld damage awards on similar facts. The 
Wilsons, on the other hand, argue that it is not 
appropriate to compare the award here to other cases, and 
that we must review it only by looking at the particular 
facts of this case. We conclude that while it is 
appropriate to look at awards in similar cases, ultimately 
we must determine the propriety of the award on a case-
by-case basis. 
In Sejfert, supra, 56 Cal. 2d at page 508, the 
California Supreme Court stated, "While the appellate 
court should consider the amounts awarded in prior 
cases for similar injuries, [*47] obviously, each case 
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. 
Such examination demonstrates that such awards vary 
greatly. [Citations.] Injuries are seldom identical and the 
amount of pain and suffering involved in similar physical 
injuries varies widely." (Italics added.) 
More recently, the California Supreme Court made 
the following statements in a footnote: "Defendants have 
compiled a lengthy list of judgments awarding damages 
which have been reversed on appeal as excessive. Those 
cases do not, in and of themselves, mandate a reversal 
here. The vast variety of and disparity between awards in 
other cases demonstrate that injuries can seldom be 
measured on the same scale. The measure of damages 
suffered is a factual question and as such is a subject 
particularly within the province of the trier of fact. For a 
reviewing court to upset a jury's factual determination on 
the basis of what other juries awarded to other plaintiffs 
for other injuries in other cases based upon different 
evidence would constitute a serious invasion into the 
realm of factfinding. [Citations.] Thus, we adhere to the 
previously announced and historically honored standard 
of reversing as excessive only [*48] those judgments 
which the entire record, when viewed most favorably to 
the judgment, indicates were rendered as a result of 
passion and prejudice on the part of the jurors." (Bertero 
v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 CaUd 43, 65, fn. 
12 [118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608] (Bertero), italics 
added.) 
(7) The Wilsons assert that Bertero stands for the 
proposition that courts of appeal should not compare the 
damages in other similar cases at all in reviewing a claim 
that an award is excessive. However, we do not read 
Bertero so broadly. Its criticism of comparing damage 
awards from other cases was limited to the statement that 
judgments awarding damages in other cases "do not, in 
and of themselves, mandate a reversal." (Bertero, supra, 
13 Cal. 3d at p. 65, fn. 12, italics added.) In the quoted 
footnote the Bertero court cited the earlier Sejfert court 
as support for its conclusion. {Bertero, supra, at p. 65, fn. 
12.) Therefore, we conclude a verdict is not excessive as 
a matter of law simply because it exceeds the amount 
awarded in other cases. Courts of appeal must make their 
decisions based on the evidence in the case being 
reviewed. However, evidence of other verdicts is still 
relevant as a point of reference, to provide [*49] context 
to the award by establishing a range of values for similar 
injuries. 
Ford cites five reported California decisions where 
noneconomic damages for purportedly similar injuries 
ranged from $ 1 million to $ 8.4 million. (Mendoza v. 
Club Car, Inc. (2000) 81 CalAppAth 287 [96 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 605] [50-year-old plaintiff-award of $ 1 million]; 
Niles v. City of San Rafael (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d 230 
[116 Cal. Rptr. 733] (Niles) [child suffered paralysis 
from head trauma-award of $ 1,604,371]; Rosh v. Cave 
Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225 [32 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 136] [plaintiff rendered paraplegic from 
gunshot-award of $ 2.99 million]; Fortman, supra, 211 
Cal. App. 3d 241 [three-year-old girl rendered paraplegic 
from fall from car-$ 6 million award]; Hess v. Ford 
Motor Co. (2002) 27 CalAih 516 [117 Cal Rptr. 2d 220, 
41 P. 3d 46] (Hess) [plaintiff rendered paraplegic after his 
truck rolled-$ 8.4 million award].) 
However, the cited cases are of only small 
assistance. Of the five California cases cited by Ford, in 
only two were the damages claimed to be excessive, and 
in both cases the damages awards were upheld. (Niles, 
supra, 42 Cal. App. 3d at p. 244\ Fortman, supra, 211 
Cal. App. 3d at p. 261.) In the case with the largest 
noneconomic damage award, the size of [*50] the award 
was not challenged on appeal. (Hess, supra, 27 Cal. 4th 
at p. 520.) Ford cites no published California decisions 
involving same or similar injuries where a noneconomic 
damage award was reversed as excessive. 
The Wilsons, on the other hand, cite an unpublished 
California decision upholding an award of $ 38 million in 
combined economic and noneconomic damages, reduced 
by 50 percent due to the plaintiffs comparative fault, to a 
quadriplegic who was 53 years old, and an award to his 
wife of $ 13 million for loss of consortium. The Wilsons 
also cite a published decision by an appellate court in 
Indiana that upheld an award of $ 55 million in combined 
economic, noneconomic, and loss of consortium 
damages, already reduced by a finding that the plaintiff 
was 20 percent at fault, making the total award $ 66 
million. (Ritterv. Stanton (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) 745KK2d 
828, 833, 857.) 
A review of all of these cases shows a range 
between $ 1 million and $ 66 million in compensatory 
damages awards and substantial differences in the facts 
of each case. This demonstrates that while a comparison 
of other cases may give us a point of reference, 
ultimately our decision must be based on the evidence 
[*51] in this case. 
d. Evidence in record that jury acted out of passion or 
prejudice 
Perhaps the most important factor that we must 
consider in determining if the award of noneconomic 
damages is excessive, other than the amount of the award 
itself, is whether there is evidence in the record to 
support the defendants' claim that the jury acted out of 
passion or prejudice. In this case we have substantial 
evidence in the record that demonstrates the jury's award 
was the product of such improper emotions and therefore 
must be reduced. 
In discussing economic damages in closing 
argument, counsel for the Wilsons argued that Mrs. 
Wilson suffered "an economic loss of $ 4.6 million 
dollars ... , based on the evidence that came before you." 
The jury awarded Mrs. Wilson that amount, and thus the 
reasonableness of her economic damages is not in 
dispute on appeal. 
In discussing noneconomic damages in his closing 
argument, counsel for the Wilsons described some of the 
matters that could be included in such an award. This 
included past and future physical pain, mental suffering, 
and loss of enjoyment of life. Counsel then suggested a 
method for calculating these numbers, taking into 
account the past injury, [*52] as well as future injuries 
over her 33-year life expectancy. Following that 
discussion, counsel made the following statement: "I 
respectfully submit that if you look at the catastrophic 
injury that we have, the numbers there, they are probably 
three to four times the specials is what you are going to 
find. It's going to be fair, just and reasonable. And this is 
an awful lot of money. I know it is. It's a lot of money. 
But when someone says it's a lot of money, why are we 
doing this, you tell them it's a lot of pain. It's a loss of a 
human being's dignity and worth. ... And I submit to you 
that there is no higher value than a good woman who is a 
good wife, a good mother, a good neighbor, that is out 
there helping others. And I can't put the number on it, but 
I want you to be reasonable, just and fair, recognizing the 
humanity of this issue." (Italics added.) Thus, counsel 
was requesting the jury award noneconomic damages to 
Mrs. Wilson in an amount three to four times the amount 
they awarded in economic damages, or $ 13.8 to $ 18.4 
million. 
As to Mr. Wilson's loss of consortium claim, counsel 
argued that "it's probably going to be equated perhaps 
reasonably just to what the economic [*53] loss is for his 
noneconomic loss." Counsel was thus requesting that the 
jury award Mr. Wilson $ 4.6 million for his loss of 
consortium claim. 
Next, addressing all the compensatory damages, the 
Wilsons' counsel stated the following: "I invite defense 
counsel to address my discussion of damages. If he does 
not discuss damages in his closing, if he does not 
disagree with me, you can accept these numbers as 
reasonable and just and fair." (Italics added.) 
Defense counsel did not address the issue of 
damages in closing argument. 
When we compare these numbers to the amount the 
jury awarded, it is apparent the jury disregarded the 
Wilsons' counsel's own statements as to what was a 
reasonable amount to award in this case. On 
noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson, the jury awarded 
$105 million, or approximately 13 times the amount 
counsel represented was "fair, just and reasonable." The 
reduced award of approximately $ 65 million is still 
approximately three to five times that amount. The size 
of the award provides compelling evidence that the jury 
rejected what even the Wilsons' counsel believed was fair 
and reasonable and acted out of passion or prejudice. 
The jury's award of loss of consortium damages 
[*54] also supports our conclusion. The jury awarded 
Mr. Wilson $ 13 million for his loss of consortium claim, 
or almost three times the amount the Wilsons' counsel 
requested. 
The jury's complete rejection of the damages 
suggested by the Wilsons' counsel, a range for 
noneconomic damages and an amount for loss of 
consortium that counsel characterized as fair, reasonable 
and just, is compelling evidence the jury acted out of 
passion or prejudice. The fact the jury's award, and the 
award as remitted by the court, far exceeded, and had no 
relation to, the amounts requested by counsel suggests 
the jury was not acting as a fair and neutral trier of fact. 
There was also a question posed by Ford's counsel, 
in light of Mrs. Wilson's catastrophic injuries, that may 
well have inflamed the passions of the jury significantly 
enough to result in the excessive damage award. Ford's 
trial counsel, in its last question on cross-examination of 
Mr. Wilson, posited the following: 
"[Q] The silver lining, to the extent that there could 
be one, it has brought you and [Mrs. Wilson] and the 
family closer together? Of]... 
"[A] I think where we were together before, we are 
together after. I don't think it's done more [*55] for us. I 
think it's—I don't think it's a benefit or a plus in any way. 
I am sorry, I don't think I can see it that way." 
This question implied that the family should find a 
silver lining in what befell Mrs. Wilson. It may very well 
have been viewed as callous by the jury and might 
explain, in some manner, the actions of the jury in 
rendering a verdict so out of line with the amounts 
requested by the Wilsons' own counsel. 
e. Our review of the record 
In addition to considering the above factors, we have 
reviewed the record to determine whether the award, as 
remitted by the court, is excessive. This includes 
reviewing the nature and extent of Mrs. Wilson's injuries, 
the testimony of lay and expert witnesses on damages 
and the damage award. Our own review of the record 
reveals the noneconomic damage award was excessive 
and was the product of passion or prejudice. 
f. Conclusion 
Based on all of the above factors, and utilizing our 
collective experience, we conclude the award of 
noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson, even as remitted 
by the court, was excessive, and the facts of this case 
instead support an award of $ 18 million, within the 
ratio/range requested by the Wilsons' counsel. As [*56] 
we have discussed, ante, the award, even as reduced by 
the trial court, far exceeds the amount suggested as 
reasonable, fair and just by the Wilsons' attorney. That is 
compelling evidence the jury acted out of "passion amd 
prejudice" in awarding noneconomic damages. Further, 
although each case must be analyzed on its own facts, the 
award far exceeds any award we could locate that was 
upheld by a California appellate court. 
However, the reduction to $ 18 million in 
noneconomic damages is in the range of one recent 
unreported decision in California where the award of 
such damages was upheld on appeal. Moreover, utilizing 
our collective experience, we conclude an award of $ 18 
million in noneconomic damages is proportionate to Mrs. 
Wilson's substantial injuries, and is proportionate to the 
economic damages award. Considering the substantial 
nature of Mrs. Wilson's injuries, we conclude $ 18 
million is a just and reasonable amount and an amount " 
'a reasonable person would estimate as fair 
compensation' " under the circumstances of this case. 
(Duarte v. Zachariah (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1652, 1665 
[28Cal.Rptr.2d88].) 
Ford summarily asserts the remitted award of $ 5 
million for loss of consortium to Mr. Wilson [*57] was 
also excessive, citing cases with loss of consortium 
awards of $ 229,000 to $ 2.55 million. However, utilizing 
the same factors we considered above, and noting the 
devastating impact on Mr. Wilson's life that Ford's 
conduct has caused, we do not find the remitted award 
for loss of consortium to be excessive or the product of 
passion or prejudice. The amount to which the court 
reduced these damages approximates the amount 
suggested by the Wilsons' counsel. 
To avoid further delay and expense to the parties, 
and because the record in this matter is sufficiently 
definite to determine the proper amount of noneconomic 
damages, we will remit the award of noneconomic 
damages to $ 18 million for Mrs. Wilson, conditioned on 
her acceptance of this reduced amount. If Mrs. Wilson 
does not agree to the reduced amount, the matter will be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of 
noneconomic damages, as specified in California Rules 
of Court, rule 8.264(d).10 
10 Ford asserts that if the noneconomic damages 
award to Mrs. Wilson is determined to be the 
product of passion or prejudice, we are required, 
as a matter of law, to grant a new trial on all 
issues. However, case authority demonstrates 
[*58] it is appropriate to issue a remittitur under 
such circumstances. (See Deevy, supra, 21 Cal.2d 
at pp. 120-121; Bellman v. San Francisco H. S. 
Dist. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 576, 586-589 [81 P.2d 
894]; Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas 
Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220, 
1255-1256 [1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301]; Burnett v. 
National Enquirer, Inc. (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 
991, 1011-1012 [193 Cal. Rptr. 206].) 
B. Due Process Considerations 
Ford also asserts that the noneconomic damages 
award is "unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of 
federal due process." Amicus curiae AAM makes the 
same argument, asserting that due process considerations 
applicable to punitive damages awards should also apply 
to compensatory damages. This contention is unavailing. 
Ford and AAM ignore the fact that while the United 
States Supreme Court has in several recent decisions held 
that due process rights limit the amount of punitive 
damages that may be imposed upon an individual, a basic 
underpinning of those decisions was the very distinction 
between compensatory damages, which are designed to 
compensate the plaintiff, and punitive damages, which 
are in the nature of fines or sanctions, designed to punish 
and deter a defendant. For example, in State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416 
[155 L. Ed. 2d 585, 123 S Ct. 1513] [*59] (State Farm), 
the majority opinion began its analysis by making just 
this distinction: "[I]n our judicial system compensatory 
and punitive damages, although usually awarded at the 
same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different 
purposes. [Citation.] Compensatory damages 'are 
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has 
suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct.' 
[Citations.] By contrast, punitive damages serve a 
broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and 
retribution." After establishing this important distinction, 
the high court concluded that the "[t]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments 
on a tortfeasor." (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 416, 
italics added.) The court likened punitive damages to 
criminal penalties, imposed without the protections of a 
criminal trial: "Although these awards serve the same 
purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to 
punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded 
the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding." (Id. 
at p. 417.) 
Ford and AAM cite no authority for the proposition 
that constitutional due [*60] process limitations 
applicable to punitive damages awards, as recently 
confirmed by the United States Supreme Court (see State 
Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 412), also apply to 
compensatory damages awards. Nevertheless, AAM 
asserts that the rule applicable to punitive damages 
awards should be extended to noneconomic damage 
awards because (1) defendants need notice of their 
potential exposure to such liability that is imposed in a 
vague and standardless manner, and (2) the lack of 
concrete standards for such awards enables juries to 
pursue punitive goals in rendering such awards. 
(8) However, because noneconomic damages are not 
a punishment that serves to deter conduct, but rather 
compensation to make a plaintiff whole as a result of a 
defendant's conduct, uncertainty in the proof does not 
preclude their recovery: " '[0]nce the cause and existence 
of damages have been ... established [with reasonable 
certainty], recovery will not be denied because the 
damages are difficult of ascertainment. ... The law only 
requires that the best evidence be adduced of which the 
nature of the case is capablef,] and the defendant whose 
wrongful act gave rise to the injury will not be heard to 
complain that [*61] the amount thereof cannot be 
determined with mathematical precision.' " (Dallman Co. 
v. Southern Heater Co. (1968) 262 Cal. App. 2d 582, 594 
[68 Cal. Rptr. 873], citations omitted; see also Speegle v. 
Board of Fire Underwriters (1946) 29 Cal.2d 34, 46 
[172 P.2d 867] [" 'The most elementary conceptions of 
justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall 
bear the risk of the uncertainty [in fixing the amount of 
damages] which his own wrong has created' "].) 
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, " 
'[T]he common law rule as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution' was that 'in cases where the 
amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment 
was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the jury 
that the Court should not alter it.' " (Feltner v. Columbia 
Pictures Television, Inc. (1998) 523 US 340, 353 [140 
L. Ed. 2d 438, 118 S. Ct. 1279]; see also Barry v. 
Edmunds (1886) 116 US 550, 565 [29 L. Ed. 729, 6 S 
Ct. 501] ["nothing is better settled than [the principle] 
that, in ... actions for torts where no precise rule of law 
fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function 
of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict"].) 
Thus, we are loath to usurp this core function of the jury 
by relying on quasi-mathematical formulas to [*62] 
assess the amount of damages that may be awarded, 
simply because noneconomic damages are not readily 
quantifiable. 
Nor does the imagined danger that vague standards 
for imposing or reviewing noneconomic damage awards 
will lead juries to use such awards as punishment, as 
opposed to compensation, justify imposing due process 
limitations on such awards. The jury here was instructed 
it "must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public 
opinion influence [their] decision." Although the jury 
was instructed that as to noneconomic damages "[n]o 
fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these 
damages," it was also instructed that it "must use [their] 
judgment to decide a reasonable amount based on the 
evidence and [their] common sense." The jury was 
instructed that for future economic damages, "[Mrs.] 
Wilson must prove that she is reasonably certain to suffer 
that harm." The court, in instructing the jury on 
noneconomic damages, also delineated the type of harm 
for which Mrs. Wilson could recover: "Noneconomic 
damages may consist of the following: ffl] Past and future 
physical pain, past and future mental suffering, past and 
future enjoyment of life, past and future disfigurement, 
past [*63] and future physical impairment, past and 
future inconvenience, past and future grief, past and 
future anxiety, past and future humiliation, past and 
future emotional distress." 
Thus, under these instructions juries are given 
guidance as to the proper matters they may consider in 
making an award of noneconomic damages. These 
guideposts protect against the purported danger that 
juries might use such an award to punish a defendant. 
Moreover, to the extent that a jury's award of 
noneconomic damages is challenged as excessive, the 
judge, sitting as a 13th juror, will then review the 
evidence to determine if the award should be remitted. 
The trial judge is not limited to setting aside an excessive 
damage award based on evidence the jury acted out of 
passion or prejudice. Rather, " 'it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court in ruling upon a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of excessive damages, to grant 
the same when there is a substantial conflict in the 
evidence regarding the extent of the damage.' " (Hughes 
v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1947) 79 Cal App. 2d 703, 
705 [180 P.2d 419].) This rule gives defendants a further 
check against excessive awards of noneconomic 
damages. 
Finally, the "passion [*64] or prejudice" standard 
under which appellate courts review such awards also 
protects against excessive awards. It is true that recent 
cases have stated that awards for emotional distress can 
in some instances have a punitive element. (Gober v. 
Ralph's Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 223 
[40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92] (Gober); State Farm, supra, 538 
U.S. at p. 426.) However, here we reviewed the record 
and determined the evidence supported an award of $ 18 
million, the award was within the range for similar cases, 
and it was proportionate to Mrs. Wilson's substantial 
injuries and economic loss. By reducing the 
noneconomic damages to $ 18 million, we have 
effectively eliminated that portion of the award that was 
the product of passion or prejudice, and no punitive 
element remains. 
AAM relies heavily upon a law review article for its 
position that the vague standards for quantifying 
noneconomic damage awards justify imposing federal 
due process constraints on such awards. However, the 
author of that article concluded that the solution to such 
unchecked awards is limits or standards imposed by 
legislatures, not application of due process notions to 
compensatory awards. (Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and 
Suffering: [*65] The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort 
System (2004) 90 Va. L.Rev. 1401, 1414, 1417-1418.) 
Ford and AAM cite one out-of-state authority that 
states in a footnote "[a] grossly excessive award for pain 
and suffering may violate the Due Process Clause even if 
it is not labeled 'punitive.' " (Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. (2004) 470 Mich. 749 [685 N.W.2d 391, 400, fit 
22].) However, that court expressly declined to address 
this constitutional issue and therefore it is not authority 
for the proposition cited. (Ibid, ["there is no need to reach 
this constitutional question"].) 
(9) We conclude it is not necessary to impose federal 
due process principles to limit noneconomic damage 
awards because (1) the Supreme Court in State Farm, 
supra, 538 U.S. 408, imposed due process limits on 
punitive damages awards because they are similar to 
criminal penalties, without the protections afforded 
defendants in criminal proceedings, and noneconomic 
damages are designed to compensate, not punish, a 
defendant; (2) the defendants have adequate notice of 
potential awards; and (3) the review accorded damage 
awards by trial and appellate courts ensures there is no 
punitive element in noneconomic damage awards. 
III. [*66] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Ford asserts the punitive damages award must be 
reversed because (1) the Wilsons only proved that 
reasonable people could disagree regarding the design 
decisions made by Ford; (2) it complied with all 
applicable governmental standards; (3) it was improper 
to admit evidence of Ford's overall financial condition; 
and (4) the award is excessive under federal and 
California law. 
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, 
with directions that we reconsider Buell-Wilson I in light 
of Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d 940, Ford asserts 
(1) it is entitled to a new trial because there is a 
"significant risk" the punitive damages verdict against it 
was based on improper evidence and arguments 
concerning third party harm; (2) the punitive damages 
award was barred because Ford's conduct was 
objectively reasonable; (3) Philip Morris requires a 
further reduction in the punitive damages award; and (4) 
we should revisit our ruling excluding industry custom 
and practice evidence. 
We reiterate our original holding that the punitive 
damages award, as remitted by the trial court, is 
excessive and reduce it to $ 55 million. We reject the 
remainder of Ford's contentions. We also decline [*67] 
Ford's (and amici curiaes') request that we reconsider our 
original holdings on the trial court's evidentiary rulings, 
the emotional distress damages, and issues related to the 
punitive damages award other than whether that award 
improperly punished Ford for harm to third parties. The 
United States Supreme Court's direction to this court was 
to reconsider our original decision "in light of Philip 
Morris." (Ford Motor Co. v. Buell-Wilson (2007) 
U.S. [167 L. Ed. 2d 1087, 127 S. Ct. 2250].) The 
only issue decided by Philip Morris was whether and 
when third party harm could be considered in imposing 
punitive damages. Based on our analysis of Philip 
Morris, our review of Buell-Wilson 1, and the 
proceedings in the trial court, we conclude that nothing 
in Philip Morris requires us to reconsider the remainder 
of our original decision. 
A. The "Reasonable People Can Disagree" Argument 
1. Standard of Review 
We review an award of punitive damages to 
determine if there is substantial evidence that supports a 
finding by clear and convincing evidence that a 
defendant acted with fraud, malice or oppression. (Mike 
Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 606 [92 
Cal.Rptr.2d897].) 
2. Analysis 
In this case the [*68] Wilsons presented evidence, 
which the jury accepted, that Ford knew of dangerous 
instability defects in the Explorer. Ford's own testing 
showed that the Explorer was unstable and prone to 
rollover on flat dry pavement at less than highway 
speeds. Ford knew before the Explorer was released for 
sale that the same instability characteristics in that 
vehicle led to serious injuries to Bronco II drivers. The 
Wilsons presented evidence that Ford knew that the 
Explorer's roof was weak and that roof crush caused 
injury during rollover accidents. Ford had the technology 
to make the Explorer stable and strengthen the roof, but 
did not use it. The modifications to strengthen the roof 
would have cost approximately $ 20 per vehicle. This 
evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the 
jury's decision to award punitive damages. 
Ford asserts, however, that because there was a 
"reasonable disagreement" among experts concerning the 
propriety of its design decisions it cannot, as a matter of 
law, be subject to punitive damages. We reject this 
contention. 
The Wilsons presented expert testimony concerning 
the design and safety issues of the Explorer. Ford 
presented contrary expert testimony. The [*69] jury 
rejected the testimony of Ford's experts, as it was entitled 
to do. Ford's assertion that punitive damages are not 
allowed unless all experts agree there were improper 
design decisions is unavailing. If such an assertion were 
true, punitive damages would never be allowed in cases 
where the defendant simply had an expert who disagreed 
with the plaintiffs expert. 
Moreover, the California cases cited by Ford on this 
issue do not support its position. They were cases where 
there was simply a failure of proof to support a punitive 
damages award. (See Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry 
(1992) 1 CalAth 976, 996-997 [4 Cal. Rptr. 2d837, 824 
P. 2d 643]; Chateau Chamber ay Homeowners Assn. v. 
Associated Internal Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 
348, 350, fn. 10 [108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776] (Chateau 
Chamberay); Mason v. Mercury Cas. Co. (1976) 64 Cal. 
App. 3d 471, 474-475 [134 Cal. Rptr. 545]; Kwan v. 
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 
Cal.App.4th 174, 184-185 [28 Cal Rptr. 2d 371]; 
Stewart v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 
468, 483-484 [21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338].) 
Ford also asserts there was no evidence any of Ford's 
decision makers believed the Explorer's design presented 
an unreasonable risk of injury, presenting the jury with 
only the "bare and illogical 'inference' that unnamed Ford 
officials [*70] 'must have' acted with malice ... ." 
However, the Wilsons presented direct and substantial 
evidence of Ford management's recognition of the safety 
implications of their design decisions. As discussed in 
detail in the factual background, ante, there is substantial 
evidence that Ford's decision makers knew how to make 
the Explorer less dangerous, but chose not to because of 
financial considerations. Ford's "reasonable people can 
disagree" argument is unavailing. 
PLAC supports Ford's arguments regarding 
disagreements among experts as a defense to punitive 
damages, asserting that where there are contemporaneous 
disagreements among experts regarding design decisions, 
punitive damages should be barred. However, PLAC 
cites no California authority for such a proposition. The 
California case law PLAC cites involves the well-
established rule in insurance bad faith cases that an 
insurer cannot be liable for bad faith if there is an 
objectively reasonable dispute about coverage. (See, e.g., 
Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347-
348; Fraley v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 
1282, 1293 [97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386].) However, these 
cases state a substantive standard of liability for 
insurance claims and [*71] do not address when it is 
proper to impose punitive damages. Notably, PLAC has 
cited no California product liability case where expert 
disputes concerning design provide a defense to punitive 
damage liability or, for that matter, liability in its 
entirety. 
In a footnote, PLAC also cites several out-of-state 
cases for the proposition that a contemporaneous 
disagreement among experts bars liability for punitive 
damages. However, several of these cases simply do not 
state such a proposition. Rather, some stand for the 
proposition that expert disagreement is merely one factor 
that could be considered in assessing the propriety of 
punitive damages awards. (Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 
Inc. (1990) 138 III. 2d 404 [563 N.E.2d 397, 406-407, 
150 III. Dec. 510]; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. 
Garrett (1996) 343 Md. 500 [682 A.2d 1143, 1158-
1168]; Satcher v. Honda Motor Co. (5th Cir. 1995) 52 
F.3d 1311, 1316-1317.) 
PLAC does cite two cases from Iowa that hold a 
reasonable disagreement among experts about the 
adequacy of design was a defense to punitive damages. 
{Mercer v. Pittway Corp. (Iowa 2000) 616 N. W.2d 602, 
618; Hillrichs v. Avco Corp. (Iowa 1994) 514 N. W.2d 94, 
100.) However, no case from [*72] any other state has 
cited these cases with approval, and we could not locate 
any other state that follows such a "rule." Because these 
cases apply Iowa law, we are not bound by their holdings 
and decline to adopt such a rule in California. 
PLAC also argues that punitive damages should be 
barred where there was a contemporaneous expert 
opinion that a product design that caused a plaintiff 
injury was necessary to avoid greater injuries of other 
kinds. This contention is unavailing. 
First, this argument by PLAC focuses only on Ford's 
decisions regarding the Explorer's stability. There is no 
assertion that Ford allowed the roof defect to exist 
because changing the design would create a greater risk 
of other injuries. Because the roofs crashworthiness 
provided an independent basis for the award of punitive 
damages, this argument fails. 
Second, PLAC cites to no evidence in the record to 
suggest that any member of Ford's management rejected 
changes to the Explorer's stability design because to do 
so would create a greater risk of injury in another 
manner. Rather, it only cites to statements made in Ford's 
brief that imply such a rationale, but Ford's statements 
are not supported by the cited [*73] record. 
As such, Ford and PLAC's "reasonable people can 
disagree" argument is unavailing. 
B. Compliance with Government Standards 
Ford and amicus curiae the Chamber assert Ford is 
not subject to punitive damages as a matter of law 
because it complied with all applicable governmental 
regulatory standards. In particular, Ford asserts it 
complied with FMVSS (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard) 216, which sets the standard for crush 
resistance of automobile roofs. Ford also asserts it 
complied with a National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) regulation requiring all SUV's 
to display a warning concerning the risk of rollovers. 
(See 49 FedReg. 20016 (May 11, 1984).) Ford's and the 
Chamber's contentions are unavailing for several reasons. 
(10) The law in California is that punitive damages 
are permitted in product liability actions precisely 
because "[g]overnmental safety standards and the 
criminal law have failed to provide adequate consumer 
protection against the manufacture and distribution of 
defective products. [Citations.] Punitive damages thus 
remain as the most effective remedy for consumer 
protection against defectively designed mass produced 
articles." (Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at p. 810.) 
[*74] Compliance with a law or safety regulation in itself 
does not establish that a product is not defective or that a 
defendant who sells or rents the product for use by the 
public has exercised due care. (See Campbell v. General 
Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 126-127 [184 Cal. 
Rptr. 891, 649 P.2d 224]; Amos v. Alpha Property 
Management (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 895, 901 [87 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 34].) 
The Chamber asks us to reject the rule stated above 
in Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, that 
compliance with industry standards does not bar punitive 
damages, because that decision predates amendments to 
Civil Code section 3294 that modified the definitions of 
"oppression, fraud [and] malice" and required proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. But Grimshaw did not 
base its conclusions on the standard of proof for punitive 
damages claims or the precise definitions of the terms 
"oppression, fraud and malice." The Chamber points to 
nothing in the 1987 amendments, or to any legislative 
history for those amendments, suggesting the Legislature 
intended to disapprove Grimshaw. 
(11) The Chamber relies on the extensive federal 
regulation of the automobile industry through the 
NHTSA and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) (49 U.S.C § 30101 et 
seq.), [*75] which, in conjunction with NHTSA-
promulgated standards, has declared the minimum safety 
standards for automobiles. However, a review of the 
Safety Act and its legislative history demonstrates the 
federal government did not intend to preclude punitive 
damages where an auto manufacturer has met minimum 
safety standards. 
Title 49 United States Code section 30103(e) 
(section 30103(e)) of the Safety Act contains a savings 
clause that provides: "Compliance with a motor vehicle 
safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not 
exempt a person from liability at common law." (Italics 
added.) 
Thus, section 30103(e) expressly provides that 
compliance with federal safety standards is not a defense 
to state common law products liability. Punitive damages 
have long been a part of the common law, originating in 
the 1763 English case Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 
Eng.Rep. 768, and finding early acceptance in the United 
States when the United States Supreme Court upheld 
their constitutionality in Day v. Woodworth (1851) 54 
U.S. 363, 370 [14 L. Ed. 181]. Thus, in enacting this 
savings clause, Congress was aware that part of the 
common law to which it referred in section 30103(e) 
included liability for punitive damages [*76] and could 
have excluded such damages from its terms. 
The Chamber asserts that Congress, in enacting the 
savings clause in section 30103(e), only sought to 
preserve common law liability in general and did not 
intend to address punitive damages. However, a review 
of the legislative history of the Safety Act further 
demonstrates that Congress intended through the savings 
clause to leave untouched all aspects of common law 
products liability actions, including awards of punitive 
damages. 
The House Report for the Safety Act states that 
section 30103(e) "is intended, and this subsection 
specifically establishes, that compliance with safety 
standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the 
rights of parties under common law particularly those 
related to warranty, contract, and tort liability." 
(H.R.Rep. No. 1776-89, 2d Sess., p. 24 (1966), italics 
added.) The Safety Act's Senate sponsor stated on the 
Senate floor that " [compliance with Federal standards 
would not necessarily shield any person from broad 
liability at the common law. The common law on product 
liability still remains as it was." (Remarks of Sen. 
Magnuson, 89 Cong. Rec. 14230 (daily ed. June 24, 
1966), italics added.) [*77] Its House sponsor, while 
arguing in floor debate against the need for criminal 
penalties in the Safety Act stated, "[W]e have preserved 
every single common law remedy that exists against a 
manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle 
purchaser. This means that all of the warranties and all of 
the other devices of common law which are afforded to 
the purchaser, remain in the buyer and they can be 
exercised against the manufacturer." (Remarks of Rep. 
Staggers, 89 Cong. Rec. 19663 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966), 
italics added.) 
The fact that California does not follow this 
proposed rule-that compliance with federal minimum 
safety standards bars claims for punitive damages—is also 
demonstrated by the fact such a rule has been proposed 
through legislation in California on several occasions but 
has not been enacted. In 2000 the Legislature considered 
a bill that would have enacted the rule that Ford 
proposes. (Assem. Bill No. 2582 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) 
§ 1.) However, the bill never made it out of committee. 
(Assem. Bill No. 2582, from committee without further 
action, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 
1865.) A similar bill did not secure passage in 1996. 
(Assem. Bill No. 2880, [*78] from committee without 
further action, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1995-1996 Reg. 
Sess.) p. 1711.) Another such bill did not pass in 2006. 
(Sen. Bill No. 1429 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) § 2.) There 
would be no need for such legislation if compliance with 
government standards already provided a defense to 
punitive damages claims. 
Ford and the Chamber's argument is also unavailing 
because there are no federal standards for stability of 
vehicles, one ground upon which Ford's liability for 
punitive damages is based. Ford points to an NHTSA 
regulation requiring all SUV's to display a warning 
concerning the risk of rollovers. (See 49 FedReg. 20016 
(May 11, 1984).) However, having a warning sticker is 
not the same as meeting a safety standard, and, in any 
event, it would not bar a state law claim alleging stability 
defects. 
The Chamber asserts that NHTSA's failure to 
promulgate stability standards and to require only a 
warning sticker represents a "policy choice" based on 
difficulties in predicting rollover risk and that 
compliance with the warning requirement alone should 
bar punitive damages. However, this exact argument was 
rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Watkins v. Ford 
Motor Co. (11th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 1213, 1216-1218, 
[*79] a Bronco II rollover case. (See also Ford Motor 
Co. v. Ammerman (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) 705 N.E.2d 539, 
555-556.) We conclude Ford's asserted compliance with 
federal safety regulations does not as a matter of law bar 
the punitive damages award. " 
11 Following oral argument in this matter, the 
United States Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008) U.S. 
[128 S. Ct. 999], holding the Food and Drug 
Administration's premarket approval process of a 
balloon catheter used in angioplasty established 
federal "requirements" under the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) that preempted 
state common law claims for negligence, strict 
liability and implied warranty. That decision has 
no impact on our holding as the MDA had a 
preemption clause that affirmatively barred such 
claims. {Riegel, supra, at pp. 1003-1005.) As 
explained, ante, section 30103(e) of the Safety 
Act, by contrast, contains a savings clause that 
that explicitly allows such common law claims. 
C. Fair Notice of Exposure to Punitive Damages 
Ford contends that if punitive damages can be 
awarded on this record, Civil Code section 3294 is 
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give Ford 
fair notice [*80] that its conduct could subject it to 
punitive damages. This contention is also unavailing. 
(12) Ford made this same argument over 25 years 
ago in Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757. The 
Court of Appeal rejected it, concluding that "punitive 
damages are recoverable in a nondeliberate or 
unintentional tort where the defendant's conduct 
constitutes a conscious disregard of the probability of 
injury to others." (Id. at p. 811.) 
Additionally, Ford bases this contention on the fact 
that, at most, reasonable people could disagree with the 
decisions it made. However, we have already discussed 
and rejected this argument, ante. 
D. Consideration of Ford's Overall Financial Condition 
Ford asserts that the punitive damages award must 
be reversed because the jury was allowed to consider its 
overall financial worth (almost $ 13 billion) as opposed 
to its worth tied to sales of products in California. We 
reject this contention. 
(13) Where the defendant's oppression, fraud or 
malice has been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence, California law permits the recovery of punitive 
damages "for the sake of example and by way of 
punishing the defendant." (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 
As our Supreme Court recently [*81] held in Simon v. 
San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 CalAth 
1159, 1185 [29 Cal. Rptr. 3d379, 113 P.3d 63] (Simon): 
"[T]he defendant's financial condition is an essential 
factor in fixing an amount that is sufficient to serve these 
goals without exceeding the necessary level of 
punishment. '[OJbviously, the function of deterrence ... 
will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows 
him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.' 
[Citation.] '[P]unitive damage awards should not be a 
routine cost of doing business that an industry can simply 
pass on to its customers through price increases, while 
continuing the conduct the law proscribes.' " (See also 
State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 428 [use of wealth as a 
factor not" 'unlawful or inappropriate1 "].) 
Despite this authority, however, Ford cites People ex 
rel. Lockyer v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2004) 116 
Cal.App.4th 1253 [11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317] (RJ. Reynolds) 
for the proposition that in assessing punitive damages 
courts may only take into consideration the defendant's 
financial figures in the state where the wrong occurred. 
In RJ. Reynolds, the State of California filed a 
complaint against the defendant tobacco company to 
enforce a consent decree entered into as part [*82] of a 
settlement agreement that prohibited targeting youth in 
advertising of tobacco products. The superior court found 
the defendant in violation of that agreement and entered 
summary judgment, permanently enjoining the company 
from continuing to violate the settlement. The court also 
awarded the state sanctions in the amount of $ 20 
million. The defendant appealed, and this court reversed 
the award of sanctions, finding them to be excessive. 
Relying on recent United States Supreme Court 
precedent holding it was improper to impose punitive 
damages against a defendant for conduct in one state 
based on defendant's out-of-state conduct, we held the 
superior court in RJ. Reynolds erred when it based its 
sanctions award on the defendant's nationwide spending 
on advertising, as opposed to its advertising activities in 
California. (RJ. Reynolds, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1289-1290.) This court found the sanctions award to be 
error because "the People's request for $ 20 million in 
sanctions was based on Reynolds's nationwide spending 
on print advertising and profitability without evidence of 
its advertising spending or profitability in California." 
(Id. at p. 1290.) As the court stated [*83] in RJ. 
Reynolds, "the award of sanctions for Reynolds's conduct 
in California could not properly be based on Reynolds's 
nationwide financial figures without violating Reynolds's 
due process rights." (Id. at p. 1289.) 
Based on the above quoted language, Ford asserts 
that it was error to allow evidence of its overall financial 
condition, as opposed to its financial worth in California. 
This contention is unavailing. 
Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury, at 
Ford's request, that it could not consider Ford's out-of-
state conduct in imposing punitive damages: "In 
determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, that 
is necessary to achieve the proper level of punishment 
and deterrence, you may consider only Ford's wrongful 
conduct, if any, that has had an adverse impact on the 
citizens of California. Accordingly, you may not award 
any punitive damages for the purpose of punishing Ford 
for the sale of vehicles in other states for any injuries that 
may have occurred in other states, or for the purpose of 
changing Ford's conduct in other states." 
Consideration of Ford's overall financial condition 
was not to punish it for out-of-state conduct as in RJ. 
Reynolds, but for the broader [*84] concept of ensuring 
the amount of punitive damages was sufficient to act as a 
deterrent. Use of a defendant's financial condition in such 
a manner is proper because " 'the function of deterrence 
... will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows 
[it] to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.1 " 
(Simon, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1185.) Consideration of 
only a defendant's finances as they relate to the state in 
which they are sued would allow the defendant to make 
them " 'a routine cost of doing business that an industry 
can simply pass on to its customers through price 
increases, while continuing the conduct the law 
proscribes.'" (Ibid.) 
E. Amount of Award 
Ford argues that the amount of the punitive damages 
awarded to the Wilsons is excessive under the federal 
due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. We conclude that, after reducing the 
noneconomic damages award to Mrs. Wilson to $ 18 
million, the award of punitive damages is excessive and 
is, therefore, reduced to $ 55 million, an approximate 
two-to-one ratio to the total compensatory damages 
award ($ 4.6 million in economic damages + $ 18 million 
in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million [*85] in loss of 
consortium damages = $ 27.6 million x 2 = $ 55.2 
million). 
1. Standard of review 
(14) "In deciding whether an award of punitive 
damages is constitutionally excessive ... , we are to 
review the award de novo, making an independent 
assessment of the reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, the relationship between the award and the harm 
done to the plaintiff, and the relationship between the 
award and civil penalties authorized for comparable 
conduct. [Citations.] This '[e]xacting appellate review' is 
intended to ensure punitive damages are the product of 
the ' " 'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's 
caprice.' " ' [Citation.] [f] On the other hand, findings of 
historical fact made in the trial court are still entitled to 
the ordinary measure of appellate deference." (Simon, 
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1172, fh. omitted.) 
"To state a particular level beyond which punitive 
damages in a given case would be grossly excessive, and 
hence unconstitutionally arbitrary, ' "is not an enviable 
task.... In the last analysis, an appellate panel, convinced 
it must reduce an award of punitive damages, must rely 
on its combined experience and judgment." ' " (Simon, 
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1188.) [*86] Moreover, our 
"constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than 
which an award may not go; it is not to find the 'right' 
level in the court's own view." (Ibid.) 
2. Analysis 
(15) The United States Supreme Court has 
determined that the federal due process clause places 
limits on state courts' awards of punitive damages, limits 
appellate courts are required to enforce in their review of 
jury awards. (State Farm, supra, 538 US. at pp. 416-
418.) The imposition of "grossly excessive or arbitrary" 
awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process 
entitles a tortfeasor to " 'fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of 
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.' " (Id. 
at pp. 416, 417.) 
(16) In State Farm the United States Supreme Court 
concluded it was improper for juries, in awarding 
punitive damages, to punish a defendant for its dissimilar 
actions in other states affecting individuals other than the 
plaintiff. (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 421-423.) 
However, the Supreme Court reiterated that, in 
determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's actions, 
juries could consider a defendant's similar repeated 
conduct that affected [*87] others. (Id. at p. 423.) 
(17) The United States Supreme Court and the 
California Supreme Court have stated there are three 
factors to consider in determining whether the amount of 
a punitive damages award comports with the federal due 
process clause: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the ... 
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages 
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive 
damages [and comparable civil penalties where 
available]." (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 418; 
Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 CalAth 1191 [29 
Cal Rptr. 3d 401, 113 P.3d 82] (Johnson).) We discuss 
these factors in order. 
a. Reprehensibility of conduct 
(18) Courts utilize five factors to help determine the 
degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct: (1) 
whether the harm was physical and not merely economic; 
(2) whether the conduct demonstrated an indifference or 
reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (3) 
whether the target of the conduct was financially 
vulnerable; (4) whether the conduct was repeated or an 
isolated incident; and (5) whether the conduct was the 
result of intentional acts or mere accident. (State Farm, 
supra, 538 U.S. at p. 419; [*88] Simon, supra, 35 
CalAth at p. 1180.) Further, the reprehensibility of a 
defendant's conduct is the most important indicator of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award. (State 
Farm, supra, at p. 419; Simon, supra, at p. 1180.) 
Based on our de novo review of the record, we 
conclude that the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct was 
high, given the catastrophic nature of Mrs. Wilson's 
injuries, Ford's reckless disregard for the safety of others, 
the repeated nature of Ford's conduct, and the fact that 
Ford's acts were intentional. 
Focusing on the first factor, Ford's decision to 
release the defective Explorer resulted in catastrophic 
and permanent physical injuries to Mrs. Wilson, not 
merely economic loss. She is permanently paralyzed and 
in constant, debilitating pain. She is confined to a 
wheelchair, without sensation or muscular control of her 
lower body. She must rely on others to care for her. As 
Mrs. Wilson explained it: "Me being dependent on other 
people ... for me that is very difficult because I have 
always been an independent sort of person. ... I have 
always been the one that has done things for other 
people. For me that is very hard to ... have to be in that 
kind [*89] of position. ... I am in a wheelchair, I am not 
going to ever be out of a wheelchair, that whole concept 
is very ... difficult to ... accept.... The things that I really 
love to do I can't do anymore. The list is just—goes on 
and on." 
As discussed, ante, and as found by the jury, Ford's 
decision to release the defective Explorer without 
warning consumers of the risk of injury it posed evinced 
a reckless disregard for the safety of its customers. As the 
trial court noted in ruling on Ford's motion for new trial 
on the ground the punitive damage award was excessive, 
"the evidence showed Ford had a pattern of deficient 
design regarding safety in favor of increased financial 
returns and was the result of the conscious disregard of 
Ford executives." Our own independent review of the 
record compels the same conclusion. Thus, the second 
factor also supports a significant punitive damages 
award. 
Addressing the third factor, the target of the conduct 
in this case was consumers, individuals who were 
vulnerable as they would not understand vehicle design, 
development and manufacture, and would rely on Ford to 
inform them of risks as they made purchasing decisions. 
Conduct is more reprehensible [*90] where, as here, 
it is part of repeated corporate policy or practice rather 
than an isolated incident. {Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at 
p. 1196.) In this case the conduct was repeated and not 
an isolated incident. Ford had a pattern of deficient safety 
design that was ignored in favor of increased financial 
returns. As discussed in more detail, ante, that corporate 
policy or practice was evidenced by Ford's refusal to 
follow its engineers' recommendations to improve the 
stability of the Explorer. As the trial court noted, "[T]hat 
evidence was primarily adduced through Ford's own 
internal memoranda and correspondence." Thus, the 
fourth factor supports a large punitive damages award. 
The evidence presented by the Wilsons in this case 
supports a finding that Ford's actions were the result of 
intentional conduct and deliberate decisions by Ford's 
management, knowing the unreasonable risk of harm 
posed to consumers, as opposed to a mere accident. 
Moreover, the fifth factor, whether the conduct was 
the result of intentional acts or mere accident, "is of little 
value in assessing a California punitive damages award, 
as accidentally harmful conduct cannot provide the basis 
for punitive damages [*91] under our law. At a 
minimum, California law requires conduct done with 
'willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of 
others' or despicable conduct done 'in conscious 
disregard' of a person's rights." {Simon, supra, 35 CalAth 
at p. 1181.) The jury's finding that Ford acted with 
"oppression, fraud or malice" demonstrates Ford's actions 
were intentional. In sum, the reprehensibility of Ford's 
conduct supports a significant award of punitive 
damages. 
b. Ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
(19) In State Farm, the United States Supreme 
Court, while still "declinfing] ... to impose a bright-line 
ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed," 
held that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process." {State Farm, 
supra, 538 U.S. at p. 425.) The high court "also 
explained that past decisions and statutory penalties 
approving ratios of 3 or 4 to 1 were 'instructive' as to the 
due process norm, and that while relatively high ratios 
could be justified when' "a particularly egregious act has 
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages" 
[citation] ... [t]he converse is also [*92] true[:] When 
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser 
ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can 
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.' " 
{Simon, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1182.) 
Our high court has interpreted this language from 
State Farm to mean that it established a "type of 
presumption: ratios between the punitive damages award 
and the plaintiffs actual or potential compensatory 
damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are 
suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example, 
extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-
detect or hard-to-measure compensatory damages), 
cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process 
clause." {Simon, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1182.) 
Here, after our reduction of the noneconomic 
damages awarded to Mrs. Wilson, the compensatory 
damages, while substantial, are within a reasonable range 
for the type of catastrophic, permanent and ongoing 
injuries suffered by Mrs. Wilson, and the loss of her 
society, comfort and companionship to Mr. Wilson. Mrs. 
Wilson's recovery for noneconomic damages is 
proportionate to the injuries she suffered. Similarly, Mr. 
Wilson's recovery on his loss of consortium [*93] claim 
is proportionate to his substantial injury. Moreover, as 
discussed, ante, there was a high degree of 
reprehensibility to Ford's conduct. Because the 
noneconomic damages award is substantial, a low single 
digit ratio is appropriate. We are mindful of the Supreme 
Court's statement in State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at page 
425, that "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, 
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due 
process guarantee." In this case we conclude that a two-
to-one ratio is warranted because the degree of Ford's 
reprehensibility is also high. 
c. Comparable civil penalties 
Ford does not address this factor in its opening brief. 
However, for the first time in its reply brief Ford asserts 
that there are comparable civil penalties to compare with 
the amount of the punitive damages claim. Ford cites title 
49 United States Code section 30165(a), which it claims 
provides penalties for designing and selling defective 
vehicles, penalties that are $ 1,000 for each vehicle, up to 
a maximum of $ 800,000. Ford asserts that since the 
punitive damages award "dwarfs" the maximum penalties 
allowed under that federal statute, [*94] the punitive 
damage award is constitutionally infirm. This contention 
is unavailing. 
First, we do not consider matters raised by 
appellants for the first time in their reply briefs. Because 
Ford did not address this factor in its opening brief, thus 
denying the Wilsons an opportunity to respond, it has 
waived the right to assert this issue on appeal. (Julian v. 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 CalAth 747, 
761, fn. 4 [27 Cal Rptr. 3d 648, 110 P.3d 903]; Shade 
Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, 
Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10 [93 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 364].) 
Second, title 49 United States Code section 30165(a) 
is part of that portion of the Safety Act which provides, 
as discussed, ante, only minimum safety standards. 
Third, as also discussed in detail, ante, there is a 
savings clause that allows common law liability 
notwithstanding compliance with those standards, putting 
Ford on notice it may be subject to private state actions 
that result in substantially higher damage awards than 
civil penalties. 
Fourth, the savings clause also evidences 
congressional intent that the maximum penalty allowed 
under title 49 United States Code section 30165(a) is not 
a sufficient penalty for all such violations because the 
varying [*95] degrees of plaintiffs' injuries and 
defendants' culpability dictate a greater flexibility in 
punishment. (See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau (Ala. 1997) 
708 So. 2d 111, 122.) 
Finally, the sanctions amounts in title 49 United 
States Code section 30165(a) were increased in 2000 to a 
range of $ 5,000 to $ 15 million, indicating Congress's 
belief that the original amounts were insufficient to deter 
vehicle manufacturers from placing defective 
automobiles on the road. The maximum penalty under 
the 2000 amendments is not "dwarfed" by the punitive 
damage award, as reduced. 
- d. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing factors, and using our 
combined experience and judgment, we conclude that a 
two-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages is sufficient to punish Ford and deter it from 
similar conduct in the future. This ratio is proportionate 
to the degree of harm suffered and the substantial award 
of compensatory damages. An award exceeding a two-to-
one ratio would exceed the constitutional maximum that 
could be awarded under the facts of this case. (Simon, 
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1188 [an appellate court's 
"constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than 
which an award may not go; [*96] it is not to find the 
'right' level in the court's own view"].) Accordingly, we 
reduce the punitive damage award to $ 55 million, 
approximately two times the total compensatory damage 
award to the Wilsons. 
F. Application of Philip Morris to Reduced Punitive 
Damages Award 
1. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has remanded this 
matter with direction that we reconsider our award of 
punitive damages in light of the high court's decision in 
Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at pages 948-949, 
holding juries cannot use punitive damages to punish 
defendants for harm caused to third parties. 
(20) We have reconsidered our original decision in 
Buell-Wilson I and have analyzed the application of 
Philip Morris to our holdings in that decision. We have 
also reviewed and analyzed the relevant trial court 
proceedings in this matter. Based on that reconsideration, 
review, and analysis, we conclude Philip Morris does not 
necessitate a change in our original decision in this 
matter because (1) Ford has forfeited the right to raise the 
issue whether there is significant risk the jury, in 
determining the amount of punitive damages to award, 
punished Ford for harm it caused to third parties; (2) our 
[*97] previous reduction of the punitive damages award 
to two times the compensatory award eliminated any 
danger the jury punished Ford for harm to third parties; 
and (3) there was no evidence or argument at trial that 
created a significant risk the jury here punished Ford for 
harm to third parties. 
2. Philip Morris 
The family of Jesse Williams, a long-time smoker, 
sued Philip Morris USA (Philip Morris) for negligence 
and deceit. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at p. 
946.) The jury concluded Williams's death was caused by 
smoking and found for the plaintiffs on their claims for 
negligence and deceit. On plaintiffs' claim for deceit, the 
jury awarded $ 821,000 in compensatory damages and $ 
79.5 million in punitive damages. The trial judge 
determined the punitive damages award was excessive 
and reduced it to $ 32 million. Both parties appealed, and 
the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the full award of 
punitive damages. (Ibid.) The Oregon Supreme Court 
denied review. 
Philip Morris appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, and the case was remanded for further review in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm, 
supra, 538 U.S. 408, which held, as we have discussed, 
ante, that [*98] the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution imposes limits on the amount a jury 
may award for punitive damages. Philip Morris raised 
two arguments on remand: (1) The jury should not have 
been permitted to consider injuries to third parties not 
before the court when awarding punitive damages, and 
(2) the punitive damages award was excessive under 
State Farm. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at p. 
946.) The Oregon Supreme Court rejected both 
arguments, and Philip Morris again appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
(21) In Philip Morris, the United States Supreme 
Court held Philip Morris's rights under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when 
the jury considered harm to third parties as a factor when 
determining the amount of punitive damages, because the 
"Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive 
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it 
inflicts upon nonparties ... ." (Philip Morris, supra, 166 
L. Ed. 2d at p. 948.) The Supreme Court concluded that 
such punishment violates the rule that a state must afford 
a defendant an opportunity to present every available 
defense. (Ibid.) A defendant "threatened with punishment 
[*99] for injuring a nonparty victim" may be unable to 
present defenses applicable to the nonparty victim if 
those defenses do not also coincide with those relevant to 
the plaintiffs claim. (Ibid.) 
Philip Morris also emphasized, however, that a 
plaintiff may offer evidence of "harm to other victims" to 
show the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct. 
(Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed 2d at pp. 949-950.) 
Reiterating its holding in State Farm, the Supreme Court 
held "[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to 
show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also 
posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and 
so was particularly reprehensible." (Philip Morris, supra, 
166 L. Ed. 2d at p. 949.) "[A] jury may not go further 
than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a 
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to 
have visited on nonparties." {Id. at pp. 949-950.) Where 
there is a "significant" risk that the jury might do so "--
because, for example, of the sort of evidence that was 
introduced at trial or the kinds of argument the plaintiff 
made to the jury—a court, upon request, must protect 
against that risk." (Id. at p. 951, italics added.) 
3. Forfeiture [*100] 
a. Jury instructions and arguments at punitive damages 
phase of trial 
(\)Fordfs proposed Special Jury Instruction Nos. 19 & 
21 
At the bifurcated punitive damages phase of the trial, 
Ford proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21, 
instructing the jury not to consider third party harm for 
any purpose'. "In determining the appropriate amount of 
punitive damages, if any, in this case, you may consider 
only the harm to the plaintiffs. Any individuals other than 
the plaintiffs who might claim to have been harmed by 
Ford have the right to bring their own lawsuit seeking 
damages for any alleged injuries they may have incurred. 
Therefore, if you decide to award any punitive damages, 
your award must be limited to redressing the injuries 
incurred only by the plaintiffs in this lawsuit." (Italics 
added.) 
In discussions regarding punitive damages 
instructions, counsel for Ford made the following 
argument regarding this instruction: "On [Special Jury 
Instruction] No. 21, particularly State Farm, in a product 
case, it tells the jury that they are only to focus on these 
particular plaintiffs. The Romo [v. Ford Motor Co. 
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 738, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Romo)] 
case refers to that same principle as opposed to [*101] 
trying to redress ... claims of other parties. So we would 
request and argue that that instruction is required by the 
due process clause and California law as it is 
developing." 
The court denied counsel's request it give that and 
several other special jury instructions, stating that they 
"are argumentative, misstate the law, or are already 
covered by the instructions that we will give from 
CACI." Ford at no time suggested a modification of 
Special Jury Instruction No. 21 or a separate instruction 
to clarify that the jury could consider harm to third 
parties in deciding reprehensibility. 
Ford also proposed an instruction, Special Jury 
Instruction No. 19, based on State Farm, supra, 538 US. 
408, that told the jury it could not consider Ford's actions 
and impact outside the State of California, but also stated 
that the jury could consider the impact of Ford's conduct 
on individuals other than the plaintiffs inside the State of 
California: "In determining the amount of punitive 
damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper 
level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider 
only Ford's wrongful conduct, if any, that has had an 
adverse impact on the citizens of California. 
Accordingly, [*102] you may not award any punitive 
damages for the purpose of punishing Ford for the sale of 
vehicles in other states for any injuries that may have 
occurred in other states, or for the purpose of changing 
Ford's conduct in other states." 12 (Italics added.) 
12 Ford also brought a motion in limine before 
trial seeking to bar "evidence or argument 
concerning Ford's out-of-state sales, profits or 
conduct." 
Counsel for plaintiffs requested Special Jury 
Instruction No. 19 be modified to state "in determining 
the reprehensibility of Ford's actions, you may consider 
Ford's conduct in California and elsewhere." As counsel 
explained to the court, "[W]hen talking about the 
reprehensibility of Ford's actions which is the chief and 
primary consideration or guidepost that the jury must 
consider, I believe that under the case law they are 
entitled from an evidentiary standpoint to consider acts 
outside of California so long as they are similar to what 
we are dealing with in this case. [A]s long as when 
awarding the amount of punitive damages they focus on 
the harm to this plaintiff and the act that was done to this 
plaintiff. When dealing with the issue of reprehensibility 
though, is this an isolated [*103] act or have they done 
this elsewhere, I think they can consider extraterritorial 
[conduct]." The court refused the requested modification 
and gave Special Jury Instruction No. 19 as proposed by 
Ford. 
(2) Plaintiffs proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 1 
Plaintiffs proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 1, 
based on State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. 408, listed the 
factors to consider in determining reprehensibility, 
including "whether the conduct involved repeated actions 
or an isolated incident." Ford objected to that instruction. 
While Ford acknowledged the proposed instruction 
tracked State Farm's discussion of "factors that are 
relevant to ... reprehensibility," Ford asserted those 
factors were not "exclusive" and argued that if the 
instruction were given, the court should add additional 
factors: "First, whether the defendant's conduct was 
consistent with industry standards and customs. Second, 
whether defendant's conduct conformed to government 
safety standards. And third, whether the defendant had a 
reasonable ground for believing its conduct was lawful." 
Ford also argued the repeated conduct factor was 
inapplicable to a product liability case involving the sale 
of vehicles because [*104] "it's inappropriate and 
misleading to suggest to the jury the fact that ... the 
company was engaging in its lawful business, selling 
multiple automobiles, could somehow be an evil that was 
punishable." 
The court rejected plaintiffs Special Jury Instruction 
No. 1. With regard to the reprehensibility factor and 
whether the conduct was an isolated or repeated act, the 
court stated: "... I think that flies in the face of what the 
court will be instructing on with regard to No. 19, saying 
not to consider ... injuries that have occurred in other 
states." The court also stated, "The jury understands the 
word 'reprehensible.' [B]oth sides are going to be able to 
argue this case and you can say why it is or is not 
reprehensible." 
(3) Punitive damages instructions given by court 
The court instructed the jury as follows on punitive 
damages: "The purposes of punitive damages are to 
punish a wrongdoer and to discourage it and others from 
similar conduct in the future. There is no fixed standard 
for determining the amount of punitive damages and you 
are not required to award any punitive damages. In 
deciding the amount of punitive damages, if any, you 
should consider all of the following separately [*105] 
for ... the defendant. A, how reprehensible was the 
defendant's conduct; B, is there a reasonable relationship 
between the amount of punitive damages and [the 
plaintiffs'] harm; C, in view of the defendant's financial 
condition, what amount is necessary to punish it and 
discourage future wrongful conduct, [f] You should keep 
in mind that compensatory damages, although awarded 
to compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, also may ... 
have the effect of punishing and deterring misconduct. 
Therefore, in determining whether and in what amount to 
award any punitive damages, you should consider the 
deterrence and punishment imposed solely by any 
[punitive] damages you may award and when added to 
the sum you have already imposed as compensatory 
damages. [%\ In determining the amount of punitive 
damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper 
level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider 
only Ford's wrongful conduct, if any, that has had an 
adverse impact on the citizens of California. 
Accordingly, you may not award any punitive damages 
for the purpose of punishing Ford for the sale of vehicles 
in other states for any injuries that may have occurred in 
other states, or [*106] for the purpose of changing Ford's 
conduct in other states, [f] Punitive damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to compensatory damages." 
(4) Closing argument 
As will be discussed in more detail, post, in closing 
argument when discussing the reprehensibility of Ford's 
conduct, plaintiffs' counsel made reference to the impact 
of Ford's actions on third parties within California, 
stating such things as "thousands of these vehicles were 
manufactured and sold in their defective condition and 
they are on our highways in California," and "they 
marketed to specifically, the soccer moms, the women 
with babies, the toddler seats, the families." 
At no time during closing arguments did Ford object 
to the statements made by plaintiffs' counsel. Further, in 
its own closing arguments counsel for Ford did not 
caution the jury to focus only on the injuries to plaintiffs 
or on Ford's impact in California. Indeed, in responding 
to plaintiffs' closing argument, Ford's counsel 
emphasized plaintiffs' counsel's reference to targeting 
"soccer moms," stating, "Mr. Schoville said to you that 
they targeted the soccer moms. That they ... let this 
vehicle out to the people out in California, knowing that 
[*107] it was dangerous and defective." Ford attempted 
to rebut this argument by noting the testimony of Ford's 
management that they and their families drove Explorers 
and commented, "[D]o you really believe that they are 
going to put their own families at risk if they knowingly 
put out a defective vehicle." Ford's argument focused on 
apologizing for its actions and asking the jury not to 
punish Ford for the fact it was a large corporation or 
because the lawyers "did a lousy job defending the 
company." Counsel for Ford commented about the 
"David versus Goliath" nature of the case, stating, "You 
saw the full wrath, if you will, Ford's power 
demonstrated for you in the number of lawyers and the 
amount of money they paid their experts." Nevertheless, 
counsel argued the verdict was the product of Ford being 
"out-lawyered. With all our money and all our power, we 
were out-lawyered." 
Counsel for Ford also attempted to present evidence 
that was excluded at trial concerning (1) the number of 
times they had successfully defended this type of case, 
(2) the overall safety record of the Explorer, and (3) 
comparing the risk of the Explorer to other vehicles. 
Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this attempted [*108] 
argument, and the court sustained the objections. 
After the court instructed the jury and the jury began 
deliberations, counsel for Ford belatedly objected to 
plaintiffs' closing argument and requested a mistrial, 
arguing it was improper for plaintiffs' counsel to argue 
"this was a case not about these plaintiffs but about 
soccer moms and other families." The court denied the 
motion. The court also interpreted the motion as one to 
strike the belatedly objected-to portions of plaintiffs' 
counsel's argument, noting it was not practical to send a 
note to the juiy saying that portions of the argument had 
been stricken. 
b. Analysis 
(1) The court properly rejected Ford's Special Jury 
Instruction No. 21 
As discussed, ante, Philip Morris holds that "upon 
request" trial courts must "provide assurance that juries 
are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not 
simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish 
for harm caused to strangers." (Philip Morris, supra, 166 
L. Ed 2d at pp. 951, 950, italics added.) 
At the bifurcated punitive damages portion of the 
trial, Ford argued Romo and State Farm required the 
court to instruct the jury that, in determining the 
appropriate amount of punitive [*109] damages, if any, 
it could not punish Ford for harm caused to third parties. 
However, Ford's Special Jury Instruction No. 21 was an 
incorrect and incomplete statement of the law and 
contradicted the holdings of Philip Morris and State 
Farm. Ford's proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21, 
did not merely tell the jury it could not impose 
punishment for harm suffered by third parties. Rather, it 
told the jury it could not consider third party harm for 
any purpose, including in assessing the reprehensibility 
of Ford's conduct. As proposed, Ford's instruction 
directly contradicted the holding of Philip Morris that a 
plaintiff may show "harm to other victims" in order to 
demonstrate a defendant's conduct "was particularly 
reprehensible." (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at p. 
949.) In fact, this rule was well established at the time 
Ford proposed its instruction and had recently been 
confirmed in State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at pages 419, 
423, upon which Ford relied in urging the court to give 
its Special Jury Instruction No. 21. 
Ford's Special Jury Instruction No. 21 contradicted 
another instruction the court gave to the jury, namely, "in 
deciding the amount of punitive damages," the [*110] 
jury must consider "how reprehensible was the 
defendant's conduct." Under State Farm, two factors the 
jury was charged with determining in assessing the 
reprehensibility of Ford's conduct were whether the 
conduct demonstrated an indifference or reckless 
disregard for the safety of others and whether the conduct 
was repeated or an isolated incident. (State Farm, supra, 
538 U.S. at p. 419.) Thus, Ford's proposed Special Jury 
Instruction No. 21 not only directly contradicted the 
holdings in State Farm and Philip Morris, but it also 
contradicted another instruction given by the court. 
An appropriate jury instruction would have been one 
similar to BAJI No. 14.72.2, which was amended to 
comport with Philip Morris, and which delineates the 
purposes for which a jury may consider third party harm 
and for what purpose a jury could not: "... If you find that 
defendant had a practice of engaging in, and profiting 
from wrongful conduct [occurring in California] similar 
to that which injured the plaintiff, that evidence may be 
considered in deciding the issues of reprehensibility, 
whether punitive damages should be assessed, and if so, 
the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. Do not 
include [*111] in your award of damages any sum that 
represents damages for injuries to any person other than 
theplaintiff[sV (BAJINo. 14.72.2 (Fall 2007-2008 ed.), 
italics added.) 
(22) California law provides that incorrect or 
misleading jury instructions may be rejected by the 
courts: " 'A trial court has no duty to modify or edit an 
instruction offered by either side in a civil case. If the 
instruction is incomplete or erroneous the trial judge may 
... properly refuse it.' " (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. 
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1673 [26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
638] {Boeken), quoting Truman v. Thomas (1980) 27 
Cal.3d 285, 301 [165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902].) 
Thus, by proposing an instruction that was an incorrect 
and misleading statement of law, Ford has forfeited the 
right to assert instructional error before this court.13 
13 Parties often refer to this as a "waiver." 
However, that term is incorrect. "[T]he terms 
'waiver' and 'forfeiture' long have been used 
interchangeably. As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, however, '[w]aiver is 
different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the 
failure to make the timely assertion of a right, 
waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right." ' " {People v. 
Simon (2001) 25 CalAth 1082, 1097, fn. 9 [108 
Cal Rptr. 2d 385, 25 P.3d 598], [*112] quoting 
United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 
[123 L. Ed 2d 508, 113 S. Ct. 1770]) 
(23) Further, the fact Ford relies on Philip Morris to 
assert its due process rights were violated does not 
change this result: "No procedural principle is more 
familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may 
be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the 
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a 
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. Courts may 
for that reason refuse to consider a constitutional 
objection even though a like objection had previously 
been sustained in a case in which it was properly taken. 
While this court in its discretion sometimes departs from 
this rule in cases from lower federal courts, it invariably 
adheres to it in cases from state courts ... ." {Yakus v. 
United States (1944) 321 US. 414, 444 [88 L. Ed. 834, 
64 S. Ct. 660], citations omitted.) Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has held that it is precluded from reaching a due 
process challenge because of a party's failure to submit 
relevant jury instructions: "We have no difficulty 
agreeing with the State that [defendant's] counsel's 
failure to urge that the court instruct the jury on scienter 
constitutes an independent and adequate state-law ground 
preventing [*113] us from reaching [defendant's] due 
process contention on that point." {Osborne v. Ohio 
(1990) 495 U.S. 103, 123 [109 L. Ed 2d 98, 110 S Ct 
1691].) 
In both criminal and civil cases, the United States 
Supreme Court will not review a federal claim arising out 
of state court litigation unless there is "no doubt from the 
record" the claim "was presented in the state courts and 
that those courts were apprised of the nature or substance 
of the federal claim at the time and in the manner 
required by the state law." {Webb v. Webb (1981) 451 
US. 493, 501 [68 L. Ed. 2d 392, 101 S. Ct. 1889].) 
Similarly, California courts have declined to review 
claims of federal constitutional error in the absence of a 
specific and timely objection made in the trial court. (See 
People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 CalAth 743, 759 [22 
Cal. Rptr. 3d I 101 P.3d956], cert. den. (2005) 546 U.S. 
834 [163 L. Ed. 2d 89, 126 S Ct 61]; People v. 
Burgener (2003) 29 CalAth 833, 869 [129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
747, 62 P.3d 1], cert. den. (2003) 540 U.S. 855 [157 L. 
Ed. 2d 100, 124 SCt 146].) 
Thus, by proposing a jury instruction that incorrectly 
and incompletely stated the law, and contradicted 
existing precedent and other jury instructions given by 
the court, Ford forfeited its due process challenge to the 
punitive damages award. 
(24) It is true, as Ford asserts, that trial courts have 
an obligation to instruct juries on the "controlling [*114] 
legal principles" in a case, even in the absence of a 
specific request from one of the parties. {Agarwal v. 
Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d932, 951 [160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 
603 P.2d 58].) However, this rule only comes into play 
when there is "a complete failure to instruct on material 
issues and controlling legal principles." {Ibid.) " '[I]f its 
charge does not fully cover the facts and issues as 
counsel conceive them, it is [counsel's] duty to request 
instructions upon specific questions arising.'" {Thomas v. 
Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal. App. 2d 812, 
820 [297 P. 2d 768].) Here, the court did instruct the jury 
on the controlling legal principles concerning punitive 
damages. If Ford wanted a limiting instruction 
concerning third party harm, it was Ford's duty to supply 
an accurate and complete instruction, which it did not do 
here. 
(25) Nor can Ford complain that it could not 
anticipate Philip Morris would reiterate the rule that 
juries could consider third party harm in determining 
reprehensibility. At the time of the punitive damages 
phase of the trial in June of 2004, both state and federal 
case law uniformly held a defendant's similar wrongful 
conduct toward others was a proper consideration in 
evaluating the reprehensibility of [*115] the defendant's 
conduct toward the plaintiff, and therefore was a proper 
consideration in determining the amount of punitive 
damages to award: "State Farm, in turn, did not bar 
deterrence of future public injuries as a goal of punitive 
damages. The court reiterated its statement in BMW [of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 
[134 L.Ed. 2d 809, 116 S Ct. 1589] (BMW),] that ' 
"[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further 
a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition" ' (State Farm, supra, 
538 U.S. at p. 416) and did not limit the concept to 
punishment and deterrence purely on behalf of the 
plaintiff. In elaborating on BMWs reprehensibility 
guidepost, the court in State Farm noted that conduct 
involving 'repeated actions' was worse than, and could be 
punished more severely than, conduct limited to 'an 
isolated incident.' (State Farm, supra, at p. 419.)" 
(Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1206, italics added.) 
(26) "To consider the defendant's entire course of 
conduct in setting or reviewing a punitive damages 
award ... is not to punish the defendant for its conduct 
toward others." (Id. at p. 1206, fn. 6.) 
Indeed, in arguing for Special Jury Instruction No. 
[*116] 21, counsel for Ford cited Romo, supra, 113 
Cal.App.4th 738, disapproved on other grounds in 
Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at pages 1205-1207, 1213, 
for the proposition that the jury could not punish it for 
harm to third parties. In Romo, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal, anticipating Philip Morris, concluded that in 
State Farm the Supreme Court had already held that it 
was improper to punish defendants for harm to third 
parties: "As we read State Farm, then, the legitimate 
state goal that punitive damages may seek to achieve is 
the 'condemnation of such conduct' as has resulted in 
'outrage and humiliation' to the plaintiffs [citation]; it is 
not a permissible goal to punish a defendant for 
everything else it may have done wrong." (Romo, supra, 
at pp. 749-750.) Elsewhere, the Romo court stated that 
juries may only punish defendants "based solely on the 
harm to the plaintiffs." (Id. at p. 753.) However, the 
Romo court also correctly predicted Philip Morris's 
reiteration that third party harm could still be considered 
on the issue of reprehensibility: "[T]his focus upon 
punishing the defendant solely for the outrage inflicted 
upon the present plaintiffs is not an evidentiary 
limitation. [*117] Plaintiffs are still entitled to show 
similar conduct on the issue of reprehensibility." (Romo, 
supra, at p. 753, fn. 7.) 
Based on its knowledge of existing precedent, Ford 
could have crafted a jury instruction (or instructions) that 
properly and completely informed the jury for what 
purposes it could consider third party harm and for what 
purposes it could not. Nevertheless, Ford elected to 
submit to the court an instruction contrary to this well-
established precedent-precedent it relied upon in arguing 
the court should give Special Jury Instruction No. 21. 
Instead, Ford argued against plaintiffs Special Jury 
Instruction No. 1, which instructed the jury it could 
consider Ford's repeated conduct in assessing 
reprehensibility. Ford even went so far as to argue that if 
the court gave an instruction on the factors delineated in 
State Farm and in California authority (see, e.g., Simon, 
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1180) in determining the 
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, the court 
should add additional factors not approved by any 
precedent and rejected by this court in Buell-Wilson I as 
being inappropriate considerations. 
In doing so, Ford forfeited the right to contend on 
appeal the [*118] court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury under its Special Jury Instruction No. 21. (Boeken, 
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 1640.) In Boeken, the Second 
District Court of Appeal rejected defendant Philip 
Morris's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, 
that the jury should have been given an instruction based 
on State Farm because Supreme Court precedent already 
established that defendants could not be punished for 
extraterritorial conduct: "... Philip Morris argues that the 
trial court should have instructed the jury using languetge 
similar to that from State Farm 'that it may not use 
evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant 
for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it 
occurred.' Philip Morris forfeited this issue by failing to 
request such an instruction from the trial court. State 
Farm was not the first case enunciating this concept. It 
was first addressed in BMW, where the Court stated that 
'a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators 
of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' 
lawful conduct in other States.' [Citation.] Thus, BMW 
provided sufficient authority to enable Philip Morris to 
draft and request an appropriate instruction. [*119] The 
trial court was not required to draft it for Philip Morris." 
(Boeken, supra, at p. 1694, fn. 27.) 
Indeed, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, White v. Ford 
Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2007) 500 F.3d 963 (White), it was 
noted that trial counsel for Ford in 2004 (before the trial 
in the instant matter) requested the court instruct the jury 
on third party harm, but at the same time acknowledged 
third party harm could be considered in considering 
reprehensibility: "Concerned that the jury would punish 
Ford for the harm suffered by other ... victims, ... Ford ... 
requested an instruction that would prevent the jury from 
punishing '[Ford] in this case not just for the harm to 
these plaintiffs, but for harm to other plaintiffs, whether 
in state or out of state.' Ford conceded that evidence of 
harm to other people could be considered by the jury in 
assessing reprehensibility, but argued that the jury could 
punish only 'for the harm to this plaintiff.' The district 
court refused such an instruction, deciding that it was not 
required by existing precedent." (Id. at p. 972, italics 
added.) 
Here, counsel for Ford was aware during the 2004 
trial that United States Supreme Court and California 
precedent [*120] provided that, in determining the 
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, juries could 
consider (1) whether the defendant's conduct 
demonstrated an indifference or reckless disregard for the 
health or safety of others; and (2) whether a defendant's 
actions were repeated or an isolated act that only 
impacted the plaintiff, both factors relating to third party 
harm. (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 419; Simon, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) As discussed, ante, Ford 
argued against giving such an instruction to the jury and 
instead proposed a jury instruction that would have 
forbidden the jury from considering these factors. 
(27) The Philip Morris decision holds "the States 
have some flexibility to determine what kind of 
procedures they will implement" to instruct the jury with 
regard to punitive damages. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. 
Ed. 2d at p. 951.) Further, the Supreme Court held a jury 
instruction on third party harm need only be given where 
the risk of prejudice to the defendant is "significant" and 
only "upon request." (Ibid.) Thus, Philip Morris (and 
other controlling United States Supreme Court precedent) 
comports with California law providing that proper 
instructions must be [*121] presented by counsel, and 
misleading or inaccurate instructions may be rejected. 
(2) Ford's Special Jury Instruction No. 19 
Further compounding the matter, Ford submitted, 
and the court accepted, Special Jury Instruction No. 19, 
based on State Farm's holding that limited the jury's 
consideration of defendant's conduct to that which 
occurred in the state where the action is pending. 
However, that jury instruction also told the jury they 
could consider the impact of Ford's actions on California 
citizens other than the plaintiffs, i.e., that the jury could 
consider harm to third parties, as long as it was limited to 
California: "In determining the amount of punitive 
damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper 
level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider 
only Ford's conduct, if any, that has had an adverse 
impact on the citizens of California." (Italics added.) 
Further, as we discuss, post, the argument of counsel 
regarding harm to third parties in closing argument on 
the punitive damages phase was limited to harm to 
persons within California. It was thus within the 
parameters of Ford's own instruction. Thus, to the extent 
the jury was allowed to consider third party [*122] harm 
in the punitive damages phase of the trial, Ford invited 
the error. (Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1645, 1653-1655 [57 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 525] [appellants cannot complain on appeal about 
jury instructions they requested].) 
(3) Ford's belated objection to plaintiffs' oral argument 
The fact Ford belatedly objected to plaintiffs' 
counsel's oral argument also does not aid Ford's position. 
First, as discussed in detail, ante, the third party harm 
instruction Ford proposed was an incorrect statement of 
law that conflicted with State Farm and Philip Morris. 
Second, plaintiffs' arguments were within Special 
Jury Instruction No. 19, submitted by Ford, that stated 
the jury could consider the impact of Ford's conduct on 
persons other than the plaintiffs inside California. In 
plaintiffs' counsel's closing arguments at the punitive 
damages phase, he made it clear he was "focusing in this 
argument just on this state." 
Third, Ford's objection came too late, after the jury 
had begun deliberations. (Horn v. Atchison, T&S. F. Ry. 
Co. (1964) 61 CaUd 602, 610 [39 Cal.Rptr. 721, 394 
P.2d 561] [objections forfeited because "[a]t no time did 
counsel for defendant ... interrupt plaintiffs counsel's 
opening or closing arguments [*123] to make objections 
as to the claimed instances of misconduct. Instead he 
elected to sit by while the improprieties accumulated 
until the conclusion of the closing argument, and then 
move for a mistrial"]; Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 
3d at pp. 797-798 [Ford waived challenge to alleged 
misconduct of counsel; motion for mistrial too late to 
raise issue]; Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles 
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 302-303 [85 Cal. Rptr. 444, 466 
P.2d 996] [failure to assert contemporaneous objection to 
improper argument of counsel concerning defendant's 
"wealth" waived right to seek mistrial].) 
(4) Ford's failure to request limiting instruction at trial 
As will be discussed in detail, post, Ford asserts it 
was error and a violation of due process for the court to 
admit evidence concerning the Bronco II's and the 
Explorer's propensity to roll over, as that evidence, and 
argument relating to it, allowed the jury to punish Ford 
for harm to third parties. Ford asserts it properly 
preserved this issue by filing a motion in limine to 
exclude evidence or argument of third party harm. 
However, that motion in limine sought in part to exclude 
evidence of (1) Ford's actions outside California; and (2) 
evidence of Ford's financial [*124] condition or net 
worth. 
(28) Further, although Ford's motion in limine made 
passing reference to the fact that "plaintiffs should not be 
permitted to urge the jury to vindicate the rights of other 
persons not before the court" or to "punish Ford for any 
conduct that goes beyond the specific harm alleged to the 
plaintiffs in this case," counsel conceded at oral 
argument before this court that some of the Bronco II and 
Explorer evidence was admissible and for certain 
purposes. As we explained in Buell I, and discuss in 
detail, post, such evidence was admissible for purposes 
not impacted by Philip Morris. However, Ford never 
requested the court instruct the jury regarding the 
purposes for which that evidence could or could not be 
considered. This failure also resulted in a forfeiture of the 
right to raise the third party harm issue on appeal: " 
'When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for 
another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly.' [Citation.] Thus, although a court should 
give a limiting instruction on request, it [*125] has no 
sua sponte duty to give one." {People v. Hernandez 
(2004) 33 CalAth 1040, 1051 [16 Cal Rptr. 3d 880, 94 
P.3d 1080], second italics added.) 
(5) Ford's failure to raise instructional error on appeal 
It is undisputed Ford did not appeal to this court on 
the basis the jury had been incorrectly instructed or there 
was improper closing argument by counsel. It is further 
undisputed Ford did not raise instructional error or assert 
improper argument by counsel in its petition for 
rehearing or petition for review to the California 
Supreme Court. Indeed, at oral argument before this 
court, counsel for Ford acknowledged it never asserted 
instructional error or improper argument of counsel as a 
basis for reversing the judgment on the first appeal. 
(29) Ford has forfeited the right to raise instructional 
error here in response to Philip Morris. The United 
States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over federal 
questions "not pressed or passed upon in the state 
courts." (Stern, supra, § 3.16, p. 171.) Ford was required 
not only to raise the issue in the trial court, but to pursue 
it "on appeal to higher state courts ... in the manner and 
with the degree of specificity required by the state rules 
of practice." {Stern, supra, at § 3.18(b), [*126] p. 179, 
citing Beck v. Washington (1962) 369 U.S. 541, 549-554 
[8 L. Ed 2d 98, 82 S Ct. 955].) " 'Without any doubt it 
rests with each State to prescribe the jurisdiction of its 
appellate courts, the mode and time of invoking that 
jurisdiction, and the rules of practice to be applied in its 
exercise; and the state law and practice in this regard are 
no less applicable when Federal rights are in controversy 
than when the case turns entirely upon questions of local 
or general law.' " {Wolfe v. North Carolina (1960) 364 
U.S. 177, 195[4L. Ed. 2d 1650, 80S. Ct. 1482].) 
Indeed, Ford understood at the time of its first appeal 
that juries could not punish defendants for harm to third 
parties. In its opening brief in the original appeal Ford 
argued that "plaintiffs' invocation of the Bronco II as a 
basis for punitive damages, in and of itself, is 
unconstitutional and grounds for reversal, because due 
process forbids imposing punitive damages against a 
defendant for conduct other than the specific conduct that 
harmed the plaintiffs before the court." However, Ford 
was attacking plaintiffs' closing argument during the 
liability phase of the trial, argument that, as we explain, 
post, was entirely proper. Moreover, that statement was 
in a section of Ford's [*127] brief asserting that the 
admission of the Bronco II evidence constituted a 
grounds for reversal of the judgment, not in Ford's 
argument that the punitive damages award should be 
reversed. This passing reference in a separate portion of 
Ford's brief was insufficient to raise a constitutional 
question on the punitive damages award. {Bd. ofDirs. of 
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club (1987) 481 US. 537, 550, fn. 
9 [95 L. Ed. 2d 474, 107 S. Ct. 1940] ["casual reference" 
in appellate brief in unrelated argument "is insufficient to 
inform a state court that it has been presented with a 
claim" subject to Supreme Court jurisdiction]; Adams v. 
Robertson (1997) 520 U.S. 83, 88-89 &fn. 3 [137 L. Ed. 
2d 203, 117 S. Ct. 1028] [reference to different related 
argument in appellate brief did not raise federal question 
presented to Supreme Court].) 
Although it understood then that juries could not 
award punitive damages to punish defendants for harm to 
third parties, nowhere in the first appeal did Ford assert 
the jury should have been instructed on third party harm 
or that plaintiffs' counsel's arguments during the punitive 
damages phase of the trial was improper. Ford has thus 
forfeited the right to raise these issues upon remand. 
(6) Recent Ninth Circuit cases 
Ford asserts a [*128] recent Ninth Circuit case, 
Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2007) 500 
F.3d 1007 {Merrick), compels the conclusion the court 
erred by failing to instruct the jury on third party harm 
"irrespective of the proposed instruction's precise 
language." This contention is unavailing. 
In Merrick, the jury awarded $ 10 million in punitive 
damages in an insurance bad faith action. The plaintiffs 
bad faith and punitive damages claims "turned upon 
linking [the defendants'] handling of [the plaintiffs] 
claim to a decade of allegedly improper claims handling 
practices." {Merrick, supra, 500 F.3d at p. 1015.) In 
response, the defendants requested the court instruct the 
jury as follows: "In deciding whether or in what amount 
to award punitive damages, you may consider only the 
specific conduct by Defendants that injured Plaintiff. 
You may not punish Defendants for conduct or practices 
that did not affect Plaintiff, even if you believe that such 
conduct or practices were wrongful or deserving of 
punishment. The law provides other means to punish 
wrongdoing unrelated to Plaintiff." {Ibid.) The court 
denied the request and, on appeal, based on the 
intervening decision in Philip Morris, the [*129] 
defendant argued the district court's refusal violated its 
due process rights. {Merrick, supra, 500 F3d at p. 1007.) 
In addressing plaintiff's claim the district court 
properly denied the defendant's proposed instruction, the 
Ninth Circuit stated plaintiff was "correct that the first 
sentence of the proposed instruction [was] misleading 
because it fail[ed] to indicate that the jury may consider 
harm to others as part of its reprehensibility analysis." 
{Merrick, supra, 500 F.3d at p. 1016.) However, based 
on federal law, the Ninth Circuit then held this error by 
defendants was not fatal to their appeal because the trial 
court had a duty to correct the erroneous instruction and 
give the jury a proper one: "[T]he fact that the proposed 
instruction was misleading does not alone permit the 
district judge to summarily refuse to give any instruction 
on the topic. ... Where a proposed instruction is 
supported by law and not adequately covered by other 
instructions, the court should give a non-misleading 
instruction that captures the substance of the proposed 
instruction." (Id. at p. 1017, citation omitted.) 
However, as discussed in detail, ante, California law 
does not require judges to correct [*130] erroneous or 
misleading instructions. (Shahinian v. McCormick (1963) 
59 CaUd 554, 565-566 [30 Cal Rptr. 521, 381 P.2d 
377], overruled on other grounds in Avila v. Citrus 
Community College Dist. (2006) 38 CalAth 148, 161 [41 
Cal Rptr. 3d 299, 131 P.3d 383].) For example, in 
Boeken, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at page 1673, the 
Second District Court of Appeal explicitly rejected the 
exact federal rule announced in Merrick: "[Instruction O 
was incomplete. ... [Defendant] argues that the omission 
was so minor as to require the trial court to modify the 
instruction. We disagree. 'A trial court has no duty to 
modify or edit an instruction offered by either side in a 
civil case. If the instruction is incomplete or erroneous 
the trial judge may ... properly refuse it.' " 
Further, here Ford did not request a legally correct 
instruction or request the court amend it to properly state 
the law. Ford also argued against instructing the jury in a 
proper manner. Indeed, Ford opposed plaintiffs request 
the court instruct the jury that, in considering 
reprehensibility, it could consider third party harm, i.e., 
whether the conduct was repeated. Finally, unlike the 
defendant in Merrick, Ford did not preserve any issue of 
instructional error because it failed to raise [*131] the 
issue when it first appealed to this court. 
White, supra, 500 F.3d 963, another recent Ninth 
Circuit case that reversed a punitive damages award 
because of the court's failure to give a third party harm 
instruction, also does not support Ford's position. As we 
noted, ante, in White, counsel for Ford, when requesting 
an instruction on third party harm, also acknowledged the 
jury could consider third party harm in assessing 
reprehensibility: "Concerned that the jury would punish 
Ford for the harm suffered by other rollaway victims, [14] 
counsel for Ford had objected to the district court's 
proposed jury instructions, and requested an instruction 
that would prevent the jury from punishing '[Ford] in this 
case not just for the harm to these plaintiffs, but for harm 
to other plaintiffs, whether in state or out of state.' Ford 
conceded that evidence of harm to other people could be 
considered by the jury in assessing reprehensibility, but 
argued that the jury could punish only 'for the harm to 
this plaintiff.' The district court refused such an 
instruction, deciding that it was not required by existing 
precedent." (White, supra, 500 F.3d at p. 972, italics 
added.) 
14 The White case involved [*132] a defect in 
parking brakes in F-series Ford trucks that caused 
the tragic death of the plaintiffs' three-year-old 
son when their truck rolled over him in the 
family's driveway. (White, supra, 500 F.3d at pp. 
966-967.) 
In contrast, in this case Ford refused to acknowledge 
the jury could consider third party harm in addressing 
reprehensibility, and in fact proposed an instruction that 
barred the jury from considering this factor and opposed 
counsel's arguments that the jury should be instructed on 
third party harm on the issue of reprehensibility. In 
White, trial counsel for Ford did not submit legally 
incorrect instructions as it did here, or oppose 
instructions that could have cured that error. 
(7) Revision ofCACI instructions after Philip Morris 
Ford asserts that because the Judicial Council of 
California (Judicial Council) recently revised the CACI 
instructions on punitive damages in response to Philip 
Morris and declined to add language specifying that 
juries could consider third party harm in assessing 
reprehensibility, its instruction was sufficient. We reject 
this contention. 
On May 24, 2007, the Judicial Council's Advisory 
Committee on Civil Jury Instructions (Advisory 
Committee) [*133] proposed revised CACI instructions 
in response to Philip Morris. (Advisory Com. Rep. (July 
24, 2007) pp. 2-3.) 15 In August 2007 the Judicial Council 
approved the revisions, which added the following 
language to CACI Nos. 3940, 3942, 3943, 3945, 3947 
and 3949: "Punitive damages may not be used to punish 
[name of defendant] for the impact of [his/her/its] alleged 
misconduct on persons other than [name of plaintiff]." 
15 Ford has attached a copy of the Advisory 
Committee report to a September 14, 2007 letter 
brief. We may properly take judicial notice of that 
document, and do so. (Evid. Code, § 452.) 
Of importance to our analysis, in considering what 
revisions should be made to the CACI punitive damages 
instructions in light of Philip Morris, the Advisory 
Committee reviewed comments from the public. 
(Advisory Com. Rep., supra, at pp. 1-2.) The committee 
noted that "the principal suggestion was to include 
language that would expressly clarify how harm to 
nonparties may be considered in determining 
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." (Id. at pp. 2-
3.) The committee ultimately rejected that suggestion, 
stating "because the United States Supreme Court did not 
approve or suggest any [*134] particular language for 
this purpose, it would be best not to attempt such an 
addition. The current instructions permit consideration of 
a defendant's (1) disregard of the health and safety of 
others and (2) pattern and practice. The committee 
believes that this language leaves sufficient room for the 
plaintiff to present harm to others for the limited purpose 
of proving reprehensibility." (Id. at p. 3, italics added.) 
These comments do not help, and indeed weaken, 
Ford's position that its proposed instruction on third party 
harm should have been given. The comments show the 
Advisory Committee did not deny the need to instruct 
juries that they may consider third party harm in 
determining reprehensibility. Rather, they found the 
existing instructions already did so. 16 One of the CACI 
instructions the Advisory Committee was speaking of, 
CACI No. 3945, specifies the factors State Farm and 
Simon hold juries are to consider in deciding the 
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, including 
"[w]hether [name of defendant] disregarded the health or 
safety of others" and "[w]hether [name of defendants 
conduct involved a pattern or practice." 17 
16 As discussed, ante, BAJI No. 14.72.2 was 
[*135] also recently amended to state that juries 
should consider third party harm in determining 
reprehensibility, but they could not punish a 
defendant for that third party harm. 
17 CACI No. 3945 provides in part: "If you 
decide to award punitive damages, you should 
consider all of the following in determining the 
amount: [|] (a) How reprehensible was [name of 
defendant]^ conduct? In deciding how 
reprehensible [name of defendant]^ conduct was, 
you may consider, among other factors: [%] 1. 
Whether the conduct caused physical harm; [f] 2. 
Whether [name of defendant] disregarded the 
health or safety of others; [f| 3. Whether [name of 
plaintiff] was financially weak or vulnerable and 
[name of defendant] knew [name of plaintiff] was 
financially weak or vulnerable and took 
advantage of [him/her/it]; fl[] 4. Whether [name 
of defendant]^ conduct involved a pattern or 
practice; and [%] 5. Whether [name of defendant] 
acted with trickery or deceit." 
In this case, Ford did not propose an instruction that 
set forth the factors juries are to consider in determining 
reprehensibility. Moreover, as discussed, ante, plaintiff 
proposed an instruction that would have listed the factors 
juries were to consider [*136] in determining 
reprehensibility. Ford opposed that instruction, however, 
and the court refused to instruct the jury with that 
proposed instruction. Most important, as already 
discussed in detail, Ford's instruction directly 
contradicted the amended CACI instructions and Philip 
Morris because it prohibited the jury from considering 
third party harm in determining reprehensibility. 
(8) Impact ofGVR order 
(30) Ford asserts the United States Supreme Court's 
GVR order implies the high court found Ford did not 
forfeit the right to raise instructional error on appeal. 
However, GVR orders do not imply any view on the 
merits of the remanded case and do not necessitate Ihe 
reversal of the remanded case if the intervening authority 
is distinguishable or otherwise does not require a change 
in the original opinion. (In re Patrick W. (1980) 104 Cal. 
App. 3d 615, 618 [163 Cal.Rptr. 848]; Stern, supra, § 
5.12(b), p. 319, fh. 94 [noting that "in a substantial 
number of the remanded cases the courts of appeals 
adhered to the original ruling, and that very few of these 
judgments were reversed by the Supreme Court"].) 
(31) Indeed, despite the GVR order, Buell-Wilson I 
"retains the ordinary precedential value of a published 
opinion of [*137] an intermediate appellate court and it 
remains the law of the case on all points other than the 
federal constitutional issue." (Romo, supra, 113 
Cal.App.4th at p. 744, fh. 1; accord, Occidental Life Ins. 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 135 Cal. App. 3d 
845, 848, fh. 1 [185 Cal. Rptr. 779] ["we refer to the 
[vacated] decision ... for the continuing value of its 
reasoning in nonfederal aspects"]; DeCamp v. First 
Kensington Corp. (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3d 268, 279-280 
[147 Cal. Rptr. 869]; Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 
48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 470 [122 Cal. Rptr. 61]; Guidi v. 
Superior Court (1973) 10 CaUd 1, 13, fn. 11 [109 Cal. 
Rptr. 684, 513 P.2d908].) The California Supreme Court 
routinely cites and relies on cases of its own, even when, 
as it notes, they have been "vacated on other grounds." 
(See People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 536, 598 [15 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 93 P.3d 344]; People v. Thomas 
(1992) 2 CalAth 489, 518 [7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 828 P.2d 
101]; People v. Allison (1989) 48 CaUd 879, 898-899 
[258 Cal. Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294].) 
Accordingly, we conclude Ford forfeited the right to 
assert, under Philip Morris, that the court erred in failing 
to instruct the jury that it could not punish Ford for harm 
to third parties. 
(9)Post-oral argument legal developments 
After oral argument was heard and this matter was 
submitted, two cases were filed relevant to our discussion 
[*138] of Ford's forfeiture of the right to raise the issue 
of whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
on third party harm. 
In Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 
Cal.App.4th 655 (Bullock), the Second District Court of 
Appeal concluded that under Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. 
Ed. 2d 940, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury, " 'You are not to impose punishment for harms 
suffered by persons other than the plaintiff before you.' " 
(Bullock, supra, at p. 693.) In doing so, the court 
concluded Philip Morris's proposed instruction was not 
incomplete or misleading even though it did not include 
the qualification that evidence of harm to others could be 
considered to determine the reprehensibility of the 
conduct that harmed the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal 
reached this conclusion by first noting that consideration 
of harm to others to determine the reprehensibility of a 
defendant's conduct to a plaintiff for the purpose of 
determining the amount of punitive damages "is not 
imposing punishment for harm caused to others." (Id. at 
p. 694.) The Court of Appeal further concluded that 
defendant Philip Morris "had no duty to qualify its 
proposed instruction in [*139] order to encompass a rule 
of law favorable to Bullock concerning the permissible 
use of evidence of harm caused to others," in the absence 
of a request from the plaintiff of such limiting language. 
(Ibid.) The court also held that a remittitur was not 
appropriate under the circumstances and ordered a new 
trial on punitive damages. (Id. at pp. 694, 695 &fn. 21) 
Bullock, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 655, is 
distinguishable from our case because, here, Ford's 
proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21 did not merely 
state that the jury could not punish Ford for harm 
suffered by third parties. Rather, as discussed, ante, that 
instruction prohibited the jury from considering third 
party harm for any purpose in setting the amount of 
punitive damages. Moreover, in our case we do not have 
a situation where Ford proposed an instruction that 
correctly stated the law, and the plaintiffs failed to 
request a qualification that would have made the 
instruction more favorable to their position. As discussed 
in more detail, ante, plaintiffs did request that the court 
instruct the jury for what purposes it was permissible for 
it to consider third party harm, and the court, at Ford's 
urging, rejected that instruction. [*140] Finally, we have 
also concluded here that Ford has forfeited the right to 
raise the contention that the court committed 
instructional error because it failed to raise this issue on 
its original appeal. 
The second recent case relevant to our discussion is 
Williams v. Phillip Morris, Inc. (Or. Jan. 31, 2008, 
S051805) P.2d [2008 Ore. LEXIS 5] (Williams 
II), wherein the Oregon Supreme Court, on remand from 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Philip 
Morris, held that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
give an instruction that properly told the jury that it could 
not punish the defendant for harm to third parties, but 
could consider third party harm in considering the 
defendant's reprehensibility. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 
L. Ed. 2d at p. 947.) The Oregon Supreme Court reached 
this conclusion because the instruction misstated Oregon 
law in two respects unrelated to third party harm. The 
Willams II court held that a jury instruction need not be 
given unless it is " 'clear and correct in all respects, both 
in form and in substance, and ... altogether free from 
error.' " (Williams II, supra, P.2d at p. [2008 
Lexis at p. *18J.) "It is not enough ... to offer [*141] a 
proposed instruction that is correct in part and erroneous 
in part, leaving the trial court to solve the problem for 
itself." (Id. at p. *19].) 
The Williams II decision provides further support for 
our conclusion here that Ford forfeited the right to assert 
the court erred in refusing to give Special Jury 
Instruction No. 21. We have concluded, ante, as the 
Oregon Supreme Court did, that because Ford's 
instruction was incomplete, misleading, and affirmatively 
misstated the law on punitive damages, the court did not 
have an obligation to give the instruction as written, nor 
to correct it for Ford. 
A. Prejudice 
We also conclude, based on our previous reduction 
of the punitive damages award and the evidence and 
argument of counsel during the punitive damages phase 
of the trial, that there was no "significant risk" the jury 
punished Ford for harm to third parties. Therefore, even 
assuming the court erred in failing properly to instruct 
the jury on third party harm, Philip Morris does not 
necessitate a reversal of the punitive damages award. 
a. Standard of review 
(32) Under article 13 of the California Constitution, 
"[a] judgment may not be reversed for instructional error 
in a civil case 'unless, [*142] after an examination of the 
entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of 
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.' " (Soule, supra, 8 Cal. 4th at p. 
580.) Instructional error is deemed harmless unless it is 
"reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable result" if the error had been corrected. 
(Id. at p. 570.) 
b. Prior reduction of punitive award 
(33) As we have explained, ante, in reviewing the 
amount of a punitive damages award for prejudice, for 
purposes of our review the relevant amount is not the 
amount initially awarded by the jury, but rather the 
amount by which the trial court, and this court, ordered 
the judgment reduced. (See Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 419.) 
In deciding whether an award of punitive damages is 
constitutionally excessive, we review the award de novo, 
making an independent assessment of the 
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the 
relationship between the award and the harm done to the 
plaintiff, and the relationship between the award and civil 
penalties authorized for comparable conduct. "This 
'[ejxacting appellate review' is intended to ensure 
punitive damages are the product [*143] of the ' " 
'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's 
caprice.' " ' " (Simon, supra, 35 CalAih at p. 1172.) 
(34) Moreover, there is a distinction to be drawn 
between what is traditionally referred to as a "remittitur," 
which we applied to the emotional distress damages, and 
a reduction of an excessive punitive damages award: "A 
constitutionally reduced verdict ... is really not a 
remittitur at all. A remittitur is a substitution of the 
court's judgment for that of the jury regarding the 
appropriate award of damages. The court orders a 
remittitur when it believes the jury's award is 
unreasonable on the facts. A constitutional reduction, on 
the other hand, is a determination that the law does not 
permit the award. Unlike a remittitur, which is 
discretionary with the court... , a court has a mandatory 
duty to correct an unconstitutionally excessive verdict so 
that it conforms to the requirements of the due process 
clause." (Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. 
(11th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 1320, 1331-1332, fa. & 
citation omitted.) 
"Thus, in deciding the constitutional maximum [for a 
punitive damage award], a court does not decide whether 
the verdict is unreasonable based on the [*144] facts; 
rather, it examines the punitive damages award to 
determine whether it is constitutionally excessive and, if 
so, may adjust it to the maximum amount permitted by 
the Constitution." (Gober, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 
214.) This is so because " 'the level of punitive damages 
is not really a "fact" "tried" by the jury.' " (Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001) 
532 U.S. 424, 437 [149 L. Ed 2d 674, 121 S Ct. 1678].) 
Thus, "the jury's award of punitive damages does not 
constitute a finding of 'fact' " to which an appellate court 
must defer. (Ibid.) 
As we discussed in Buell-Wilson I and reiterate in 
this opinion, we remitted the noneconomic damages to an 
amount supported by the evidence and omitted any 
punitive element. 
Moreover, in deciding the constitutionally 
permissible amount of punitive damages in our original 
opinion, we conducted a de novo review of the punitive 
damages award, applying the factors dictated by State 
Farm and other applicable precedent. Our Buell-Wilson I 
opinion, however, did not consider or justify the amount 
to which we reduced the punitive damages award by 
reference to potential harm to others. The only evidence 
we cited in our discussion of punitive damages related 
[*145] to harm to third parties was in our discussion of 
the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct. (Buell-Wilson I, 
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 568-569.) Thus, in 
conducting our independent review and arriving at a 
constitutionally permissible amount of punitive damages, 
we satisfied the due process concerns of Ford. 
For example, in Romo, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 738, 
disapproved on other grounds in Johnson, supra, 35 
CalAth at pages 1205-1207, 1213, the Court of Appeal 
was reconsidering a punitive damages award in light of 
State Farm after the United States Supreme Court 
vacated the Court of Appeal's original decision. (Romo, 
supra, at p. 743.) The Court of Appeal concluded the 
jury instructions given by the trial court violated State 
Farm and prejudiced Ford. (Romo, supra, at pp. 753-
754.) However, rather than remanding the matter for a 
new trial on punitive damages, the Court of Appeal 
reduced the award to an amount that was not 
constitutionally excessive: "While the underlying facts 
supporting a punitive damages award are for the jury to 
decide, the amount of punitive damages must be 
independently reviewed on appeal. [Citation.] In 
conducting such review, we remove any prejudice 
accruing [*146] to the defendant as a result of 
misinstruction concerning the amount of such award; we 
do so by modifying the judgment to reflect a level of 
punitive damages below which we believe no properly 
instructed jury was reasonably likely to go. [Citation.] 
Accordingly, our reduction of the award satisfies the due 
process interests of defendant." (Id. at p. 754.) 
In determining as a matter of law the constitutionally 
appropriate amount of punitive damages when this matter 
was first before us, we also necessarily reduced the 
award to comport both with due process principles, 
including the notion Ford could not be punished for harm 
to third parties, and the factors to be considered under 
State Farm. We made an independent determination 
under these factors that Ford's conduct justified an award 
of punitive damages in an amount equal to a two-to-one 
ratio to the compensatory damages, which we had 
already reduced to eliminate any potential punitive 
effect. We did not consider harm to third parties (except 
when assessing the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct) 
when making that award. 
There is no basis for a further reduction in the award 
or a new trial on punitive damages, as the reduced 
amount of [*147] the award comports with the holding 
of Philip Morris. 
c. Evidence and arguments at trial 
Ford has also failed to demonstrate that evidence or 
argument at trial prejudiced it in a manner that would 
require, under Philip Morris, a further reduction in the 
punitive damages award or a new trial on punitive 
damages. 
(1) Evidence admitted at trial 
Ford first asserts that admission of evidence at the 
liability and compensatory damages phase of the trial 
regarding the Bronco II's and Explorer's propensity to 
roll over was itself a due process violation under Philip 
Morris. However, as we explained in our original 
decision, and again in this opinion, ante, that evidence 
was properly admitted as relevant to issues related to 
proof the product was defective in the plaintiffs' case-in-
chief. The Bronco II and Explorer evidence was relevant 
during the liability phase of the trial to show, under 
California law, that Ford had notice of the defective 
product. (Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d atp. 404.) Further, as 
stated, ante, that evidence was admissible to show Ford 
acted with malice on the issue of whether the plaintiffs 
were entitled to an award of punitive damages. 
"Marketing a product that is known [*148] to be 
defective and dangerous to consumers supports an 
inference of malice for purposes of punitive damages." 
(Karlsson, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; Grimshaw, 
supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at p. 814; Taylor, supra, 24 
Cal.3d at p. 895 [malice may be shown by fact the 
defendant had acted with a "conscious disregard of the 
safety of others"].) 
(35) As our Supreme Court explained in Johnson, 
United States Supreme Court precedent "makes clear that 
due process does not prohibit state courts, in awarding or 
reviewing punitive damages, from considering the 
defendant's illegal or wrongful conduct towards others 
that was similar to the tortious conduct that injured the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs. [A] civil defendant's recidivism 
remains pertinent to an assessment of culpability." 
(Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at p 1204.) " ' "[P]unitive 
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's 
legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and 
deterring its repetition" ' [citation] and [State Farm] did 
not limit the concept to punishment and deterrence 
purely on behalf of the plaintiff." (Id at p. 1206.) 
(36) Nowhere does Philip Morris suggest due 
process requires trial courts to exclude otherwise 
relevant, [*149] admissible evidence in the process of 
determining liability or whether an award of punitive 
damages is warranted. "A basic principle of federalism is 
that each State may make its own reasoned judgment 
about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its 
borders, and each State alone can determine what 
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant 
who acts within its jurisdiction." (State Farm, supra, 538 
U.S. at p. 422.) 
Rather, Philip Morris held that in appropriate cases 
courts will need to ensure, by appropriate jury 
instructions and limitations on argument by counsel, that 
evidence of third party harm is not used to punish 
defendants when determining the amount of punitive 
damages to award. 
(2) Closing arguments at liability phase 
Ford also attacks statements made by plaintiffs' 
counsel in closing arguments that it claims were in 
violation of Philip Morris. This contention is unavailing. 
In the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury was 
deciding liability, compensatory damages, and whether 
plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages. Ford points 
to closing arguments counsel for plaintiffs made there 
that allegedly invited the jury to punish Ford for harm to 
third [*150] parties. Specifically, Ford points to the 
following arguments made by plaintiffs' counsel: "They 
go ahead and release the Bronco II in 1983 ... knowing it 
will roll over and kill or catastrophically injure many 
people, which it has. flf] Fraud, oppression, malice, these 
are issues that relate to one question that has [sic] clear 
and convincing. I\his is t]he last question on the verdict 
form, [and] it is the most importan[t] [answer] you will 
give in this case. ... [f] ... This is the report to the 
Consumers Union. Bronco II. [The following] 
[q]uotation [appears] in the document[:] 'We are in deep 
trouble regarding our rollover rates. Our data are not 
terribly favorable. Our rollover rate is three times higher 
than the Chevy S-10 Blazer. We think, however, we have 
clouded their minds/ Ron Campbell testifies that Ford is 
aware by 1989 that many people are killed or seriously 
injured in [Bronco II] rollovers. Right in this time period, 
and they are going out to market with this new launch 
[i.e., the Explorer] with Job 1 with the engineers telling 
them [that it had] the same problems. Conscious, 
deliberate, oppressive, fraudulent conduct. [f| ... [If] 
Hundreds of Explorer rollover [*151] cases. [Ford 
expert] Tandy, involved at least in dozens of on-road 
untripped Explorer rollover cases. And I cross-examined 
[Ford expert] Germane, from other cases . . . . Cases that 
these guys are working on together. Ford management's 
willingness to accept this risk from the Bronco II through 
the [1997 model Explorer] is the definition precisely of 
fraud, malice and oppression.'' (Italics added.) 
Counsel's argument in the first phase of the trial did 
not ask the jury to punish Ford for harm to third parties. 
Rather, as discussed, ante, this argument properly 
referred to facts supporting entitlement to an award of 
punitive damages, i.e., whether Ford's actions 
demonstrated malice, fraud and/or oppression. (See 
Karlsson, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; Grimshaw, 
supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at p. 814; Taylor, supra, 24 
Cal.3d at p. 895.) Philip Morris does not stand for the 
proposition that juries cannot consider the repeated 
nature of a defendant's conduct in determining whether to 
award punitive damages, and the factors used to reach 
that conclusion. Rather, it only held that in determining 
the amount to award, juries could not punish defendants 
for harm caused to third parties. 
(3) Closing [*152] arguments at punitive damages stage 
The statements made by plaintiffs' counsel in the 
bifurcated punitive damages closing argument also did 
not create a "significant risk" the jury would punish Ford 
for harm to third parties. Ford focuses on the following 
arguments by counsel: "So you understand what the 
consequences and what the risk factor was that they 
voluntarily, at the highest level of this company, chose to 
put people in wheelchairs, brain damaged or death, in a 
defectively designed product, their decision to put this 
vehicle out to the market in California. And I am focusing 
in this argument just on our state. And the effects it has 
on the people driving these vehicles out there on the 
highway, not knowing what they are in for if they should 
do a simple avoidance maneuver. That is the ramification 
in California, without fixing its known stability 
problems. That was callous, that was willful disregard. 
Did they do the test? No. The test drivers are out on the 
roads of California. Willful disregard of the health and 
safety of [Mrs. Wilson] and those like her. Was this a 
single isolated incident? No. You have heard of others in 
California. Just a few we were allowed to present. 
[* 153] [fj History repeated itself They had had the same 
problem before. The same issues. Did they learn? Did 
they care? Did they really care? [f| [Thousands of these 
vehicles were manufactured and sold in their defective 
condition and they are on our highways in California. 
And every time we look at one of those vehicles, we 
hope and pray there is no [accident] avoidance maneuver 
necessary, flf] ... [f| [R]eprehensibility of the conduct I 
submit to you, here in California, the unlawful conduct 
taking place in this state that should bear the weight of 
your discussion and consideration, [^ f] ... [f] This is not 
only ... a case involving one family here in California, 
but... they marketed to specifically, the soccer moms, the 
women with babies, the toddler seats, the families." 
(Italics added.) 
(37) Based on our review of the record, plaintiffs' 
counsel was not asking the jury to punish Ford for harm 
done to third parties. Rather, counsel was discussing the 
repeated nature of Ford's actions in arguing the 
reprehensibility of Ford's conduct. That argument was 
entirely proper and did not create a "significant risk" the 
jury would punish Ford for injuries to third parties: 
"California has long [*154] endorsed the use of punitive 
damages to deter continuation or imitation of a 
corporation's course of wrongful conduct, and hence 
allowed consideration of that conduct's scale and 
profitability in determining the size of the award that will 
vindicate the state's legitimate interests." {Johnson, 
supra, 35 Cal. 4th at p. 1207.) "Nothing [State Farm or 
Philip Morris have] said about due process review 
requires that California juries and courts ignore evidence 
of corporate polices and practices and evaluate the 
defendant's harm to the plaintiff in isolation." (Ibid.) 
Moreover, as discussed, ante, counsel's argument 
was within the parameters of the special jury instruction 
submitted by Ford based on the holding in State Farm 
that juries could not punish defendants for conduct 
outside the state in which the action was pending. That 
instruction informed the jury it could consider harm to 
"the citizens of California." Plaintiffs' counsel informed 
the jury, when discussing the impact of Ford's actions on 
third parties, that it was limited to considering Ford's 
conduct with regard to the citizens of California. Thus, 
plaintiffs argument was within the bounds of an 
instruction Ford itself drafted [* 155] and proposed to the 
court. Ford cannot complain it was prejudiced by 
argument based on one of its own instructions. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed in all respects except as to 
the award of noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson and 
punitive damages to the Wilsons. The award of punitive 
damages to the Wilsons is reduced to $ 55 million. The 
award of noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson is 
reversed and remanded for retrial on the issue of the 
amount of noneconomic damages, unless Mrs. Wilson 
shall, within 30 days from the date this opinion is filed, 
file with the clerk of this court and serve upon Ford Mrs. 
Wilson's written consent to a reduction of her 
noneconomic damages award to $ 18 million, in which 
event the judgment shall be modified to award Mrs. 
Wilson noneconomic damages in that amount, which will 
result in a total reduced award to the Wilsons of $ 
82,606,004 ($ 4,606,004 in economic damages + $ 18 parties shall bear their own costs on appeal, 
million in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million in loss of 
consortium + $ 55 million in punitive damages), and in 
which event the judgment will be affirmed in its entirety, 
as modified. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(d).) The 
McConnell, P. [*156] J., and Irion, J., concurred. 
